AIG – FCIC

  • 2008 0916 – FCIC – FRB (Alex to Tim) – FCIC-SSI0007460 – 1p
    • Attached is a document that summarizes some of our discussion earlier.
    • The key takeaway is that AIG could be more systemic in nature than Lehman due to the retail dimension of its business.
    • Insolvency should be managed in a way that insulates the retail activity from contagion arising from the wholesale part.
    • Stating the obvious, intervention needs to insulate retail acitivities (inc. those in the parent, like stable value wraps) in a way that inspires confidence among the public to avoid a potential crisis of confidence.
    • Coordination issues among state regulators could make this difficult.
  • monolines
  • 2008 0916 – FRB – Alejandro LaTorre to Tim Geithner – 4p
    • re: Summary of an AIG Bankruptcy Impact
    • Attached is a document that summarizes some of our discussion earlier.
    • The key takeaway is that AIG could be systemic in nature than Lehman due to the retail dimension of its business.
      • Insolvency should be managed in a way that insulated the retail activity from contagion arising from the wholesale part.
    • Stating the obvious, intervention needs to insulate retail activities (inc. those in the parent, like stable value wraps) in a way that inspired confidence among the public to avoid a potential crisis of confidence. 
    • Coordination issues among state regulators could make this difficult.
  • Second, in about 2006, the people actually writing credit protection began to look at the quality of these subprime loans, and they start to stop writing.
    • They kept writing a few more new protection.
    • At the same time, though, AIG ramps up its securities lending program and starts buying tens of billions of dollars more of subprime securities on behalf of their insurance subsidiaries. (p25)

— Mr. Angelides

2011 0216 – GOV (House) – The Final Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – [PDF-147p, VIDEO-CSPAN]

  • 2008 0914 – FRB (Adam B. Ashcraft) – FCIC-AIG0021566 – 2p
    • The bottom line is that this downgrade action is about risk management and not capital, and reflects the unwillingness of AIG to sell or hedge some of its ABS COO risk, preferring to keep the upside of these exposures to to itself, and thus leave the bondholders vulnerable to a further deterioration in the housing market.
    • The threat to sell assets is a clear attempt to scare policymarkers into giving the access to the discount window, and avoid making otherwise hard but viable options: sell or hedge the COO risk (little to no impact on capital), sell subsidiaries, or raise capital.

Regulators – AIG – FCIC

  • YPFS: Since AIG is an insurance company, what was the role of the insurance regulators and their interaction with the Fed during this time?
  • Baxter: Part of the reason some people were not comfortable that the Trust owned 80% of AIG was because the investment could be subject to the jurisdiction of state insurance supervisors.
    • We worked with multiple state insurance supervisors and their national organization, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
    • From the perspective of a federal supervisor, you are working with a collection of state insurance commissioners with very different financial support and very different capabilities.
    • With that understood, the insurance commissioners have significant political power.
    • That combination is one of the complicating factors for AIG and this became an issue with respect to the Trust.
    • ……………….
    • The insurance commissioners really didn’t help the rescue of AIG, but they didn’t harm it either.

2018 1120 – Lessons Learned Oral History Project Interview: Thomas Baxter – 19p

  • AIG has put together a term sheet for NYSID , which they will be discussing this evening.
  • The term sheet would outline all pieces of liquidity plan, and plans for debt and equity injections, plans for asset sales as well as regulatory forebearance to move assets from subs to parent.
  • NYSID: Dinallo outlined the same plan that AIG gave us earlier — ie move muni’s from P&C subs to parent, and parent send equity in life insurance subs to the P&C subs in return.
  • There are a number of multi-state regulatory hurtles to this, but Dinallo thinks it is possible to do.
  • Dinallo described P&C companies in NY and PA as having very large capital cushions, and so he thinks that they can accommodate this.
  • He also noted negative consequences in insurance markets in general if AIG goes down (ie cost of insurance is likely be much higher if they file) and negative consequencies in muni bond market if GICs default so regulatory forbearance can be justified politically.
  • They are very happy to speak with our experts (Elise and team) tomorrow with more details.
  • My impression is that while they are comfortable with the capital dilution at the P&C companies, they are less knowledgable and comfortable about the equity value of the life companies, so they have work to do on that front.

