Illustrations – Problems

  • We’ve all heard a lot about the junk bond crisis.
    • Is the next crisis going to be junk illustrations?

—  Judy Faucett

1991 – SOA – Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 20p

  • The number one perceived problem is that buyers simply do not understand the nonguaranteed nature of life insurance illustrations.
    • Also, it is impossible for the average buyer to judge the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the numbers in the illustration. 

—  John W. Keller, Northwestern Mutual

1991 – SOA – Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 20p

  • Certainly customers are not going to be happy if they get a dividend considerably less than the dividend that has been illustrated.
    • That is a fact of life that we have to worry about and be concerned about.

—  Richard M. Stenson

1980 – SOA – Premiums and Dividends — Participating Insurance, Society of Actuaries – 26p

  • Frankly, I think that present sales practices give dividend “illustrations” too much prominence compared with actual dividend histories.

—  Kenneth R. MacGregor

1971 –  SOA – Mutual Life Insurance Companies —  Their Objectives and Operating Philosophy, Society of Actuaries – 250p

  • It is these concepts or the uses of the products and not the illustrations that are the difficulties here.

—  George Coleman, Prudential, ACLI, TRG-Technical Resource Group for the NAIC (Industry Advisory Group – Illustrations)

1994 – SOA – Problems and Solutions for Product Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • In my presentation, I will be talking about the views of the regulators in the U.S. on the illustration problem.
  • Some of the comments that we have heard from regulators about the illustration situation suggest feelings of, if not outright despair, growing frustration.
    • A couple of them spoke sadly of the futility of regulating an illustration when the real issues involve the agent or the company.
    • Larry Gorski of the Illinois department mentioned that in states that do not regulate advertising or promotional materials, misleading statements can be rampant in those materials even if the illustrations are made pure.

 —  Benjamin J. Bock, Transamerica Occidental

1992 – SOA – Life Insurance Sales Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 16p

  • Tony Higgins (N.C.) said the problem with an illustration was that there were so many variables to the illustration.
  • Commissioner Robert Wilcox (Utah) pointed out that the members of the working group were significantly more knowledgeable than the target audience of the illustration.
    • He said if it was difficult for these regulators to understand the illustrations, think how difficult it would be for a potential buyer to understand them.
  • Commissioner Wilcox responded that some standards exist but that they did not provide much comfort except to another actuary.

1994-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • Report of the Life and Health Actuarial (Technical) Task Force to the Life Insurance (A) Committee Chicago, Illinois – June 23, 1993
  • 13. Non-Guaranteed Element Annual Statement Interrogatories
    • The actuarial task force is monitoring work being done by the American Academy of Actuaries group considering this area.
    • The task force decided at its June 1993 meeting this project should be combined with Project 14 “Disclosure and Sales Illustration Practices.”
    • Accordingly, the actuarial task force recommends that this be deleted as a separate project in June 1993. This project is a priority 2 project.
  • 14. Disclosure and Sales Illustration Practices
    • The actuarial task force is monitoring work being done by the Society of Actuaries and the American Academy of Actuaries and the Actuarial Standards Board in this area and is also monitoring the work of various states covering this area.
    • Many problems with respect to illustrations exist at the present time.
    • The California Insurance Department has developed a proposed regulation which might be studied as the basis for a model regulation (Attachment One-H).
    • This project is a priority 1 project.
  • 10. Recommend deletion of Project 13 “Non-Guaranteed Element Annual Statement Interrogatories” from the actuarial task force’s agenda because any remaining work can be done under Project 14 “Disclosure and Sales Illustration Practices.”

1993-2, NAIC Proc.

  • (p2) – Judy Faucett: Also in the fall, Senator Metzenbaum sent a letter to the NAIC describing the problems that he saw with today’s illustrations based on the hearings that he held in June.
    • The main problems that he saw were that buyers had no way to really understand what was and wasn’t guaranteed in the illustration.

1993 – SOA – Sales Illustrations – We Can’t Life With Them, But We Can’t Live Without Them!, Society of Actuaries  —  [BonkNote]  —  28p

  • How did the industry, in the 1980s and 1990s, get into a situation where it was selling illustrations instead of value?

—  Roger R. Heath

1991 – SOA – Disclosure Systems: Can an Ideal Method be Found?, Society of Actuaries – 22p

  • Those illustrations were too aggressive I think.

Shane Chalke

1995 – SOA – Current Developments Surrounding Regulations and Standards of Life and Annuity Products, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • The United Kingdom and Australia have relatively competitive life insurance markets, with many similarities to the North American market.
    • As in our market, ledger illustrations have been employed for Type B comparative cost and performance evaluation.
    • Not surprisingly, these countries have also encountered problems with sales illustrations.  (p161)

1991-1992 – SOA – Final Report* of the Task Force for Research on Life Insurance Sales Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 142p

Mis-selling

  • Mis-selling and market conduct issues in the United States obviously have been important features of the U.S. markets in recent years, and again, some of that ties back to corporate governance.
    • SarbanesOxley obviously will have an impact.

