Q: Could Guaranty Funds Handle a Large Insurance Company?

  • (p29) – Senator Richard SHELBY. (R-AL) –  Mr. Hunter, do you agree with his statement <Michael McRaith (Illinois Insurance Commissioner / NAIC)>?
    • What is your take on it.
  • J. Robert HUNTER. I didn’t hear him answer the question.
  • Chairman DODD. He did–
  • Mr. HUNTER.  I don’t think it could handle-I don’t think the guaranty funds could handle it, no.
  • Senator SHELBY.  Couldn’t handle it–
  • Mr. HUNTER. That was your question, and I don’t think they–
  • Senator SHELBY. It would be too big for them to handle, would it not?
  • Mr. HUNTER. Of course. Yes.
  • Senator SHELBY. I thought so, too. Thank you.

2009 0317 – GOV (Senate) – Perspectives on Modernizing Insurance Regulation – [PDF-160p,

  • In the Executive Life case in Illinois, the amount levied used up our capacity for 1991 and, as it turned out, it was a good thing we did because we had to use virtually all of our capacity again in 1992 because of additional insolvencies that hit Illinois harder than most other states — Inter-American for one, AMS Life for another.
  • There was about $200 million involved in just those two cases in Illinois.

—  Robert Ewald, not a member of the Society, is Executive Director of Illinois Life and Health Guaranty in Chicago, Illinois.

1993 – SOA – Rehabilitation Fallout, Society of Actuaries – 20p

  •  

Crisis in Confidence

  • Terri Vaughan, NAIC CEO/ Iowa
    • (p25) – One of my colleagues likes to say the greatest risk we have right now is a crisis of confidence.  —  It is that people are scared.  — We know our policyholders are scared.
  • Gary Ackerman (D-NY)
    • We cannot address or we certainly cannot legislate the confidence in the market.
    • We are going to do a lot of cheerleading to do that.

2009 0305 – GOV (House) – Perspectives on Systemic Risk – [PDF-254p

  • 585 The consensus among industry analysts is that once confidence is lost in an insurance company like AIG, policyholders will pull their policies, insurance agents will dissuade clients from purchasing insurance policies from the company, and that, in effect, all the insurance companies would have become ”run-off” businesses.

—  Panel staff conversations with industry analysts.

2010 0610 – COP – Report – The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy – 337p

  • The disaster we fear is the looming crisis of confidence, of lost credibility, of spreading fear among the public and, ultimately, of a “run on the bank” as policyholders pull their money out of the insurance industry. (p160)

—   Martin D. Weiss, President, Weiss Research

[PDF-369p-GooglePlay

  • Perhaps the greatest threat to the insurance industry is one of an erosion of public confidence stemming from a perceived inability of regulators, guaranty funds, and the industry itself to fully protect policyholders…

— Daniel J. Kunesh

1991 – SOA – Solvency Issues and the Investment Actuary, rsa91v17n4b10 – Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • For life insurers, the risk of a bank-like “run” resulting from loss of consumer confidence is virtually non-existent.

2016 0831 – ACLI – Life Insurers Do Not Pose a Systemic Risk to the Nation’s Economy, By Dirk Kempthorne – (President and Chief Executive Officer of the ACLI – [link]

  • We are seeing a real crisis in confidence:
    • That, in my mind, is probably the worst thing that could happen.   
    • There is not a company in the country that can stand runs that Commissioner Weaver was talking about, where people ask for $1 billion in policy loans and surrenders in a 2-week period.  (p13)

—  William McCartney, William, Director of Insurance, State of Nebraska and Vice President, National Association of Insurance Commissioners <NAIC>

1991 0729 – GOV (House) – Regulation of Insurance Companies and the Role of The National Association of Insurance Commissioners – [PDF-286p]

Demutualization

  • 1983 12 – SOA – The Actuary – act-1983-vol17-iss10-angle – Society of Actuaries
  • 2000 – SOA – U.S. and Canadian Demutualizations-Postmortem, rsa00v26n3130pd – Society of Actuaries – 21p
  • (p54) – 1:34-1:41 – Bruce BRALEY (D-IA)Mr. Dinallo, I want to start with you.
    • Twenty-five years ago,I was a research assistant to Professor Alan Whitus, who was updating the Keeton and Whitus basic text on insurance law; and I think both Professor Whitus and Professor Keeton would be rolling over in their graves seeing what has happened to the industry that they were so passionate about.
      • I think you would agree with me that industry has changed radically in the 25 years that I’ve been talking about.
  • Eric DINALLO, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department – Yes. In particular going from mutual companies to publicly traded companies.
  • Mr. BRALEY. And a lot of those demutualizations resulted in a significant financial loss to policyowners who owned the shares of those mutual companies-who owned the mutual companies and during the conversion in many cases were screwed out of their financial share of those companies.
  • Mr. DINALLO. I might not use the same verb, but I will agree.
  • Mr. BRALEY. I think you get my point.