2008 0913 – FCIC – FRB email (Mosser) – SB-AIG-35651 – 1p

FCIC – AIG – Annuities

  • 2008 0913 – FCIC – FRB (Brian Peters/NY/FRS) -FRBNYAIG00510 – 2p
    • They are also large issuers of annuities and have $11B of contingent exposure in their domestic retirement services business.
    • These are retail but run by large sponsors who could encourage accounts to put back the annuities in exchange for cash if they lose confidence in AIG.
    • These sponsors are U.S. banks who have exposure elsewhere.
    • This could be on top of the $18B payout above.
    • They have similar exposures in Japan but could not quantify the size.

2008 Financial Crisis – Goldman Sachs

  • 2008 0818 – FCIC – Goldman Sachs Report re: AIG – Company Update – American International Group (AIG) – Neutral – Don’t buy AIG: potential downgrades, capital raise on the horizon – 18p
  • 2009 1204 – Bloomberg – Geithner Slams Bonuses, Says Banks Would Have Failed (Update2), (Goldman Sachs), by Robert Schmidt – 2p
  • Lloyd Blankfein
  • Craig Broderick, Chief Risk Officer
  • Andy Davilman
  • David Lehman
  • “Woody” Sherwood
  • Dan Sparks
  • Fabrice Tourre
    • SEC v. Tourre, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 10-03229. ABACUS 2007-AC1, ACA Holdings, Paulson & Co
  • David Viniar
  • CDOS
  • Abacus – C.D.O
  • Davis Square Funding VI – CDO
  • Timberwolf – CDO
    • LC – Heungkuk Life Insurance Co. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc
      • Heungkuk Life Insurance Co. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 650978/2011, New York State Supreme Court, New York County (Manhattan);
      • and Heungkuk Life Insurance Co. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 11-cv-1856, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).
      • “Hungkuk Life”
  • As Mr. Viniar stated in March 2009:
    • In the middle of September, it was clear that AIG would either be supported by the government and meet its obligations by making payments or posting collateral, or it would fail.
  • In the case of the latter, we would have collected on our hedges and retained the collateral posted by AIG.
  • That is why we are able to say that whether it failed or not, AIG would have had no material direct impact on Goldman Sachs.678 (p176)

678 Goldman Sachs, Overview of Goldman Sachs’ Interaction with AIG and Goldman Sachs’ Approach to Risk Management (Mar. 20, 2009) (online at www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/on-theissues/viewpoint/archive/aig-summary.html).  – [not a working link]

Gary Gorton

  • Economist
  • Yale
  • AIGFP
  • 2009 – AP – Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, Gary Gorton – 65p
  • 2010 0227 – FCIC – Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC
    • Session 9: Shadow Banking – Gary Gorton, Professor of Finance, School of Management, Yale University

    • February262010Session9.mp4

  • 2010 0511- FCIC – Gary Gorton Interview – 173p
  • 2015 – Book Review – Stress for Success: A Review of Timothy Geithner’s Financial Crisis Memoir Gary Gorton, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, VOL. 53, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2015, (pp. 975-95) –
  • AP – The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort
    • https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.27.4.45
  • The Panic of 2007, Gary Gorton – 132p
  • 2018 0511 – WSJ – Yale Professor Who Had Controversial Role in the Crisis Now Teaches About It After his work on AIG’s risk models came to light, Gary Gorton received death threats – [link]
  • FCIC – Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
  • 2011 0104 – D Heyl Letter re Use of Gorton Quotes – 2p
  • 2010 0511- FCIC – Gary Gorton Interview – 173p
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 1)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 2)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 3)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 4)_1.wma
  •  (p33) – Gary GORTON: No. I mean, I basically, you know, from roughly 2002 or 2003 to the end, I didn’t really work on this anymore. 
  • MR. GORTON:  And there — there are descriptions of, you know, what the model does, basically. And I didn’t write all of them. Sometimes there was somebody I was working with who wrote part of  it.
  • MS. HEYL: So as far the CDO modeling, when would you have written a memo about that?
  • (p53) – MR. GORTON: I don’t think — I’m not sure I ever wrote a memo about CDO modeling.  
  • Dixie NOONAN: So, let’s step back a little bit. If you  developed the model for CDOs around 2002, 2003, ….What was your involvement after building the model when the deals came in?
  • (p58-59) – MR. GORTON: I typically wasn’t really involved.
    • And there would be all this discussion about it, and there’d be this intense focus on transactions that looked like there’d been a little deterioration, and, so I would go to that.
    • But, you know, by this time, you know, Adam Frost — Al Frost and Adam Budnick — Adam Budnick had been hired at some point — and they worked on this. 
    • They — you know, I didn’t really — they didn’t need me.
    • So I didn’t have any input on it.  
  • Mr. Gorton: I mean, the company had a loss in Maiden Lane III, I’m told, because of the way the accounting worked, how they priced it or something.
    • I don’t really know the details. But a few months ago is the last time I asked.
    • And I said, “Do any of our positions have any realized losses?” And the answer was no.
    • So, you know, and I was curious about that, because, you know, the model had been predicated upon: Could you survive exactly what’s happened?
      • And at least so far, the answer appears to be yes. I mean, there’s no — no dollar has been paid out to a counterparty under one of these swaps.
  • MS. NOONAN: Not under the actual terms of the swap as opposed to the collateral —
  • MR. GORTON: Yes, the collateral was something —
  • MS. NOONAN: — provisions.
  • MR. GORTON: — completely separate (p62-63)

