Solvency
1995 – GAO – Insurance Regulation: Observations on the Receivership of Monarch Life Insurance Company – 22p
1995 – GAO – Insurance Regulation: Observations on the Receivership of Monarch Life Insurance Company – 22p
- 1995 – GAO – Insurance Regulation: Observations on the Receivership of Monarch Life Insurance Company. (Letter Report, 03/22/95, GAO/GGD-95-95) — [BonkNote] — 22p
Municipal Bond Defaults
Municpal Bond Defaults
- Bond Insurance
- Ambac
- MBIA
- 2008 Financial Crisis
- Orange County, California
- Executive Life Insurance Company
- Mutual Benefit Life
- 1995 0726 and 0727 – GOV (House) – Debt Issuance and Investment Practices of State and Local Governments, Richard Baker (R-LA) – [PDF-1011p-GooglePlay]
- Richard C. Lehman, President, Bond Investors Association
- Chapter 33 – Municipal Bond Defaults – [Bonk: What is the Title of the Book?]
- (p150) An interesting question arising in third-party guaranteed defaults is what happens when the guarantor collapses.
- When the letter-of-credit bank or insurance company goes under, or the corporate guarantor goes bankrupt, there is no more credit enhancement or guarantee on the bond issue.
- In these instances bondholders usually lose.
- Such was the case with the $1.6 billion of munis backed by Executive Life and the $600 million of housing issues backed by Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company.
- House – Committee on Banking and Financial Services – Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
- Richard C. Lehman, President, Bond Investors Association
GSLIC – Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company
GSLIC – Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company
- 2016 – The Australian Actuarial Journal – “Someone Else’s Problem” – The Failure of the Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company, by S. Ferris – (p1-64) – 113p
- The receiver estimated that GSL’s policy liabilities amounted to $620 million – but unfortunately the company’s assets were worth only $230 million.
- The shortfall was about $390 million, ie. a deficit amounting to 63% of the liabilities.1
- At the time, this was one of the largest insolvencies in the history of the US life insurance industry.2
- nolhga.com/companies/public/main.cfm/NAICCode/84271/GAID/100
- Midland National Life Insurance Company
- myfloridacfo.com/division/receiver/companies/detail/403
- <WishList> – 1993 – GOV (Senate) – Third interim report on United States government efforts to combat fraud and abuse in the insurance industry: enhancing solvency, regulation, and disclosure requirements – a case study of Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company
- Senate – Committee on Governmental – Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
- (Y 1.1/5: 103-29) , 93-19683
- – LC – GUARANTEE SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
- 1996 – LC – In re Receivership of Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company, 678 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
- 1991 1221 – NYT – Merrill Is Sued in Florida Over Ties to Shaky Insurer, By Kurt Eichenwald – [link]
- Transmark, Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company, Coopers & Lybrand, Shereff, Friedman, Hoffman & Goodman
- The transfers allowed the company to appear solvent, when in fact it became insolvent in 1985, the state regulators assert.
- 1992 0429 and 0430 – GOV (Senate) – Efforts To Combat Fraud And Abuse In The Insurance Industry – Part V – [PDF-1419p-GooglePlay]
- 1994 – LC – Transmark, U.S.A. v. Dept. of Ins. Co. – [link-casetext.com]
- Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
- Date published: Mar 2, 1994
- 631 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
- In SEC v. Transmark USA, Inc.,27 the Commission alleged that the defendants failed to disclose the nature of certain transactions and materially misstated the financial condition of the company’s principal subsidiary, Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company (GSL). The complaint alleged four instances of related sale and repurchase transactions in high yield securities between GSL and Merrill Lynch. These transactions occurred at year-end and were intended to replace temporarily GSL’s portfolio of high yield securities with either a cash receivable or liquid Treasury securities, resulting in increased reported statutory capital and surplus. The defendants consented to the entry of injunctions.
- (p15) – The Commission alleged violations of the books and records provisions in In the Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,44 administrative proceedings against Merrill Lynch; Robert Plunkett, a trader formerly associated with Merrill Lynch; and Frederick Roemer, a Merrill Lynch corporate bond salesman. The Commission found that Merrill Lynch failed to record properly certain securities transactions in two separate matters.