 GOV (House-OGR) – The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout- AIG Bailout Oversight Hearing, Henry Waxman (D-CA)  —  [BonkNote]

Deposit

  • Bank-like
  • Deposit Term Policy
  • Demand Deposits
  • Savings Deposits
  • 2010 08 – AP – Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, by Viral V. Acharya – 11p
  • Demand Deposits Demand deposits are funds on deposit with banks; they are subject to immediate withdrawal and are classified as cash.
  • Savings Deposits – These are interest-earning accounts in which the depositor is required (or may at any time be required) by the bank to give notice in writing not less than 30 clays before a withdrawal is to be made.
  • Banking regulations provide that banks may waive the requirement of notice if the waiver applies to all depositors having the same provision of notice.
  • The general banking practice today is to waive this 30 day notice, with balances withdrawable at any time during banking hours.
  • Interest usually is earned from date of deposit to date of withdrawal and is credited periodically to the account.  (p22)

1988-2, NAIC Proceedings

Contagion

  • 1994 – FRB / AP – Announcements of Asset-Quality Problems and Contagion Effects in the Life Insurance Industry, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2 – 29p
    • 2014 1218 – LC – 15-cv-45 – MetLife v FSOC – re: MetLife – D85-2, 85-2 – Explanation of the Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination that Material Financial Distress at MetLife Could Pose a Threat to U.S. Financial Stability and that MetLife Should be Supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Be Subject to Prudential Standards  —   [BonkNote]   —  387p
  • And doubts about the value of AIG life insurance products could have generated doubts about similar products provided by other life insurance companies, feeding the panic that was crippling the economy.  (p78)

— Tim Geithner

2009 1210 – COP – TREASURY SECRETARY TIMOTHY GEITHNER – 98p, VIDEO-Youtube] – MP3

  • [Bonk: Contagion-?]
  • In the meantime, a movement was afoot within the life insurance industry led by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as well as the securities brokerage industry, to put together an enhanced rehabilitation plan which would raise the crediting rate on the SPDAs from 5.5% to at least 7.5%.
    • This effort was motivated not only by a desire to salvage the reputation of SPDAs as an investment vehicle, but also to make the SPDA holders whole and thus eliminate damage claims in the many suits filed against the brokers who sold SPDAs.
    • Forty of those cases had been consolidated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and came to be known as MDL 581, (The Honorable Charles Brieant presiding); In re Baldwin-United Corporation Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 739 (J.P.M.L. 1984).
    • Any commitment to such a plan, financial or otherwise, was initially contingent upon a resolution of the dispute between the rehabilitators and the Debtors.
    • If this could not be accomplished by early 1985, the possibility of an enhancement plan was threatening to evaporate.

1987 1016 – LC – Matter of Baldwin-United Corp, (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1987) – United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio, W.D.  Oct 16, 1987 – casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c194add7b049347ba6af

⇒  CITATION CODES – 79 B.R.321, DOCKET NO. – Bankruptcy No. 1-83-02495.

  • (p93) – [Contagion] – MetLife’s size and market prominence increase the potential for MetLife’s material financial distress to cause or exacerbate contagion.
    • MetLife holds approximately 10 percent of the total admitted assets (on a statutory basis) in the U.S. life insurance industry422  and has a market share of life insurance products of approximately 16.6 percent.423
    • Institutional and individual contract holders and policyholders with the ability to surrender or withdraw their contracts early may seek to do so.
    • MetLife’s material financial distress could lead investors to withdraw from other insurers or other significant financial intermediaries, out of fear that those firms could also experience distress.424
    • These actions could lead to a reduction in the provision of credit and a reduction in financial markets activities by market participants seeking to reduce exposures to other financial firms, which could impair financial intermediation and financial market functioning.
    • Institutional policyholders could potentially experience greater losses because of institutional products that have redeemable, investment-like features that may increase MetLife’s near-term liabilities and do not have any additional third-party protections.
      • Notably, the avoidance of contagion effects was an important concern before the intervention that helped to prevent the potentially disorderly failure of AIG in the fall of 2008.425