—  Tom Dardis, Tillinghast‘s Dallas office who specializes in risk management

2004 – SOA – VASP – Integrated Risk Management, va04-29pd – Society of Actuaries – 22p

  • As Steve discussed, you were illustrating 9% or in the heyday 11%.
    • Granted that was just an illustration, and you may or may not have had cautionary language alerting the policyholder that this isn’t a guarantee. 
    • This is just where we are today.
    • Maybe the guarantee is something like 4%, but these people who perhaps were missold a policy by an aggressive agent thought that that 11% was going to be there forever.
    • It’s now 7%.
    • ⇒  What is it that they lost?

—  Allan Horwich, partner in a law firm located in Chicago

1999 – SOA – The Role of the Actuary in Litigation Support, Society of Actuaries – 16p

  • The easiest way for a large corporation to respond to allegations of fraud or dishonesty is to suggest that there are a few ‘bad apples’ in every organization, but that the company’s policies and practices are honest.
    • Life insurance companies, however, would have a hard time making this argument.
  • A practice, referred to in some locations as ‘misselling’ of insurance policies – “violating industry rules, guidelines and codes of ethics, if not the law” – occurs quite regularly.These practices involve “institutionally endorsed manipulation, deception and sometimes fraud” (p. 994).
  • [Bonk: 2006 – AP -The Institutionalization of Deceptive Sales in Life Insurance. Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46, Issue 6, p993-1010]

2007 01 – Criminological Highlights – p.4 – Deceptive sales practices in the life insurance business have become part of ‘normal business’: sales agents are taught by companies how to be deceptive and not get caught., Volume 8, Number 4 – 12p

  • 7.4 MISSELLING – Misselling of insurance and investment products has not been confined to unit-linked products.
    • Misselling in general falls under three categories:
      1. The sale of an inappropriate product
      2. The use of unrealistic assumptions to illustrate the benefits under the product
      3. Failure to explain the way the product works, including an explanation of policy factors that are and are not guaranteed or subject to review.

2000 – Report – Munich Re Group – Unit-linked insurance: A general report, Münchener Rück – 51p

  • 9.2.6 Operational risk
    9.2.6.1 Background and proposed approach
  • 342. This covers risks associated with the operations of the IAIG.
    • Examples of operational risk include losses due to fraud, failures in computer systems and administrative processes, legal risk (excluding strategic risk and reputation risk), mis-selling of products and external events causing damage to the IAIG’s premises,  equipment or people.  (Page 96 of 159)

2014/2015 – Report – IAIS – Risk-based Global Insurance Capital Standard – Public Consultation – 17 December 2014 – 16 February 2015 – 159p

  • 2016 – Max Planck Society – Financial Fraud: A Literature Review – 101p
  • (p63-64) – 4.3 The mis-selling of life insurance and pension schemes
    • One segment of the financial services industry that over the last few decades has been repeatedly plagued by episodes of large-scale mis-selling is the life-insurance and private pensions industry.
      • Widespread mis-selling of life insurance and pension plans resulted in major scandals and regulatory actions…
        • …in the United States in the 1980s (Fischel/Stillman 1997; Egler/Malak 1999),
        • …in the United Kingdom in the 1990s67 (Black/Nobles 1998; Ryley/Virgo 1999; Schulz 2000; Ward 2000),
        • …and in the Netherlands68 and India in the 2000s (Anagol/Cole/Sarkar 2013; Halan/Sane/Thomas 2014).
    • Although academic literature on mis-selling practices in the life insurance industry is scarce, the literature that does exist shows that the abovementioned mis-selling scandals all occurred against the backdrop of a gradual withdrawal of government support for state pension provision and a secular move away from traditional, collective “defined benefit” pensions toward personal “defined contribution” accounts, which essentially are investment products based on the investment performance of an underlying portfolio (Black/Nobles 1998; Ryley/Virgo 1999: 20; Ericson/Doyle 2006: 998; Mitchell/ Smetters 2013: 1).
    • Governments in those countries allowed, through legislation, and encouraged, through tax incentives and advertising, individuals to substitute personal pension plans provided by life insurance companies for collective occupational pension schemes (Black/Nobles 1998: 796-797).
    • The political rhetoric behind these reforms was one of bigger pension benefits, increased efficiency and flexibility of pension systems, enhanced individual control over life savings, higher returns, and decreased government pension costs (Schulz 2000: 104).
      • In reality, however, the reforms turned out to create the perfect conditions for widespread mis-selling of life insurances and pensions in all of the abovementioned countries.
  • Lincoln UK Maintains reserves established in 1997 and 1999 for mis-selling activities.  (p82)