2010 0511- FCIC – Gary Gorton Interview – 173p

  • 2014 – SOA – Model Validation for Insurance Enterprise Risk and Capital Models – 47p
  • (p26) – A Case Study of AIG’s Model of Credit Default Swaps
    • [AIGFP, Gorton Model,  Gary Gorton]
    • An October 31, 2008, article in the Wall Street Journal [16] included this observation:
      • AIG didn’t anticipate how market forces and contract terms not weighed by the models would turn the swaps, over the short term, into huge financial liabilities.
      • AIG didn’t assign Mr. Gorton to assess those threats, and knew that his models didn’t consider them.
    • Another observation from the same article:
      • Mr. Gorton’s models harnessed mounds of historical data to focus on the likelihood of default, and his work may indeed prove accurate on that front.
      • But as AIG was aware, his models didn’t attempt to measure the risk of future collateral calls or write-downs, which have devastated AIG’s finances.
    • These statements make it clear that any validation of AIG’s CDS model was done with reference only to potential claims, and not as a model of the full financial operation of the CDS business.
    • The CDS contracts required AIG to post collateral if the value of the insured loans fell.
    • The model did not include this collateral requirement, nor did it reflect the way that fluctuations in loan value could dramatically increase the short-term cost of meeting that requirement.
    • The model used to run the business was incomplete because it did not simulate all of the material risks of the business.
    • As a result, management did not maintain either the liquidity or the capital required to post collateral when the need arose. 

[16] Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam Pleven, and Randall Smith, Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test, Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2008. <and/or 1103 2008>  – [link]

  • Gary Gorton, a 57-year-old finance professor and jazz buff, is emerging as an unlikely central figure in the near-collapse of American International Group Inc.