2014 1218 – LC – 15-cv-45 – MetLife v FSOC – re: MetLife – D85-2, 85-2 – Explanation of the Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination that Material Financial Distress at MetLife Could Pose a Threat to U.S. Financial Stability and that MetLife Should be Supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Be Subject to Prudential Standards  —   [BonkNote]   —  387p

  • (p15) – These resources and the record of success for coordinated responses clearly demonstrate that the fear of “contagion” resulting from a run on insurer assets is greatly overstated

2015 0626 – LC – 15-cv-45 – NAIC – Document 43 – Consent Motion of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff Metlife, Inc. – 32p

  • (p24-25) – Steve STIVERS (R-OH).  I have a quick question for Mr. Monroe and Mr. Lanza.
    • In the scenario that Mr. Schwarcz gave earlier about a run on life insurance companies, wouldn’t the State regulatory scheme under McCarran-Ferguson have to essentially completely collapse and fail and the State regulators not do their jobs?
  • Michael LANZA. (Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Selective Insurance Group, Inc., on behalf of the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America (PCI)
    • I believe so.
  • Steve MONROE. (Chief Compliance Officer, U.S. & Canada, for Marsh, Inc., on behalf of the Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers)
    • I would have to agree with that.
    • I can’t imagine a scenario where it would be a contagion from life insurance company to life insurance company.

2011 1116 – GOV (House) – Insurance Oversight and Legislative Proposals, Judy Biggert (R-IL) – [PDF-131p – VIDEO-?]

Class Actions

  • The actual versus expected performance for some Universal Life policies led to class-action lawsuits that have caused a substantial amount of negative attention to be focused on cash-value life insurance in the illustration of projected values. 

—  Deanne Osgood, Milliman & Robertson

1999 – SOA – The Next Generation Universal Life, Society of Actuaries – 30p

  • 2003-1, NAIC Proceedings – 2022 1216 – Legal Times – Class Actions to Raid Insurance Coffers Recklessly Undermine Expert Decisions of State Regulators, By Lawrence H. Mirel (Larry Mirel) – District of Columbia Insurance Commissioner – Attachment Four-B – 
  • 1997 1024 – WSJ – MONY Wins Dismissal of Suit Over ‘Vanishing Premium’ Policies, by Leslie Scism – [link]
    • The company, popularly known as MONY, won a dismissal this week of a national class-action lawsuit that is similar to more than 30 suits pending against major life insurers.
    • … in the MONY case, New York state judge Beatrice Shainswit found that..
      • while thousands of consumers nationally “have been deeply aggrieved by what they perceive to be a grave injustice perpetrated upon them by the numerous insurance companies who contrived, and profited, from the “vanishing premium” concept,” this “ill-conceived product” doesn’t necessarily “equate to fraud, or any other actionable wrongdoing, which can be compensated for in a court of law.”
      • Her 29-page decision debunks key arguments in almost all of the suits. – <WishList = “29-page decision”>
        • She said insurance agents don’t have a fiduciary relationship with their clients, as plaintiffs’ lawyers contend.
        • She also maintained that sales documents stating that dividends aren’t guaranteed at high levels were sufficient warning to consumers that they couldn’t rely on other promotional literature showing rosy dividend scenarios.
    • [ACLI] – “This case, being typical of many other baseless class actions, will be cited as authority in other jurisdictions for dismissing those frivolous cases,” predicted Phillip Stano, senior counsel for the American Council of Life Insurance, a trade group in Washington. “And we congratulate MONY for standing up to those who sought to intimidate them into a frivolous settlement.”
  • 1998 – SOA – Corporate Governance of Investments: Avoiding the Next Class-Action Suit?, Society of Actuaries – 20p
  • 1998 0305 – GOV (House) – Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits, Howard Coble (R-NC) – [link]
    • Barney Frank (D-MA)
    • House – Committee on the Judiciary – Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property
  • 1999 0914 – GOV (House-Report) – Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999  —  [BonkNote]  —  47p
    • The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 1875) to amend title 28, United States Code, to allow the application of the principles of Federal diversity jurisdiction to interstate class actions, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
    •  
  • 2018  08 – DRI For the Defense – As Universal Life Insurance Premiums Increase, So Does Class Action Litigation”, p12-19 – [92p]
  • (p37) – AARP – Cristina Martin Firvida, Director, Financial Security and Consumer Affairs – There are two additional things that I would just like to add briefly, because we have talked a lot about the litigation risk in this rule. And I would like to make sure that we say today, reminding everyone that the litigation that is permitted in the rule is class-action litigation. And there are two things about that we need to remember.
    • ⇒  First, there has to be a systemic problem before a class-action cause of action can be brought, and I think that we can all agree that if there is a systemic issue in advice that is being provided, we would want to address that. So this is not about individual rights of action. This is about a systemic problem that affects a class.
    • And second, it is extremely difficult to certify a class, extremely difficult and more so in recent years after certain Supreme Court cases have been decided. So I really just wanted to make sure that we were all clear on what is the scope of the litigation risk.