Lincoln National Corporation – 2006 Annual Report to Shareholders – 228p

  • 2. Heard a Presentation from the Operational Risk Consortium John Simone (Operational Risk Consortium-ORIC)
    • The definition of operation risk management would include any issues regarding people or governance as it pertains to oversight, technology, infrastructure, business continuity management, outsourcing, mis-selling, data protection, or transaction processing and products.
      • He explained that this is a broad definition, which makes it difficult to quantify because of the vast amount of variables involved, and is people-driven with a large amount of technology included, which makes it difficult to measure.
    • Operational risk also includes legal risks.  (10-596)

2012-3, NAIC Proceedings 

  • The life insurance disclosure movement has focused almost entirely on point-of-sale disclosure, to the virtual exclusion of post-sale disclosure.
    • Life insurance companies are therefore under pressure to provide attractive point-of-sale information.
  • Some of the methods used to achieve this objective adversely affect long-time policyholders.
  • Emphasis should be placed on the need for post-sale disclosure. and policyholders should be educated on how to perform their own evaluations.
  • Publicity should be given to companies whose actions improve the position of long-time  policyholders and to companies whose actions adversely affect long-time policyholders.

1981 – AP – 140 Million Forgotten Consumers-The Life Insurance Policyholders of America, by Joseph M. Belth, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 1-12 – 12p – JSTOR

  • 7.4 MISSELLING – Misselling of insurance and investment products has not been confined to unit-linked products.
    • Misselling in general falls under three categories:
      1. The sale of an inappropriate product
      2. The use of unrealistic assumptions to illustrate the benefits under the product
      3. Failure to explain the way the product works, including an explanation of policy factors that are and are not guaranteed or subject to review.
    • In relation to unit-linked products, the potential client should be fully aware that its contract does not guarantee returns (unless otherwise stated) and that point-of-sale illustrations are used only to demonstrate how benefits would be affected under hypothetical investment scenarios.
    • However, intermediaries may be tempted to use unrealistic return assumptions for these illustrations in order to facilitate the sale, especially in a competitive environment.
  • In unregulated markets with no illustration guidelines, some purchasers may be misled into believing that the rates were guaranteed or that there were some minimum guarantees.
    • Widespread misselling of investment products can result in the local regulator imposing remedial action on the insurers (for example the pensions review in the UK) or in class action lawsuits against them (for example the “vanishing premium” class action in the USA).
    • The UK pensions review arose from sales of inappropriate products.
    • The “vanishing premium” class action arose from sales of universal-life policies where the high interest rates of the early 1980s were assumed to continue far into the future.
      • As interest rates actually fell, clients were notified that they would have to pay premiums for a longer period of time than illustrated in order to maintain their benefits or achieve their cash-surrender value objectives.
      • In the end, the insurance companies paid heavy fines and illustration guidelines were created.

2000 – Report – Munich Re Group – Unit-Linked Insurance: A General Report, Münchener Rück – 51p

Q: What's the Problem That We Are Trying To Solve?

1995 - SOA - Current Developments Surrounding Regulations and Standards of Life and Annuity Products, Society of Actuaries - 18p

⇒ *Robert E. Wilcox, Utah Insurance Commissioner and Chairman of the Life Disclosure Working Group (NAIC)

  • I think the problem you identify is the vagueness in the standard and the lack of any connection to an actual problem.  (p26)

--  Professor Jonathan Macey, the Sam Harris professor of corporate law, corporate finance and securities law at Yale University

2015 1119 – GOV (House) – Oversight of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Due Process And Transparency in Non-Bank SIFI Designations, Sean Duffy (R-WI) - [PDF-179pVIDEO-YouTube-01:42:09]

  • Kanjorski - What is the plan, and what is the problem? - <Paraphrasing a Staffer) - (p14)

2009 0210 - GOV (House) - Extraordinary Efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank to Provide Liquidity in Current Financial Crisis - [PDF-123p

  • Observation #1: We should be clear on the problem we are trying to solve. - Which raises the question:
    • What is that missing piece?
    • What is the problem we are trying to solve?
    • We must know the problem if we are to assess whether the solution works or whether, as is also possible, it only makes the situation worse.