- The first matter involved related sale and repurchase transactions designed to permit a customer, Guarantee Security Life Insurance Company, temporarily to replace high yield securities with a cash receivable or liquid Treasury securities at year end, thereby avoiding certain reserve requirements of Florida insurance law.
- The second matter involved a series of sale or repurchase transactions between Merrill Lynch, Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., and a third party, designed to permit Reliance to realize gains on certain securities.
- Respondents, without admitting or denying the Commission’s findings, consented to the entry of a cease and desist order by which they were censured and Merrill Lynch was required to adopt internal procedures, policies, and controls reasonably designed to assure compliance with broker-dealer recordkeeping requirements.
1994 – SEC – Annual Report – 182p
Receivership Law Working Group – (E) – NAIC
Receivership Law Working Group – (E) – NAIC
- Receivership Law Working Group – (E) – NAIC — [BonkNote]
- 2020 1023 – RLWG – Receivership Law Working Group – Conference Call / Attachments – Comments – (E) – NAIC – 61p
- p7 – On Aug. 25, 2020, the Receivership Law (E) Working Group requested comment from members, interested regulators and interested parties on qualified financial contract (QFC) guidance in the Receivers Handbook for Insurance Company Insolvencies, and the use of bridge financial institutions for handling QFCs in an advance planning or pre-receivership process. Refer to the attached Chapters 4 and 11. Please provide comments in the following areas:
- 2020-? – Letter – Joint Submission of NOLHGA And NCIGF Regarding the NAIC Model Law Working Group’s Survey of States’ Receivership Laws – 3p
AIG – Perceived As Solvent
AIG – Perceived As Solvent
- Scott ALVAREZ, FRB – General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board
- Secretary Tim Geithner
- Secretary Hank Paulson
- Secretary Hank Paulson
- 2010 – Book – On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System, by Henry M. Paulson
- AIG’s case the problem wasn’t capital-at least we didn’t think so at the time.
- 2018 – CNBC – Former Treasury Sec. Paulson On The 2008 Crisis, Moderator: Andrew Ross Sorkin – [VIDEO-YouTube]
- 10:48- 11:40 – Hank Paulson:
- AIG was a dramatically different situation than Lehman Brothers.
- We had a situation with AIG where the market perception was that there was this liquidity problem… a serious one at the Holding Company, but that the insurance companies were well capitalized.
- They had independent ratings. And that they were solid.
- And the Fed was able to make a loan looking at them as collateral.
- And so, the Fed made this judgement. I’m not saying that it was an easy judgement for them, but they made the judgement where the collateral was good.
- ⇒ And what was more important, in my judgement, is that the market accepted it.
- Secretary Tim GEITHNER: AIG — inconceivable to me, going into the weekend, that we should or could do anything about AIG. I was completely against it. I thought it would be a mistake, not necessary. But I thought about it a lot.
- I spent a lot of time over that weekend when we were doing this, looking at the way the insolvency regime would work for a global insurance company, and looking very, very carefully at the alternatives and what their basic balance sheet looks like. And I think there were three things that were sort of clear in the end.
- One was that it would be a terrible mess, much worse than Lehman. Because they had Lehman-type risks for the entire system, but they also were an insurance company. They had written a huge amount of contracts. They would have the classic retail insurance panic that would have, in our judgment, made it much worse.
- So it was — I learned something about it over the weekend. Interesting. The insolvency regime had no capacity of managing. — It would have been just a terrible nightmare. Remember, it’s 80 countries, 50 states. Not designed for this.
- ⇒ We spent a bunch of time with the insurance people, the experts on how this thing would work, it was a terrible, terrible mess.
- I can’t be sure, but that was our basic deduction.
- The other thing was, in the eyes of many people, their underlying insurance companies, which are generating a lot of earnings over time, made the whole company basically probably conditionally solvent if they could be funded.
- So we could make the argument, legal argument, that we had the ability as the central bank because we were lending against collateral.
- Congress had authorized that in 1930, or nineteen-whenever, when they did that.
- And as long as there was enough collateral to lend against, we had real companies operating businesses that were generating a huge amount of earnings over time, huge market share.
- So we could make the argument, legal argument, that we had the ability as the central bank because we were lending against collateral.
