ART – Annual Renewable Term

  • 2003 – SOA – Mortality Anti-selection – Different Versions of Dukes/MacDonald, by Douglas C. Doll, pdn-2003-iss56-doll-a – Society of Actuaries – 3p
    • 1) “Mortality Expectations Under Renewable Term Insurance Products”, Proceedings of the Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Vol. XXX.
      2) “Pricing a Select and Ultimate Annual Renewable Term Product”, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, Vol. XXXII.

Jennifer L. Keller

  • kelleranderle.com/lawyers/jennifer-l-keller/
    • In 2018, Jennifer won a jury verdict for MassMutual Life Insurance Co. in a bellwether class action jury trial in Los Angeles.  The class claimed it had been unfairly deprived of dividends.  The jury found it had not, which led to the collapse of a nationwide class.  The trial was covered live on CVN, which named it one of the Top Defense Verdicts of the year, as did the Daily Journal.
    • [Bonk: “Chavez v. Mass Mutual Life Insurance”]
      • Case Number – BC435321
      • Jurisdiction: Superior Court of California, Los Angeles
  • COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
    • B289876 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2018)
    • 2018 – Opinion – casetext.com/case/chavez-v-mass-mut-life-ins-co  
    • Jennifer defended Standard & Poors in United States v. McGraw-Hill Companies, in the government’s lawsuit alleging that S&P inflated the ratings of certain mortgage-backed securities. After years of hard-fought litigation, the case settled for $1 billion – less than one-fifth of what the government had initially demanded.

Search – Google – Terms

  • “trial exhibit” “life insurance” “location”
    • 2021 Spring – ABA-Litigation – Demonstrative Evidence: Tell and Show, by Jennifer L. Keller and Chase A. Scolnick, American Bar Association, VOL. 47 NO. 3 – p43-48 – 68p
      • (p44) – Trial counsel used the following graphic in a bellwether trial challenging an insurer’s products:

      • The plaintiffs had purchased low-cost term life policies but demanded benefits provided only with more expensive insurance products. The defendant’s counsel explained to the jury that those plaintiffs shouldn’t get something for which they hadn’t paid. Because the jurors weren’t familiar with the differences among various life insurance products, counsel analogized the types of policies to automobiles.
      • The graphic likened the plaintiffs term policy to a Toyota Corolla and a more expensive whole life policy to a Mercedes Benz. The images were immediately recognizable, resonated with the jurors, and attacked the plaintiffs’ argument. Even jurors unfamiliar with life insurance policies understood the argument that it was unfair and unreasonable for those plaintiffs to expect “a Mercedes” when they paid for “a Corolla” instead.

EBSA – Employee Benefits Security Administration

  • Department of Labor
  • 2017 0706 – RFI – EBSA – Request for Information Regarding the Fiduciary Rule and Prohibited Transaction Exemptions – RIN: 1210-AB82, Document Number:2017-14101 – federalregister.gov/documents/2017/07/06/2017-14101/request-for-information-regarding-the-fiduciary-rule-and-prohibited-transaction-exemptions
  • Regulations.gov – EBSA-2017-0004 – regulations.gov/docket/EBSA-2017-0004
    • 822 Comments – regulations.gov/docket/EBSA-2017-0004/comments
      • 2017 0807 – Letter – NAIC to EBSA – Re: RIN 1210-AB82 Request for Information Regarding the Fiduciary Rule and Prohibited Transaction Exemptions – 4p
        • While the DOL has shared jurisdiction with the states with respect to insurance products sold through ERISA plans, states have regulatory responsibilities with respect to the entire market for such products, including disclosure requirements, professional standards of conduct for agents, and supervisory controls. Some sales distribution of insurance and retirement products is shared with investment advisers, securities agents and dealers, and, in fulfilling the congressional intent of Section 989j of the Dodd-Frank Act, we strive for an appropriate amount of regulatory consistency and harmony with other regulators across all uses and sales channels. Coordination and consultation with state and federal securities regulators with the DOL at this critical juncture would ensure that our approaches are as consistent and compatible as possible to provide effective, clear standards for consumer protection, while avoiding excessive compliance burdens on the industry. We also hope we can be a resource to the DOL as it evaluates the existing rule, how it fits with the existing regulation of insurance products and agent sales, and the impact of the rule on the insurance sector and retirement product purchasers.