2011 0328 - Comments to the NAIC Solvency Modernization Initiative (SMI) Task Force, Therese M. Vaughan, CEO, NAIC - 11p

It is hard to fix a system that has not been analyzed.  (p14)

-- J. Robert Hunter

2003 0506 - GOV (House) - Increasing the Effectiveness of State Consumer Protection - [PDF-123p

  • Tom Leonardi (CT - Insurance Commissioner):  So I think what we need to do is step back and say again, what is the problem we are trying to solve with this very complex structure?  (p26)

2014 0204 - GOV (House) - The Federal Insurance Office's Report on Modernizing -  [PDF-277pVIDEO-YouTube]

  • Robert Ehren (Securian Financial Group)...  noted that Securian has adopted the ACLI proposal for its illustrations.
    • He said the proposal addresses 90% of the IUL illustration problems the industry has identified.

2014 - NAIC Proceedings - Fall 2014, 6-62 

  • Brad Barks (Life USA) commented that there were many good building blocks on the models, but there had not been good objectives identified.

1994-1. NAIC Proceedings, (353)

  • Mr. Myers reemphasized that without the benefit of the originally anticipated study to determine the problem, a regulation would be produced before the problem is clearly defined.

1991-1A, NAIC Proceedings - Life Marketing Practices to Senior Citizens Working Group (601)

  • Now, each one of those people is solving a different problem.
  • One of the suggestions that I have for you, when you go into situations like that, is to ask a very simple question:
    • "What problem are we trying to solve?"
    • You'll be surprised at the answers you'll get.

--  Steven Weber

2003 - SOA - The Discipline of Getting Things Done, rsa03v29n3119ts - Society of Actuaries - 19p

  • (p33) And, Mr. Chairman, as they say in baseball-and I understand you have an interest in baseball these days-you cannot tell the players without a scorecard?
    • Well, it is far too easy for consumers these days to lose track of balls and strikes on how their insurance product works for them, and that is leading to the type of problems we have heard about this morning.

--  NAIC - Statement of David J. Lyons, Commissioner, Iowa Insurance Department, And Chairman, Disclosure Task Force, National Association of Insurance Commissioners

1993 0525 - GOV (Senate) - When Will Policyholders Be Given The Truth About Life Insurance?, Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)  ---  [BonkNote]

  • Bruce Ferguson (ACLI) said more than 40 states have adopted Model #582.
    • He noted that, in its comment letter, the ACLI suggests enhancing simplicity and transparency of the narrative summary in Model #582 to reflect the significant changes in the marketplace since Model #582 was adopted 20 years ago, including the demographics of consumers who buy life insurance, the product designs developed to meet the changing needs of consumers and the technology consumers use to obtain information about life insurance products.

2015-3, Proceedings

3. (LIAC) Appointed a New Working Group to Address Life Insurance Policy Illustration Issues

  • Mr. Lovendusky said the ACLI work group discussed whether the charge should include revising the Buyer's Guide, which was a suggested addition to the charge from the American Academy of Actuaries (Academy).
  • While the ACLI work group did not oppose including the Buyer's Guide, some on the work group thought that revisions to the Buyer's Guide might work instead of revisions to the models.
  • However, Ms. Cude pointed out that the Buyer's Guide has a different purpose from the policy summary and that revisions to one would not take care of the other because the Buyer's Guide is designed to be educational, while the policy summary is informational and explains a particular policy.

2016 0403, NAIC Proceedings, LIIIWG CC

  • 2016 0403, LIIIWG CC, NAIC Proceedings (6-8)
    • Mr. Schwartzer reminded the Working Group that the Life Insurance Illustration Issues (A) Working Group came out of concerns raised when the Indexed Universal Life (IUL) Illustrations (A) Subgroup under the Life Actuarial (A) Task Force was working on guidance for IUL policy Illustrations that would result in consumers being better able to understand the product performance and interest variability of IUL products. (IULISG - Indexed Universal Life Illustrations Subgroup - NAIC)
      • During the IUL Illustrations (A) Subgroup's discussions, interested parties expressed a need to take a broader look at how all products are explained to consumers

2016/10/20 - LIIIWG CC, 2016-3 NAIC Proceedings

a. Purpose of Policy Overview Document

  • Birny Birnbaum (Center for Economic Justice - CEJ) suggested that the policy overview document should be a tool to aid consumers in comparing plans across companies, but not to choose between types of plans.
  • Mr. Wicka explained that he envisions the policy overview as being a high-level document including the basic elements of the plan.
    • He said the policy overview should enhance consumer understanding, but not replace the buyer's guide or the details in the illustrations.
  • Ms. Mealer said she agrees with Mr. Wicka's description of the intended purpose of the policy overview document.
  • ....perhaps, this came out of the fact that Illustrations were not as clear.
  • Maybe there's been complaints. 
  • And the purpose of this entire committee was to provide some kind of summary to make it a little bit more clear.

