Sarah Dahlgren

  • ?-2008-2010-? – Federal Reserve Board 
  • She explained that most of the money drawn from the facility went to securities lending counterparties. 
  • Dixie asked how much money was drawn from the facility between September 16 and November 10 when the Maiden Lane transactions were announced.
    • Ms. Dahlgren said “north of $60 billion, but I’d have to verify that.” (p2)

2010 0430 – FCIC memo of staff interview with Sarah Dahlgren, New York Fed – 5p

  • 2009 – FCIC – emails – FRBY-TOWNS-R3-002225 – big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Dahlgren.pdf – 15p
    • (p2-3) – (2009 0303) – Sarah Dahlgren – [Federal Reserve Board]
    • — why segregate the specific counterparties on these transactions from the range of others who have “benefitted” from the government assistance to AIG (which would include not just financial counterparties, but also a range of other debtors to AIG. as well as policy holders, etc … )
    • (p3) – (2009 0303) – Sarah Dahlgren – [Federal Reserve Board] — separately, if the public wants to know where the funds have been used, AIG gave details of the uses of the government funds in its 10K that was issued on Monday — it’s on page 45 of the 10K ….. (and the *$20 billion to insurance companies shouldn’t go unnoticed …… )
  • For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 – AIG 10k – 344p
  • (p45) – Borrowings outstanding and remaining available amount that can be borrowed under the Fed Facility were as follows:
  • Inception through December 31, 2008  // Inception through February 18, 2009 (c) (In millions)
  • Borrowings:
    • Loans to AIGFP for collateral postings, GIA and other debt maturities ……… $ 46,997 //  $ 47,547
    • *Capital contributions to insurance companies (a) ……….. 20,850 // 20,850
    • Repayment of obligations to securities lending program . …. 3,160 // 3,160
    • Repayment of intercompany loans ………………… 1,528 // 1,528
    • Contributions to AIGCFG subsidiaries ……………… 1,672 // 1,686
    • Debt repayments ……………………………. 2,109 // 2,319
    • Funding of equity interest in ML III……………….. 5,000 // 5,000
    • Repayment from the proceeds of the issuance of Series D  Preferred Stock and common stock warrant ………..(40,000)  // (40,000)
    • Other(a)(b) ……………………………….. (4,516) // (6,890)
  • (a) Includes securities lending activities.
  • (p42) – Sarah Dahlgren (FRB) – No amount of liquidity can save an insurance company whose customers are fleeing.
  • (p61) – AIG found itself unable to obtain short-term or long-term financing in the public debt markets.
    • This, coupled with its inability to roll over commercial paper coming due, posed the most significant immediate threat to the company‟s solvency.201
    • 201 AIG Form 10-K for FY08, supra note 47, at 201.

2010 0526 – COP – Hearing – TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG, Congressional Oversight Panel, Elizabeth Warren  —  [BonkNote]

  • 2009 – FCIC – emails – FRBY-TOWNS-R3-002225 – big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Dahlgren.pdf – 15p
    • (p2-3) (2009 0303) – Dahlgren — why segregate the specific counterparties on these transactions from the range of others who have “benefitted” from the government assistance to AIG (which would include not just financial counterparties, but also a range of other debtors to AIG. as well as policy holders, etc … )
    • (p3)  (2009 0303) – Dahlgren –separately, if the public wants to know where the funds have been used, AIG gave details of the uses of the government funds in its 10K that was issued on Monday — it’s on page 45 of the 10K ….. (and the $20 billion to insurance companies shouldn’t go unnoticed …… )

2000s

2010s

  • 2010 0430 – FCIC – FCIC memo of staff interview with Sarah Dahlgren, New York Fed – 5p
  • 2010 0526 – COP – Thomas C Baxter, Jr and Sarah J Dahlgren: The FRBNY’s involvement with the AIG – 6p
  • 2010 0526 – COP – Hearing – Congressional Oversight Panel Hearing on TARP and Other Assistance to AIG Testimony of Sarah Dahlgren – 46p
    • (p42) – Sarah Dahlgren (FRB) – No amount of liquidity can save an insurance company whose customers are fleeing.

2020s

  • 2021 04 – Yale – Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren – Journal of Financial Crises – 1p / 3p / 13p
  • 2010 0430 – FCIC memo of staff interview with Sarah Dahlgren, New York Fed – 5p
  • (p2) – Dixie asked Ms. Dahlgren if she was involved when AIG initially said they did not need a facility and then quickly revised their estimate to $14 billion.
    • “Yes, that was me,” she said. “Early in the day, they said they’d be ok.
    • But the facility had been set up, the demand note signed, otherwise though there was no term sheet, no real lending documentation. But when they said $14 billion, we literally trucked in collateral from 70 Pine.”
    • She explained that most of the money drawn from the facility went to securities lending counterparties.
  • Communication is key: The public demands information.
  • The Federal Reserve System, including the FRBNY, long operated in relative anonymity.
  • “We weren’t used to sharing information,” Dahlgren said.
    • “We were a closed society.”
    • The mindset was, “we do monetary policy, and nobody needs to know what that is,” she said.
    • That changed with the financial crisis, when billions of dollars in public money propped up private companies.
    • She recalled, The idea of communicating to the public and with Congress wasn’t on my radar until all of a sudden, there was enormous backlash.
      • You’ve got enormous compensation issues and a whole bunch of things that we didn’t really anticipate.

2021 04 – Yale – Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren – Journal of Financial Crises – 3p