- I spent a lot of time over that weekend when we were doing this, looking at the way the insolvency regime would work for a global insurance company, and looking very, very carefully at the alternatives and what their basic balance sheet looks like. And I think there were three things that were sort of clear in the end.
2009 1117 – FCIC – Hearing – Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury – Closed Session — [BonkNote]
- Mark MCWATTERS, COP Member – Okay. Mr. Alvarez, Mr. Baxter, in the view of the Federal Reserve Bank, in the view of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is AIG today a solvent entity?
- Scott ALVAREZ, FRB – General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board. – So AIG does not have negative net worth. It has a positive cash capital. It is meeting the demand for loans as they come due.
- Mark MCWATTERS, COP Member – Okay.
- Scott ALVAREZ, FRB. So it does meet the traditional definition of solvency. It is repaying the Federal Reserve from the liquidation of assets in the Maiden Lane II and III facilities and also from the sale of its companies to repay the revolving line of credit. (p90)
2010 0526 – COP – Hearing – TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG, Congressional Oversight Panel — [BonkNote]
- update: brief conversation with Jacob.
- Told him we were “very reluctant” to open up another 13-3 facility for an entity not even an investment bank.
- And that the market thought it was not only a liquidity problem but also a capital problem. He gave me the bridge to asset sales speech and then said he would get willumsted and call me back. I’m waiting.
- [Bonk: Jacob = Jacob Frenkel, AIG Vice Chairman]
- [Bonk: willumsted = Bob Willumstad, AIG CEO]
2008 0913 – email – Donald Kohn (FRB-NY) to Scott Alvarez (FRB) – JX-046 – 1p
⇒ Case 1:11-cv-00779 – V2 – 2014 0930 – Trial Volume 2 – Alvarez – 231p
AIG – Seven – Insolvent Insurance Companies
AIG – Seven – Insolvent Insurance Companies
- 2009 0807 – NYT – A.I.G. Posts Its First Quarterly Profit Since 2007, By Mary Williams Walsh – [link]
- 2010 0318 – GOV (House) – Insurance Holding Company Supervision, Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote] — [PDF-183p, VIDEO-?]
- (p19) – Ed ROYCE (R-CA) – There is a lot of blame to go around in the case of AIG, but to say the various State insurance commissioners are not to be included in that group is a failure to look at the facts.
- Further, there are at least seven State-regulated insurance subsidiaries that were participating in AIG’s Securities Lending Division that would have been insolvent but for the American taxpayers.
- (p19) – Ed ROYCE (R-CA) – There is a lot of blame to go around in the case of AIG, but to say the various State insurance commissioners are not to be included in that group is a failure to look at the facts.
- David J. Merkel, a former life insurance actuary for A.I.G., said he thought Mr. Benmosche would bring the kind of expertise with life insurance that might now be needed, given the continuing weakness at the life and annuity subsidiaries.
- Mr. Merkel, now chief economist at Finacorp Securities, gathered all of A.I.G.’s state regulatory files for 2008, reviewed each insurance company’s finances and concluded that seven of its life insurers could have been deemed insolvent and shut down last year had it not been for the federal rescue.
- A.I.G. declined to comment on his observations.
2007 0807 – NYT – A.I.G. Posts Its First Quarterly Profit Since 2007, By Mary Williams Walsh – [link]
Restructuring Mechanisms Working Group – (E) – NAIC
Restructuring Mechanisms Working Group – (E) – NAIC
- 2023 0404 – NAIC – RESTRUCTURING MECHANISMS (E) WORKING GROUP – 124p
- O’Sullivan said that on the life side, the inquiry can be relatively narrow and that likely a due diligence, factual inquiry rather than a traditional legal opinion may not be needed.
- Superintendent Dwyer suggested that while it would be difficult to predict future guaranty fund coverage.
- d. NOLHGA, the NCGIF, and other entities also commented that all policyholders should be covered by the same state guaranty association both before and after the transaction so that they have the same degree of protection if one of the insurers becomes insolvent.
- Some commenters noted concerns regarding monitoring for undue strain on individual state guaranty associations.
- Comments were also received regarding the differences between transactions with direct writers versus those that were only between reinsurers.