--Teresa Winer (GA)

2019 0903 - LIIIWG, NAIC, <Bonk>

  • 2008 1009 - FAIR Canada - Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights - re: Product Suitability Consultation - 2p
    • We believe that the consultation would benefit from a clearer articulation of the reasons for and objectives of the consultation.
  • ICP 24 - Summary of comments received
  • There is still a lack of articulation around the nature of systemic risk in the insurance sector.
  • For any activity to be deemed potentially systemically risky there needs to be a clear transmission channel into wider financial markets, with the quantification of the nature, scale and materiality of activities/exposures in the context of the size of the market as a whole.
  • In terms of global collaboration and cross-sectoral consistency, it is not clear how this will work in practice.
  • The guidance under ICP 24.3.4 mandates supervisors to require insurers to take action necessary to mitigate any particular vulnerabilities that have the potential to affect financial stability.
  • No actual guidance is given as to how vulnerabilities could be mitigated.

  • IAIS response
  • As per the Holistic Framework for Mitigating Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector, the IAIS has developed an approach for assessing systemic risk informed by both an entity-based analysis and an activity-based analysis.
  • These are based on the Individual Monitoring data collection, Sector-Wide Monitoring data collection and their interplays.
  • The Holistic Framework describes the IAIS' view in terms of transmission channels of systemic risk.
  • The ICP 24 statement has been amended in this respect so it captures the macroprudential supervision around transmission of systemic risk as well. ICP 24.2.11 language has been amended to better reflect the cross-sectoral consistency.
  • Also, the scope of ICP 24 is broader than systemic risk assessment, focusing on all aspects of macroprudential supervision.
  • These elements will be further developed and built upon in the planned Application Paper on Macroprudential Supervision.

2019 - IAIS - Main_public_consultation_comments_received_and_resolution_to_holistic_framework_supervisory_material.pdf

Solutions

  • Illustrations
  • Annual Reports
  • Ratebook
  • Graphs
  • If there is a better way, let it be sought and may it be found —
    • and let it be to the credit of our industry that we are the ones to find it and to provide it for the consumer.

—  Wilfred A. Kraegel


1975 – SOA – Ordinary–New Products, Society of Actuaries – 18p
  • Actuaries can do lots of things.
    • We can provide the field with a clear description of the policy and how it works.

—  Bruce E. Booker (a member of the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) Task Force on Cost Disclosure and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Advisory Group on Illustrations

1993 – SOA – Sales Illustrations – We Can’t Life With Them, But We Can’t Live Without Them!, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • Solutions include:
    • new compensation structures,
    • a different delivery system (perhaps direct mail) for
      • term Insurance,
      • and fresh products such as ‘total life” (essentially term insurance with a side fund). 

1980 – SOA – States Club Examines Future of Life Insurance Delivery, by Ira L. Boyle, act-1980-vol14-iss10-boyle – Society of Actuaries – 2p

  • … the policy summary should include a statement on the point at which the policy will expire based on the policy guarantees and the anticipated premiums shown in summary.
    • …Universal Life should be treated as a life insurance plan with a nonguaranteed cost element for cost disclosure purposes.

—  1982-1, NAIC Proceedings – 1981 1215 – Letter – ACLI to NAIC – Cost Disclosure for Universal Life, by the Special Task Force of the ACLI Cost Disclosure Subcommittee to NAIC Task Force on Life Insurance Cost Disclosure – 4p

  •  If we are going to have a group of consumers of our products who are satisfied with what they get, we have to meet their expectations.
  • Obviously, there are two adjustment points whereby that can be accomplished.
    1. One is that you can change the outcome to match the expectations.
    2. The other is to change the expectation to match the outcome

Robert E. Wilcox – Chairman of the Life Disclosure Working Group (NAIC)

1994 – SOA – Problems and Solutions for Product Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • It is of great importance at the present moment that sound principles on the subject of insurance should be widely and rapidly disseminated.
    • Whether they act by producing conviction, or opposition, a step is equally gained:  nothing but indifference can prevent the public from becoming well acquainted with all that is essential for it to know on a subject, of which, though some of the details may be complicated, the first principles are singularly plain.
    • Public ignorance of the principles of insurance is the thing to which these advertisements appeal:
    • Whether they act by producing conviction, or opposition, a step is equally gained : nothing but indifference can prevent the public from becoming well acquainted with all that is essential for it to know on a subject, of which, though some of the details may be complicated, the first principles are singularly plain.