2017 0713 – GOV (House) – Impact of the DOL Fiduciary Rule on the Capital Markets, Bill Huizenga (R-MI)  —  [BonkNote]

  • 2005 0209 – GOV (Senate) – Senate Session
    • Class Actions, KB Toys (Deceptive Pricing Practices – 05:28:00 – Hatch), Coca Cola (Apple Juice – 05:29:00 – Hatch)
    • 2005 0209 – Congressional Record – [PDF-70p]
    • 05:17:00 (pS1178) – Orrin Hatch (R-UT) – Abuse of the class action system has even become the inspiration for popular literature.
      • In 2003, the author, John Grisham, released a book entitled ”The King of Torts.” Grisham’s novel takes its reader into the world of the mass tort/class action lawyer where clients are treated like chattel and bargaining chips.
      • The value of a potential action is not measured by the merit of the claim but on the number of class members that can be rounded up.
      • The end game is not the pursuit of justice for the class members and clients, but in the pursuit of a hefty attorney’s fee.
      • Although Grisham’s book is intended as fiction, it is hard to distinguish it from the facts of our broken class action system. Let me read a few passages: 
      • 05:46:00 – Settlements, Verdict Money – Big, even if unjust, This doesn’t take away consumer rights, important cases should be in important courts. Less Jackpot Justice, Forum Shopping. Madison County Illinois, It’s a disgrace what has gone on. Disgrace in the Law in this country.
    • 04:55:00 – pS1176 – Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) – I have been in the Senate for 31years. I came at a time when there was a real effort for Republicans and Democrats to work together, and for White Houses to do so.
      • 05:00:00 – Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) – Attack on Senator Reid.  We should be working together.
      • 05:04:00 – Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) – They might stir up some of the true believers this way. They do nothing for the country. They do nothing for the Nation. All they do is deepen the divides instead of healing them. It would be nice if we could have leaders.
        • class actions – 
  • Commissioner Mirel distributed a proposed outline for a white paper on class action lawsuits (Attachment Three A).
    • He announced that the outline was a draft and he welcomed input from everyone on it.
    • He observed that the civil justice system is very different from the regulatory system in that the courts are asked to decide justice between or among the parties while the regulatory system is asked to determine the best public policy for all citizens.
    • The two systems can become conflicted when the civil justice system goes beyond its usual realm and renders judgments that have profound impact on persons not represented in the courtroom, and on the public in general.
    • Insurance regulators and the courts both rely on state laws to guide their efforts.
      • Often, however, there is little awareness by courts and trial lawyers of the regulatory system and its purpose.
      • This is of concern to regulators and legislators as they try to draft laws that are clear and convey the public policy decisions that they wish to make. (p336)

2003-2, NAIC Proceedings – Class Action Insurance Litigation (C) Working Group, Property and Casualty Insurance Committee

  • Equitable Life Insurance was accused of misleading and cheating customers.
  • This was a situation of the so-called vanishing premium cases in the 1980s.
    • They sold policies when interest rates were high.
    • They told customers as soon as the interest rates went down their premiums would be lower.
      • That was not true.
    • Class action lawsuits were filed in Pennsylvania and Arizona state courts, and Equitable settled the suits for $20 million helping over 130,000 people.
    • However, because the insurance company was based in another state, under this legislation, the case would have been removed to federal court and these people harmed between 1984-1996 would still be waiting for justice.  (S1150)

—  Harry Reid (D-NV) 