AIG – FRB – Federal Reserve Board

  • 2008 0902 – FCIC – FRB (Danielle Vicente) – AIG Liquidity and Access to the PDCF – 4p
    • Liability runs: not just a banking problem
    1. AIG is an active securities lender; the firm takes a large portion of its securities and lends them to institutions and investors who pledge collateral against these securities.
      • AIG then takes the collateral and invests it in assets with longer durations in order to earn a spread.
      • This is possible because the liabilities due to the investors are normally rolled over.
      • Currently, AIG’s assets associated with securities lending are experiencing losses, and are valued at $59.5, less than the $75.1 billion in liabilities.
    2. Potential liquidity need:
      • Securities lending contracts range in maturity from one day to six months.
        • Given the current operating environment, roll over risk is substantial, and could mirror a run on deposits.
        • Therefore, AIG’s potential overnight liquidity needs for securities lending varies, but is limited to $75 billion.
  • 2008 0912 – FCIC – FRB – FRB Patricia Mosser email re AIG – 3p
    • Situation is a mess — AIG is open to having someone go over/call in tonight to start the process.
    • Any chance you could call in at about 8 pm or so tonight?
  • 2008 0912 – FCIC – FRB – AIG Meeting Notes – FCIC-AIG0021217 – 2p
    • AIG is facing serious liquidity issues that threaten its survival viability.
    • Rating triggers:
    • GICs are issued out of AlG-Financial Products (AlG-FP), insured by the holding company.
      • downgrade by 1 rating agency leads to $10B in collateral calls, plus an additional $4B-$5B in portfolio obligations that are puttable if  downgraded (total of $15B in liquidity needs)
      • downgrade by 2 rating agencies – additional $3B in liquidity needs If downgraded, they must post half of the additional collateral within 2 days, and the other half in 10 days.
    • Securities lending (mostly out of the insurance companies) – about $69B in liabilities, and the holding company has only enough cash to fund ½ of that, if the sec lending counterparties turn away from the AIG name.
    • Mobility of liquidity – most cash within the organization is ‘trapped’ in regulated entities  [Bonk: Insurance Companies] and is not freely transferable to AIG holding company or AIG Financial Products (the derivatives and trading sub) for its liquidity needs.
      • Today, the holding company started with $9B in liquidity, used $1 .4 for CP, but was able to upstream about $1.4B in ‘dividends’ from subs up to holding company, but little ability, in general, to use subs to upstream liquidity to holding co or its non-regulated subs.
  • 2008 0913 – FCIC – FRB (Brian Peters/NY/FRS) -FRBNYAIG00510 – 2p – <includes: 2008 0912 – FCIC – 2008-09-12 Alejandro LaTorre Email to Geithner et al re Update on AIG
    • Outside of the holding co., the insurance subs have about $68B in securities lending liabilities to the 12 largest firms.
    • Program is managed by the holding company (AIG Financial Products).
  • 2008 0916 (3:30pm) – FCIC – AIG / FRB ? – Email from Larry Nath Regarding Speaking To The Fed Possible AIG Bankruptcy – 1p
    • Bob and I spoke with Geitner.
    • Will will hear within the hour.
    • The Secretary and Geitner will call us.
    • We continue to plan for possible filing for Bankruptcy.
    • We have told this to the Fed.
  • 2008 0916 – FCIC – FRB – Summary of AIG Bankruptcy Impact – FCIC-SSI0007460 – 1p
    • Tim, Attached is a document that summarizes some of our discussion earlier.
    • The key takeaway is that AIG could be more systemic in nature than Lehman due to the retail dimension of its business.
    • Insolvency should be managed in a way that insulates the retail activity from contagion arising from the wholesale part.
    • Stating the obvious, intervention needs to insulate retail acitivities (inc. those in the parent, like stable value wraps) in a way that inspires confidence among the public to avoid a potential crisis of confidence.
    • Coordination issues among state regulators could make this difficult.
    • The counterparty exposure figures you asked for will be sent by Supervision under a seperate cover.
    • Regards, Alex
  • 2008 0916 – FCIC – FRB – Systemic Impact of AIG Bankruptcy attachment to FRBNY –  internal email from Alejandro LaTorre to Geithner – FCIC-SSI0007443 – 3p
    • Filing at holding co. level may, however, cause liquidity stresses at the insurance subsidiary level because of exposures to affiliates, and! or runs because of name aversion (risk of run mainly at the life insurance subsidiaries).
    • I Key Differences between Impact of AIG and Lehman Failure
    • II. How the Bankruptcy Process Might Unfold
    • III. Impact on Financial Counterparties (see details from Bank Supervision)
    • IV. Impact on Market Liquidity and Related Spillover Effects