1838 – Book – An Essay on Probabilities: And  on Their Application to Life Contingencies and Insurance Offices, by Augustus De Morgan – 306p-GooglePlay

  • … could we use some of the Society of Actuaries resources to do some educational pieces, such as a videotape?
  • I’m not sure a booklet does it.
  • But a videotape that talks about the Society of Actuaries, utilizing Society of Actuaries resources.
  • We are a research body and an education body to help educate the public on why these are not guarantees, and how they should be looking at these in terms of flexibility.
  • I’m not talking about numbers now.
  • I’m talking about perceptions and concepts regarding the nonguaranteed elements of a contract.

— Barbara J. Lautenheiser

1992 – SOA – Life Insurance Sales Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 16p

  • Commissioner Wilcox also spoke favorably of a new provision in California where the illustration of non-guaranteed elements must show the lesser of the amount being currently paid, the amount the company is currently earning, or the amount the company can expect to earn.

1994-3, NAIC Proceedings

  • I’d like to stress that agents don’t pretend to know the answers.
  • It is our intent to ask for your <actuaries> help because we’re currently living with problems that lack solutions.

—  Robert Nelson, chairperson of the National Association of Life Underwriters (NALU) Task Force on Illustrations

1993 – SOA – Sales Illustrations – We Can’t Life With Them, But We Can’t Live Without Them!, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • It is probably true that most of the information needed is already in illustrations but doesn’t get to the consumer because:
    • of their limited attention span
    • or because of how the information is presented.
  • Though it is usually not stated so simply, in the area of llustrations, format not content is the key to improving disclosure.

—  Bradley E. Barks

1993 – SOA – Sales Illustrations – We Can’t Life With Them, But We Can’t Live Without Them!, Society of Actuaries – 28p

 

  • If I bought a camera down the street and when I got back to my hotel room, the shop owner called me and said, “Oh, by the way, you owe me another $100 for that camera,” I would feel exactly like many of the vanishing premium victims have felt.
    • I understand the lawsuit.
    • I think we could have avoided the problem through effective reillustration.

—  Christopher H. Hause

1995 – SOA – Current Developments Surrounding Regulations and Standards of Life and Annuity Products, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • This was an optional idea that we called “Illustrations As Road Maps.”
    • The concept is that instead of letting the actual performance of a Universal Life policy diverge over time further and further from what was originally illustrated, you could send policyholders a notice each year on the anniversary, if the results are below what was illustrated.
    • A letter would state the need to pay an additional amount to get back to what was illustrated, because interest rates are lower. This would have two advantages.
      • First, it would keep people on track with their illustrations.
      • Second, it would help people understand the workings of their universal life policy.” 

—  John Keller, Northwestern Mutual

1991 – SOA – Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 20p

Disclosure

  • The purpose of disclosure is to let the life insurance buyer know what he’s getting. 

—  Russell R. Jensen

1977 – SOA – Cost Disclosure in Individual Life Insurance – Society of Actuaries – 18p

…. I agree that failure to disclose not only misrepresents but also sows the seeds of destruction. 

—  Allen D. Booth, FSA, is a consultant in the Milwaukee office of Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby 

1982 – SOA – Universal Life Update , Society of Actuaries (rsa82v8n34) – 26p

  • I. Objectives of the New (A) Committee
  • a. Simple disclosure form for universal type life products, as well as other simplified cost disclosure methods.

1982-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • Abstract
  • In the last ten years, life insurance consumers have endured unprecedented raiding of their policy cash values by replacing agents, have suffered through insolvencies of major companies, have been promised more than could be delivered in computer illustrations and agents’ sales pitches, and still lack any tools to comparison shop for cash value life insurance policies.
  • Litigation is rampant; the lawyers have discovered new targets.
  • The image of the business appears at its lowest ebb since the Armstrong Investigation of 1905. Insurance commissioners are at work to devise remedies for some of these problems, but appear to lack power to effect meaningful reforms.
  • Life insurers retain the upper hand politically, which gets in the way of necessary reforms that put consumers first.
  • Until consumers are served, rather than manipulated, life insurers will continue to lose market share to the mutual fund business.

1995 – JIR / NAIC – Life Cost Disclosure: Prospects for True Reform, By James H. Hunt, Consumer Federation of America Insurance Group formerly National Insurance Consumer Organization, CFA / NICO – 20p

  • 1990 – SOA – Quality of Life Insurance Sales Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 16p
    • Tony Spano (ACLI):  I’m going to discuss what Norm referred to as consumer disclosure forms.
    • ⇒  Policy Information for Applicant – Universal Life Policy – NAIC  — [BonkNote]
      • 1993 – NAIC – Policy Information for Applicant – Universal Life – Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation – Appendix D – 3p
      • 1990-1A NAIC Proceedings – NAIC LIMRA – Universal Life Disclosure Form Test Market Results – 10p
  • 4. Establishing Methodology for Reviewing the Appropriate Time for Delivery of the Guide to Buying Life Insurance After Age 60
  • Superintendent Robert Willis (D.C.) stated his opinion that the sale of life insurance was a discovery process that could be harmed by disclosure of too much information too early in the process.
    • He thought there was not value in disclosure at the point of application.
  • Mary Alice Bjork (Ore.) agreed that disclosure at the point of application or even delivery was not very helpful.
    • In her experience, most purchasers bought because they had confidence in the agent selling the life insurance.  (p250)