Annuity Suitability Working Group - (A) - NAIC

  • carltonfields.com/insights/expect-focus/2018/another-bout-in-the-naic-best-interest-standard-ti
    • In response to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC) Annuity Suitability Working Group's (Suitability WG) proposed revisions to the "Suitability and Best Interest Standard of Conduct in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation" (Model), 23 comment letters were submitted by regulators, consumer groups, industry groups, and companies (the Contenders). - <WishList - 23 Comment Letters>
    • Several rounds of sparring are likely at the NAIC's Spring National Meeting in March, with the following points of contention:
  • 2018 - Request for Comments
    • 2018 0427 - Letter - ABA to NAIC - Re: Potential Revisions to the NAIC Annuity Suitability Model Regulation, IABA, NAPA - 3p
  • 2017 0731 - Letter - CFA to NAIC - Comments of NAIC Consumer Representatives and Consumer and Worker Advocates to the NAIC Annuity Suitability Working Group - Regarding "Best Interest" Amendments to the NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation - 5p

Primerica – Lawsuits

  • 2023 – LC – Primerica vs Marco Moukhaiber – Always Marco  —  [BonkNote]
  • [Primerica – The Bear Cave Report  —  [BonkNote]] 
    • 2024 0418 – Report – The Bear Cave – Problems at Primerica (PRI), by Edwin Dorsey – [link]

Primerica – Bad Press

  • 1998 05 – InsuranceObserver.com – 9p
    • The Devil Inside Sandy Weill
      • Indeed, we were unaware that Sandy Weill, Travelers’ chairman and CEO, was such a bluenosed prig, especially in light of Weill ‘s own obscene behavior: the many hundreds of millions of dollars of options he’s been granted; the eyesore five-story neon orange umbrella logo he emblazoned on the company’s New York headquarters; and his executive responsibility for the despicable sales practices of Primerica Financial Services, the sleazy life-insurance bucket shop formerly known as A. L. Williams.

Ferguson vs Crown Life and William Casteel – V7of23 – 231p

  • 1995 0824
  • PLAINTIFF’S DIRECT EVIDENCE – CONTINUED
  • STEPHAN HUBBARD (By Video Deposition – Continued)
    • Direct Examination (Contd.) by Mr. Tekell ——–1257
    • Direct Examination (Contd.) by Mr. Tekell ———-1293
  • WILLIAM E. CASTEEL
    • Direct Examination by Mr. Bostwick—————-1325
    • Direct Examination (Contd.) by Mr. Bostwick ——-1357
    • Cross-Examination by Mr. Becker ————1422
  • [(p-1325-) – WILLIAM E. CASTEEL – Direct Examination by Mr. Bostwick (Ferguson)]
  • Work History
    • 1968-1973 – MetLife
    • 1973-1979 – Lincoln National Life – I was recruited by a company called Lincoln National Life to go into their management program to teach other people how to sell, and I accepted that job.
  • 1343-1344 – [Training]
    • Q Okay. What training did Crown Life give you to sell their product, their life insurance product?
      A None.
      Q And that would have been during .the — I said 16 and I think you — it’s properly 13 years, from ’73 to ’86, they didn’t give you any training.
      A That’s right.
      Q So whatever knowledge you had of their product and how to sell and what to say about their product was what you gleaned through your own experience, number one?
      A Yes.
      Q Or number two, what you could pick up from the printed material which they provided — which Crown Life provided you.
      A Yes, sir, that’s true. But I had received training prior to that.
      Q I understand.
      A But not from Crown Life. Yes, sir.
  • 1355 – Okay. And it was Crown Life’s agent, Mr. Hicks, general agent Mr. Hicks, that made the decision, apparently on your behalf, to determine what information would ultimately be included on the proposal or illustration.
    A Apparently that’s correct.
  • 1356 – MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, I’m at a breaking point, if it’s — if the Court wishes —
  • [RECESS]
  • 1362 – Okay. Let me ask it this way: “n pay” or super vanish, by Crown Life’s definition, necessarily includes
    and must include, in terms of professional fashion, the concept of arbitrage, i.e. it must have a difference
    between the variable loan rate and the dividend scale rate in order for it to work. Did you know that?
    A Not then. I’d never heard the word arbitrage associated with life association. [Bonk: sic – Life Insurance – ?]. Stocks and bonds, but not life insurance.
  • 1365 – But back then, I thought I understood it. But since this trial, I realize I didn’t.
  • 1386 – We couldn’t even talk to the home office people.