  • 2005 0209 – GOV (Senate) – Senate Session
    • Class Actions, KB Toys (Deceptive Pricing Practices – 05:28:00 – Hatch), Coca Cola (Apple Juice – 05:29:00)
    • 2005 0209 – Congressional Record – [PDF-70p]
    • [VIDEO-CSPAN]
  • Plaintiffs wrongly accuse the court of speculating about agent disclosures.
    • What the court concluded was that the non-uniform sales process inherently defeats Plaintiffs’ class-wide omission theory. ER791 49:11-50:3.
    • The trial record supports that conclusion, and is dispositive. See Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 847-848 (2009)

– LC – Walker et al v. Life Insurance Company of the Southwest Settlement, Case No. CV-10-9198-JVS-JDE  —  [BonkNote]

http://lswclassaction.com/docs/download/SANFRAN-%238165194-v1-2016_02_08_042_Appellees_Answering_Brief.pdf

  • 2002 0731 – GOV (Senate) – Class Action Litigation, Patrick Leahy (D-VT)  —  [BonkNote]  
    • (p55) – AEGON – Patrick Baird
      • The life insurance industry has experienced over a decade of abusive class actions.
      • In one of the more recent examples of such class action abuses.
      • State courts in New Mexico are certifying nationwide classes of plaintiffs for the manner in which their premiums are disclosed in their policies.
      • These cases are being certified even though State Commissioners of Insurance reviewed and approved these policy disclosures.
      • These class action cases have steadily weakened the very fabric of State regulation of insurance as the State judges’ decisions have had national implications for insurers in other states.
      • The result of nationwide regulation through targeted class action litigation has indirectly usurped the role and authority of the State Commissioners of Insurance.
    • Senate – Committee on the Judiciary
  • 1996 – SOA – Legal Issues Affecting Nontraditional Products, Society of Actuaries – 14p
    • Metlife – Florida – Nurses
    • Prudential – Multi-State Task Force
    • Media
  • p11 – Philip A. Loomis, SEC Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission – …and the Superintendent of Insurance case, has considerably expanded the scope of private litigation for violations of the securities laws, as compared with what existed before.
    • And this, of course, has encouraged private plaintiffs to bring actions.
    • Class actions have also become more common than they used to be.
    • And class actions are frequently used in securities cases where you will have a person who has defrauded each of 10,000 people out of a $100, and no one of them can effectively sue, but if you have got a class action for all 10,000, it is an action worth bringing and may be brought. 

1975 – GOV (Senate) – The Bankruptcy Reform Act, Quentin N. Burdick (D-ND)

⇒  Part 2 – APRIL 29, 30; JUNE 4; JULY 31; SEPTEMBER 24, 25; OCTOBER 1 , 8, 30; NOVEMBER 5, 6, 11, 12, AND 18 –  [PDF-717p-GooglePlay]

  • Civil Rule 23 – Working Papers of the Advisory Committee – on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to Civil Rule 23 – Volume Two, Compiled by the Rules Committee Support Office, Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director Administrative Office of the United States Courts
  • It has an impact on other insurance companies, too.
    • A few years ago, I found I had been made a plaintiff in a case brought in Santa Fe, New Mexico, against Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.
  • What was it alleged Massachusetts Mutual had done wrong?
    • Well, when you get your premium, your bill, from Massachusetts Mutual, you can pay it on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis.
      • If you pay it on a monthly basis, you pay a little more than on a quarterly basis, and that is a little bit more than on an annual basis.
      • Why? Because if you pay on an annual basis, it costs them a lot less money to send out one bill than to send out 12 bills a year, and they have the opportunity to get that money sooner invested.
      • So it is a little less expensive to them, and they pass that savings along to the consumer.
    • The plaintiff in this case and their attorney said they should have to spell out exactly what the difference in savings is rather than simply look at the bill and see that these payments are 12 times what there is and that that is a little more.
      • They said they had to make a disclosure under laws that are not even supposed to apply to insurance companies.
    • Well, they went ahead and settled that case.
      • Why? I asked them.
        • They said because they did not want to get in the same situation that State Farm Insurance Company found itself in with a $1.3 million lawsuit.
    • What was the agreed-upon settlement they sent to the judge in that Santa Fe, New Mexico, court?
      • Well, it provided for $13 million in attorneys’ fees, $5 million up front, $5 million over a period of time, and a nice $3 million universal life insurance policy for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Is that not nice?
    • Now, what did the plaintiffs get?
      • The plaintiffs, all the plaintiffs got a promise that Massachusetts Mutual would not do this again.
    • Now there is a new settlement proposed because that one actually was withdrawn when they realized how embarrassing it was for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to get $13 million in fees and the plaintiffs would simply get a promise for nothing.
  • Now they have changed it so the plaintiffs might get as much as $50 off on their policy.
  • The plaintiffs’ attorneys would still get the massive 8-digit settlement amount in the multimillions of dollars.  (p55 / H687)