1993-1, NAIC Proceedings

  • Commissioner Hager of the Universal & Other Plans (A) Task Force stated that there appeared to be disclosure problems with universal life plans and that the identification of these items should be placed on the Actuarial Task Force agenda.
  • Some of the items identified which should be disclosed:
    • (1) what is guaranteed versus what is not;
    • (2) adequate disclosure of the fact that a premium quoted will not support the contract for the whole life if the policy is a universal life policy;
    • (3) disclosure of the guaranteed surrender values on a flexible premium policy.”

1988-2, Universal Life Insurance Model Regulation, Proceeding Citations

  • 1977 – SOA – Cost Disclosure in Individual Life Insurance, Society of Actuaries – 18p
  • 1979 – SOA – Cost Disclosure, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • 1991 – SOA – Disclosure Systems: Can an Ideal Method be Found?, Society of Actuaries – 22p

  • 2020 – LR – The Simplicity In Modernizing Financial Disclosure, by Tyler Jacobs – 31p
  • 2020 0724 – NAIC Life Insurance Illustrations Working Group Conference Call – ACLI – Pat Reeder
    • Idea of the Informed Consumer
    • 3 Broad Recommendations:
      • #3) Have a larger discussion about the disclosure and  buying process…  backed with data driven studies to understand when consumers need what information in the buying process.
      • Consider the information available at each point in time.
  • (p280) – Richard Bryan (D-NV) – Is the concept of a disclosure offensive to you, assuming that you could get a disclosure that is not so highly technical as to be actually meaningless?
    • But I mean, is the concept of full disclosure at the point of sale, assuming that you could get something that is more understandable than the complexities might permit it to be? You can be so complex that nobody is going to read it, and those that do —
  • Tom SUTTON, ACLI / Pacific Mutual Life – My personal opinion is that I would not have any problem with a kind of disclosure that could be communicated simply, but was based on extensive analysis by someone capable of making the appropriate analysis.
    • I would not like a simplistic disclosure that could cause great dislocation because it did not recognize all of the factors in what is, in fact, a very complicated business. 

1991 0227, 0507, 0509 and 0523 – GOV (House) – Insurance Company Solvency, (CSPAN) Insurance Company Insolvencies, Cardiss Collins (D-IL)  —  [BonkNote]

  • In closing, Madam Chairwoman, I hope that the future and the legacy of the Met will be that two concepts come into the world of insurance compliance, the concept of suitability and the concept of disclosure.
    • It is shocking in the 1990’s that a person who hands a mutual fund salesman a $100 bill gets a complete disclosure of the sales charge, the commission, who the players are, what the investment objective of that fund is…
    • …and yet that same person giving $100 to an insurance agent to buy an annuity product or a whole life product learns absolutely nothing about the internal workings of that product.  (p9)

—  Thomas Tew, Lawyer – a Joint-agency investigation into certain sales practices of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

1994 0528 and 0929 – GOV (House) – Deceptive Practices in the Sale of Life Insurance, Cardiss Collins (D-IL)  —  [BonkNote]

  • It is probably true that most of the information needed is already in illustrations but doesn’t get to the consumer because of their limited attention span or because of how the information is presented.
  • Though it is usually not stated so simply, in the area of llustrations, format not content is the key to improving disclosure.

—  Bradley E. Barks

1993 – SOA – Sales Illustrations – We Can’t Life With Them, But We Can’t Live Without Them!, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • Plaintiffs wrongly accuse the court of speculating about agent disclosures.
    • What the court concluded was that the non-uniform sales process inherently defeats Plaintiffs’ class-wide omission theory. ER791 49:11-50:3.
    • The trial record supports that conclusion, and is dispositive. See Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 847-848 (2009)

http://lswclassaction.com/docs/download/SANFRAN-%238165194-v1-2016_02_08_042_Appellees_Answering_Brief.pdf – <Bad Link>

  • 1988 Letter from Ted Becker Pertaining to Disclosure Statements for Universal Life Plans – Texas State Board of Insurance

ATTACHMENT TWO-A – SAMPLE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, Specifications – For All Disclosure Statements, Draft: 12-11-88

 

1988-?, NAIC Proceedings

  • Commission Disclosure
  • Angele KHACHADOUR (attorney with the firm of Miller & Daar, Mill Valley, CA): The moment you talk about disclosing one portion of that premium, you’re going to have to start disclosing the rest of that premium and the allocation of every penny in that dollar.
    • It’s not fair to identify just the agent’s compensation, and have him confess publicly to getting 100% of the first year premium.
    • We agreed earlier that the buyer just looks at the overall price.
  • Barbara LAUTZENHEISER: The consumerists I have heard talk, seem to be more concerned about the compensation to the agent than they have been about other specific costs within the policy.