FCIC – WishList

  • 2010 0810 – FCIC – Hearing – Letter – To Tim Geithner from FCIC – Thank you for testifying on May 6, 2010 in front of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and agreeing to provide additional assistance. Toward that end, please provide written responses to the following additional questions and any additional information by August 24, 2010.1 – 10p
    • Geithner’s Response – <WishList>
  • Key Quotes
  • Background Binder
  • Daniel Schwarcz
    • Schwarcz ProtFinMkts MinnLRev 2008_1.pdf
    • Email – Systemic Risk Article – Professor Schwarcz_1.htm
    • Schwarcz – Governments and International Organizations Worry About Systemic Risk – Mar 2008_1.pdf
    • 377,478 Schwarcz – Systemic Risk – Mar 2008_1.pdf
  • NY State Insurance Dept – 8 results
    • 37,279 2010-05-05 Doc Demand to NY State Insurance_1.docx
    • 61,103 NY State Insurance Dept – 2008 History of Regulation of CDS_1.pdf
  • OTS
    • Cease and Desist Orders from the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
  • 15,452 FCIC Staff Guide to the Research Library_1.docx
  • 8,849 Email – William Cohan on why Bear should have been left to tank_1.htm
  • Weil, Gotshal & Manges
  • Angelides
  • John Holdsworth, AIG – General Re’s Dublin-based subsidiary Cologne Re
  • Dinallo – 40 results
    • 98,816 b-i. Dinallo written tstmny for FCIC 7-1-10_1_1.doc
    • 29,943 b. Key Quotes – Eric Dinallo_1_1.pdf
    • 196,721 Notes of 9_14_08 conference call with Dinallo FCIC-AIG0021169-
      72_1_1.pdf
    • 19,280 dinallo, eric, cheat sheet_1.docx
    • 17,044 dinallo, eric, interview questions_1.docx
    • 27,904 dinallo, eric_1.docx
  • https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ypfs-audio/
  • 2010-05-13 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Mark Adelson, Standard & Poor’s_1.wma
  • Martin Mayer
    • 2010-05-19 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Martin Mayer, Brookings Institution_1.wma
    • 2010-05-19 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Martin Mayer, Brookings Institution_2.wma
  • Arnold Kling – CATO
    • Found – 2010-07-28 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Arnold Kling, Cato Institute_1.wma – [AUDIO-link]
  • Jeff Madrick – The Cooper Union
    • 2010-07-28 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Jeff Madrick, The Cooper Union (Part 1)_1.wma
    • 2010-07-28 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Jeff Madrick, The Cooper Union (Part 2)_1.wma
  • 2010-07-30 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with William Cohan, Author_1.wma
  • 2010-08-04 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Author and Herv‚ Ferhani, I_1.wma
  • 2010-08-12 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Scott Patterson, Wall Street Journal_1.wma
  • 2010-08-18 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Sheila Bair, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation_1.wma
  • 2010-08-31 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with William (Bill) Sharpe, Stanford University_1.wma
  • 2010-09-09 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with David Belmont, UBS_1.wma
  • 2010-09-13 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Harry Markowitz, University of California San Diego_1.wma
  • 2010-09-13 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Nell Minow, The Corporate Library_1.wma
  • 2010-09-14 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Alex Hart and Neil Miller, Maryland Insurance Administration_1.wma
  • 2010-09-16 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Department of the Treasury_1.wma
  • 2010-09-16 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Stanley O’Neal, Merrill Lynch_2.wma
  • 2010-09-17 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Alan Blinder, Princeton University_1.wma
  • John Taylor – Stanford University
    • 2010-09-23 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with John Taylor, Stanford University (Part 1)_1.wma
    • 2010-09-23 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with John Taylor, Stanford University (Part 2)_1.wma
  • 2010-09-27 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Sihan Shu, Paulson & Co._1.wma
  • 2010-10-04 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with George Soros, Soros Fund Management, LLC_1.wma
  • 2010-10-04 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Sandy Weill, Citigroup_1.wma
  • 2010-10-06 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Paul Krugman, Princeton University_1.wma
  • 2010-10-06 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Susan Wachter, University of Pennsylvania_2.wma
  • 2010-10-07 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with John Snow, Department of the Treasury_1.wma
  • 2010-10-08 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Stanley Sporkin, United States District Court for the District of Columbia_1.wma
  • 2010-10-12 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Alyssa Katz, Author_1.wma
  • 2010-10-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Prentiss Cox, Minnesota, Office of the State Attorney General_1.wma
  • 2010-10-19 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Ralph Cioffi, Bear Stearns Asset Management_1.wma
  • 2010-10-20 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase_1.wma
  • 2010-10-20 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Judge Michael Mukasey, United States Attorney General_1.wma
  • 2010-10-20 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with William Bojan, Integrated Government Solutions_1.wma
  • 2010-10-27 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Greg Mankiw, Harvard University_1.wma
  •  2010-10-27 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Greg Mankiw, Harvard University_2.wma
  • 2010-10-28 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Adam Levitin, Georgetown University_1.wma
  •  2010-10-28 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gillian Tett, Financial Times_1.wma
  • 2010-10-29 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Bill Gross, PIMCO_1.wma
  • 2010-11-01 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General_1.wma
  • 2010-11-02 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with John Mack, Morgan Stanley_1.wma
  • 2010-11-02 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Katherine Porter, University of Iowa_1.wma
  • FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Ed Lazear,
    Council of Economic Advisors_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Board_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Nouriel Roubini, New York University_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Robert Diamond, Barclays_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Board_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Nouriel Roubini, New York University_1.wma
  • 2010-11-15 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Robert Diamond, Barclays_1.wma
  • 2010-11-22 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Raghuram Rajan, University of Chicago_1.wma
  • 2010-11-29 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Roger
    Lowenstein, Author_1.wma
  • 2010-12-06 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Steve Jackson, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency_1.wma
  • 2010-12-14 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Robert Mueller, Federal Bureau of Investigation_1.wma
  • 2010-12-17 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Andrew Cuomo, Department of Housing and Urban Development_1.wma
  • 2010-05-25 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Ed Parker, Ameriquest_1.wma
  • 249,845 Congressional Research Service – Systemic Risk and the Federal Reserve – 28 Oct 2009_1.pdf
  • 529,764 Stiglitz et al, Procyclical role of rating agencies_1.pdf
  • 992,642 McCoy Pavlov Wachter – Systemic Risk Through Secutitization The Result of Deregulation – May 2009_1.pdf
  • 372,794 Schwarcz – Governments and International Organizations Worry About Systemic Risk – Mar 2008_1.pdf
  • 377,478 Schwarcz – Systemic Risk – Mar 2008_1
  • FCIC Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, May 5-6, 2010, Commission Documents, Day 1
  • 22,659 2008-10-23 PBS – Greenspan Admits Flaw_1.pdf
  • 156,850 Vulnerability of Austrian, German, Italian bking systems to crisis in E. Europe_1.pdf
  • 53,760 ComplaintsTrackingSystem._1.doc
  • 40,960 DATA!!!!!!!!_1.msg
  • 68,096 FW- Blog List_1.msg
  • 44,544 Fw- Certainly worth looking into-similar to the Goldman scam_1.msg
  • 53,760 FW- SEC Charges State Street for Misleading Investors About Subprime Mortgage Investments_1.msg
  • 2,833,408 Fw- Short Paper on Basel I and II_1.msg
  • 398,848 Fw- Special Report on AIG Cover-Up_1.msg
  • 3,039,744 FW- Triggers memo with exhibits_1.msg
  • 21,696 Fw- US Burry Story Betting against Subprime 10_1.msg