Ferguson v. Crown Life and William Casteel – V14of23 – 244p

  • 1995 0905 – LC – Ferguson v. Crown Life and William Casteel – V14of23 – 244p  —  [BonkNote]
    • DEFENDANT BILL CASTEEL’S DIRECT EVIDENCE
    • JOSEPH FRANK ZULLO
      • Direct Examination by Mr. Deshazo—————— 2723
      • Cross-Examination by Mr. Becker——————– 2732
    • DEFENDANT CROWN LIFE’S DIRECT EVIDENCE – CONTINUED
    • MICHAEL E. MATEJA (Continued)
      • Direct Examination (Contd.) by Mr. Becker———2740
      • Cross-Examination by Mr. Bostwick—————–2790
      • Cross-Examination (Contd.) by Mr. Bostwick——–2826
      • Redirect Examination by Mr. Becker—————–2870
    • JAMES R. HICKS
      • Direct Examination by Mr. Hardesty—————-2879
      • Cross-Examination by Mr. Bostwick——————2944
  • [(p2879-) – JAMES R. HICKS (called as a witness in behalf of the Defendant Crown Life) – Direct Examination by Mr. Hardesty (Crown)]
  • Life insurance, general agent, Father worked for Crown since 1954
  • A after graduation. I mean, seriously. That’s — it just went straight into it.
  • 2884 – Q Okay. And what is – a general agency briefly?
    A General agency, I guess, would be kind of considered a a wholesaler. We marketed other insurance agents primarily. We do very little selling ourselves but we work with other agents.
  • Q And how many independent brokers do you work with?
    A Oh, I’d say somewhere between a hundred to 150 typically. apprenticeship type of system in a lot of cases.
  • Q How did communications work between the home office and agents and brokers?
  • -> really weren’t part of that pipeline.
  • 2926  – And to the point that it was — they had been paying out about, oh, anywhere from 60 to 80 percent higher, over a 20-year period, than they had projected.
  • 2926 – Okay. If Mr. Casteel told Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Love in 1987 that Crown Life had never failed to meet its dividend projections, would that have been a true statement?
    A Yes.
  • 2928 – Q Right. Could you tell a potential buyer, Look, we’re paying out more than this?
  • 2932 – Q Have you sued Crown Life?
    A No.
  • Q As a policyholder, how does litigation like this affect you?
    A Besides time, but the main thing is it affects the cost of — all this has to come out of — it doesn’t grow on trees. The money has to come out of the — the company coffers and everything, which is basically the dividends. So it affects the contracts that myself and my family
  • 2933 – (Exhibit No. 82. – Universal Life Illustration – Single Premium – Second to die 
  • 2934 – Exhibit No. 83 – Sun Life Illustration – 
  • 2936 – {Exhibit No. 84 – 
  • 2938-2939 – Q – Now, Mr. Lawyer, whom the Plaintiffs called, has said that interest rates will probably be around — between seven and eight percent in the future. Using that assumption, will the illustrations that you prepared perform as illustrated?
    A Yes. Yes, they would.
  • 2940 – Q Mr. Mateja, who was just on before you, testified that if the Fergusons don’t pay anymore premiums, that their policy will lapse in the 16th year or maybe some in the 15th year, but certainly no earlier than Year 15. Have you done a comparison to see what it would have cost the Fergusons to buy a 15-year policy in 1987?
  • 2941 – Defendant’s Exhibit 85 – A Yes. These are two illustrations with First Colony, another company that we deal with, on a 15-year level term.
  • 2943 – And what does Exhibit 85 show as a cost to the Fergusons, assuming this policy could have been bought in 1987 for a term of 15 years?
    A There’s two sheets, because this is an individual life product. So you’ve got one on Mr. Ferguson and one on Mrs. Ferguson. Both of them age 38, and it’s showing that on his 5 million, it would have been about $5420 every year, guaranteed for 15 years. It could not change. And on hers, it would be $4620 guaranteed for 15 years.
    Q What’s the total of all that?
    A For a total of about 10,000 a year. So over a 15-year period, about 150,000, a little over 150.
    Q And how much did the Fergusons pay for 15 years of coverage from Crown Life, assuming they don’t pay anymore?
    A I think it’s somewhere under $100,000, 92,000 somewhere in there.
  • 2944 – Q Is Mr. Casteel still receiving commissions on the Ferguson policy and on the other policies that are the subject of the lawsuits?
    A Yes.
  • 2944 – (Exhibit No. 255 – Big Best Book
    • A That’s a copy of a — what we call the Big Best Book of — that goes through all the different insurance companies.