—  Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)

2002 0216 – Congressional Record – 255p

  • That is wrong.
    • And it is just one more clear example of evidence why this is an extortion racket.
  • Here are some more of what we call the class action wheel of fortune.
    • If you are a company, or if you work for a company that gets caught up in the class action wheel of fortune, watch out, because it can affect your job, it can affect the success of your company and get you tied up in these multimillion dollar cases where there really is little or no damage; or, even if there is, like there was in the Thompson Electronics case, where the television sets were not working, the attorneys got $22 million and the plaintiffs got a coupon, a $50 coupon or a $25 coupon to buy more of the same thing they were not happy about in the first place. (p55 / H687)

— Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA)

2002 0216 – Congressional Record – 255p

Regulatory

  • 2022 1109 – AP – Regulatory Competition in the US Life Insurance Industry, by Johnny Tang – 88p
    • Competition between jurisdictions is a central feature of many public policy problems.
      • I examine the consequences of such competition in the US life insurance industry, where states vie to attract insurers by setting lower capital requirements, but the costs of such actions are borne by consumers in other states.
      • I document empirical evidence of competition between state regulators and its effects on the supply of life insurance.
      • I then develop a quantitative model of the insurance market to evaluate the effects of this competition.
      • I find that competition leads regulators to set lower capital requirements, which increases default risks but also increases consumer surplus by lowering prices.
      • On net, these effects decrease regulators’ utility based on regulators’ revealed- reference objective functions.

Regulatory Reform

  • Regulatory Reform Task Forces
  • 2009 – DOTT – Financial regulatory reform: a new foundation. Rebuilding financial supervision and regulation, Department of Treasury – 89p
  • Regulatory Reform
    • [VIDEO-CSPAN]
    • Senate Governmental Affairs Committee members heard testimony from witnesses concerning regulatory reform issues, including whether cost/benefit analysis and risk assessments should be conducted before new regulations are put into effect.

Financial Services

  • 1969 – SOA – Diversification of Life Companies to Financial Services, Society of Actuaries – 84p
    • a) Includes expansion within the insurance business into new lines not previously offered: for example, health, group, property and casualty, variable annuities, mass marketing, pensions.

 

  • Integrated financial Services Task Force (EX) – NAIC
  • Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Co. announced yesterday it plans to buy the Calvert Group, a Washington-based mutual fund company, for $12.5 million.
    • The acquisition, believed to be the first local combination of an insurance company and an investment company, demonstrates the blurring of traditional distinctions between financial services. Insurance companies are racing commercial banks into other investment areas.
    • The giant Prudential Insurance Co. began the trend by merging with Bache Securities about two years ago.
    • Geico Corp. has started mutual funds and also owns an industrial bank.
  • The Reagan administration has proposed allowing bank holding companies to underwrite insurance.

1983 0826 – Washington Post – Acacia Will Purchase Washington Mutual Fund, by Nancy L. Ross – [link]

  • Until fairly recently, subsidiaries were not an important aspect of the life insurance business.
    • In the 1960’s, however, there was a strong movement toward diversification via subsidiaries to enable life insurance companies to market other products and skills to meet all of an individual’s needs for financial security, and also to move into other enterprises which may be financially advantageous. (p181)
1980 0915 – Letter – ACLI to NAIC – To: Task Force on Subsidiaries and MSVR Rules of the the NAIC Valuation of Securities Subcommittee
Re:  Mandatory Securities Valuation Reserve Requirements for Controlled Subsidiaries

1981-1, NAIC Proc.

  • 1973 – SOA – Digest of Discussion at Concurrent Sessions – 1973 SOA Annual Meeting, Society of Actuaries – 130p
    • This … simply another manner of broadening the financial services of the life insurance agent. 
  • Statement on Behalf of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners – Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
    • …..on the Integration of Financial Services, By Bruce W. Foudree Insurance Commissioner of the State of Iowa and Chairman of the NAIC Integrated Financial Services Task Force – (p90-

1983-2, NAIC Proceedings