Reasonable to Get

  • 219,817 Eric Sirri Testimony.pdf

 

  • 15,901,139 henrey paulson july15th 2008 capital markets and gses_1.wma
  • 18,046,523 henry paulson introduction to gse reform july 15th 2008_1.wma
  • patricia connecticut law school_1.wma
  • 40,221 10-05-26_Interrogatories_OTS_Derivatives.docx
  • 4,988,972 11.14.00 1.31.16 pm holdsworth.wav
  • 1,347,554 2010-04-07 HEARING 2 & 3 TRANSCRIPT [DAY ONE].pdf
  • 259,351 Christopher Cox Testimony (DO NOT USE).pdf
  • 19,626 NYFRB AIG Emails Index–Easterly and Crego additions.xlsx

Don’t know who these people are, but looked interesting for some reason

  • 40,794,064 2010-08-02 Audio Interview of P McKenna.wma
  • 11,078,948 2010-11-09 Interview of David Smith.wma
  • 20,205 NYFRB AIG documents index_1.xlsx
  • 20,026 NYFRB AIG Emails Index (box 164)–complete_1.xlsx
  • 33,567 timeline of systemic events_1.docx
  • 493,154 FN03a_2010-05-06_Hearing_transcript_(Shadow_Banking_System)_1.pdf
  • 54,784 Testimony_Senate_Banking Housing and Urban Affairs_re Enhanching
    Investor Protection & Regulation of_1.doc
  • 50,688 Testimony_Senate_Banking_Housing_and Urban Affairs_re_Regulation
    of Systemic Risk_7-23-09_1.doc
  • 1,917,285 Sheila Bair Briefing Binder_1.pdf
  • 999,467 b. Systemic Risk Through Securitization.P. McCoy.Connecticut Law
    Review.2009-05_1_1.pdf

Unlikely to Get

  • Directory of I:FCIC_draftFCIC Staff DocumentsStaff DocsUser FoldersGNEWSOMAudio Recordings – Meetings, Forums, Hearings
  • .. 27,977,800 090916_ FCIC Closed Session Meeting.wma
  • 26,205,596 090917_FCIC Public Hearing.wma
  • 30,412,496 091020_FCIC Closed Roundtable 2.wma
  • 26,301,104 091020_FCIC Closed Roundtable I.wma
  • 23,281,232 091020_FCIC Closed Session Meeting 1.wma
  • 4,037,128 091020_FCIC Closed Session Meeting 3.wma 31,384,252 091116_FCIC
  • Closed Session Dinner.wma
  • 123,904 091117.Transcript_ Closed Session Meeting with Geithner_Nov 1

FCIC – Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Index

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FCIC – Securities Lending

  1. 2005-12-20 CRC memo re AIGGIG Global Securities Lending Cash, (AIG-FCIC00550171-00550175.pdf)- 5p 
  2. Securities Lending – Tom K’s Notes_1.docx
  3. 2010-08-31 (Miller, Stroebel) Securities Lending_1.docx
  4. Wholesale Funding/Shadow Banking:
    • Real Estate Lending Standards
    • Repo
    • Reserve Primary Fund
    • Securities Lending