1981 – SOA – The Life Insurance Business—The View of Consumerists (rsa81v7n17), Society of Actuaries – Daphne Bartlett- Moderator – 16p

  • 1979 0710 and 1017 – GOV (Senate) – FTC Study of Life Insurance Cost Disclosure, Howard Cannon (D-NV)   —  [BonkNote]  —   [PDF-592p]
  • 1992 0623 – GOV (Senate) – Consumer Disclosure of Insurance, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)  —  [BonkNote]  —  [PDF-323p-GooglePlay – VIDEO-?], 
  • 1993 0525 – GOV (Senate) – When Will Policyholders Be Given The Truth About Life Insurance?, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)  —  [BonkNote]  —  [PDF-354p-GooglePlay,  VIDEO-?] 
  • 2001-4v1 – NAIC – Do Product Disclosures Inform and Safeguard Insurance Policyholders –  11p 
  • 2005 – JIR / NAIC – Insurance Disclosures: An Effective Mechanism to Increase Consumers’ Insurance Market Power?, by Brenda Cude – 25p
  • 2007 – JIR / NAIC – Using Research to Help Make Disclosure Statements More Effective: A Case Study in Research Design and Implementation – 11p
  • 2007 – JIR / NAIC – Consumer Disclosure as Consumer Protection, by Linda Lanam – 5p
  • Commissioner Hager of the Universal & Other Plans (A) Task Force stated that there appeared to be disclosure problems with universal life plans and that the identification of these items should be placed on the Actuarial Task Force agenda.
    • The main concern was that an unsophisticated buyer purchased a policy and did not know what the coverages, benefits and limitations were.
    • “Some of the items identified which should be disclosed:
      1. what is guaranteed versus what is not;
      2. adequate disclosure of the fact that a premium quoted will not support the contract for the whole life if the policy is a universal life policy;
      3. disclosure of the guaranteed surrender values on a flexible premium policy”

1988-2, NAIC Proceedings, p566

  • An actuary cautioned that life insurance disclosure issues have been the subject of ongoing debate since the 1970s, and addressing the problems could be an extremely challenging and time-consuming effort.
  • [Bonk: actuary = Bart Munson, William M. Mercer Inc.]

1993 Proc. IB 788-789

NAIC Model Laws, Regulations, Guidelines and Other Resources-January 2011 – LIFE INSURANCE ILLUSTRATIONS MODEL REGULATION – Proceeding Citations – All references are to the Proceedings of the NAIC

  • In the state of Maryland, a recently enacted disclosure regulation has two special features.
    • First, there must appear a statement in the disclosure form which warns that any oral statement of the agent should be considered in the purchase decision, but only if it is reduced to writing and given to the applicant.

—  Bill Snell

1979 –  SOA – Cost Disclosure, Society of Actuaries – 18p 

  • The findings and conclusions, and this Is the part that created the explosion, were that there is a shortfall of information, particularly with respect to ordinary life and that consumer experience does suggest that the consumer Is not able to adequately determine the suitability of the product, the quality of the product, or the cost of the product.
    • As a consequence, consumers are sustaining losses, and this would be a definite Indication of a market failure.
  • [Bonk: re 1978 12 – GOV (House – Report) – Life Insurance Marketing and Cost Disclosure Report Together with Dissenting Views, John Moss (D-CA)  —  [BonkNote] —   [PDF-109p] 

—  Jack E. Bobo, NALU, National Association of Life Underwriters, Executive Vice President

1979 – SOA – Cost Disclosure, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • One of the key things about interest rates that cannot be overemphasized is that there must be complete disclosure.
  • The company cannot purport to pay 14 percent interest on cash values when it pays only the guaranteed rate on the first $I,000.
  • This issue has received some exposure, but companies that pay less than the current rate on some minimum amount must disclose that fact.

—  Robert W. Buechner, President of the Legal Professional Association, Buechner, Haffer and O’Connell, Cincinnati, Ohio

1982 – SOA – Universal Life Update (rsa82v8n34), Society of Actuaries – 26p

 

1982-Hartford-Life-UL-Mitchell-Wis-Hartford_Courant_Tue__Jun_8