- Marcotte stated that as noted earlier in the meeting, there were also comments on whether there was a need to obtain a legal opinion regarding the impacts to guaranty association coverage.
- Frasher noted that the comments from Northwestern Mutual, New York Life, and Western and Southern Financial noted potential strains on individual state guaranty associations.
- He stated concentrating the transactions in a few states was problematic because there are assessment caps that exist and there is a real threat of straining the system.
- Smith noted agreement with monitoring for strains in the system and with ensuring the guaranty association coverage is not affected by the transactions.
- Broccoli stated that with these transactions, its important to note that, the terms of the policy don’t change at all.
- So the important review issue is the financial condition of the company that the policy is being transferred to has the ability to pay the claim throughout the life of the policy.
- Stolte questioned why any policyholder has any adverse impact.
- He also noted that materiality can be judged at different levels and can also be subjective.
- Frasher stated that both no worse off and no material adverse impact could be subjective. He stated that in
- Northwestern Mutual’s opinion, transferring policies to an entity with lower financial ratings after the transaction than before is certainly worse off and is certainly a material change.
- James Mills (Enstar) stated that there is a lot of interest around reinsurance with the reinsurance policy transfers, supplementing assumption, or loss portfolio reinsurance transfer.
- He noted that reinsurance transfers do not typically have the same guaranty fund concerns. He noted that the independent expert plays a significant role in determining materiality in the UK Part 7 process.
SBLIC – Security Benefit Life Insurance Company
SBLIC – Security Benefit Life Insurance Company
- securitybenefit.com/about-us/our-company
- Everly Holdings, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
- oci.wi.gov/Documents/Companies/FinAcquisitionSettlersTransmittalLetter.pdf
- 1991 0603 – The Tampa Tribune – Riding the Waves of Insurance Woes –
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- Panel 1 – Howard R. Fricke (president and chief executive officer, Security Benefit Life Insurance Co
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- 1993 0629 – GOV (Senate) – NOLHGA Bails Out a Healthy Insurance Company: Examining the Current System The State Guaranty Fund System Uses to Pay Off Insurance Policyholders, re: Security Benefit Life Insurance Company
- 2022 0309 – Testimony – Security Benefit Life Insurance Company – HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE (Kansas), Testimony on Senate Bill 336, By: Chris Swickard, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Security Benefit Life Insurance Company – 5p
- 2023 0328 – Reuters – U.S. appeals court revives investor lawsuit against annuity company, By Jody Godoy – [link]
- An insurance company owned by private equity firm Eldridge Industries must face a lawsuit claiming it misrepresented how much investors stood to gain on certain fixed annuities, a U.S. appeals court ruled on Tuesday.
- The 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 to revive the proposed class action alleging Security Benefit Life Insurance Company (SBL) engaged in fraud and racketeering by misleading investors in its Secure Income Annuity and Total Value Annuity products.
- In Tuesday’s decision, U.S. Judge Veronica Rossman wrote that a Kansas judge who dismissed the case in 2021 failed to consider the complaint as a whole, which alleged the company concealed the “collective impact” of the terms of the annuities.
- U.S. Circuit Judge Harris Hartz dissented, saying the decision would require sellers to not only disclose the risk of investments, but to analyze “whether, given the disclosed facts, the investment is a good one.”
- “Courts should eschew assuming the role of becoming the final backstop to protect disappointed investors,” he wrote.
- The case is Clinton et al. v. Security Benefit Life Insurance Company, 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 21-3035.
Insolvent
Insolvent
- Failures
- Insolvencies
- Surplus Notes
- Solidity (Solvency)
- 1977 0525 – NP – The Washington Post – How an Insolvent Firm Keeps Selling Insurance, By John F. Berry – [link]
- 1992 – LR – The Effects of the Insurance Industry Insolvency on Pensioners’ Incomes: A Plan for Federal Insurance, by Lee Anne LeBlanc – 33p
- 1998 – LR – The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, by David A. Skeel Jr – 59p
- 1996-1, NAIC Proceedings – INSOLVENCY (EX5) SUBCOMMITTEE – March 27, 1996
- 6. Received the report of the Federal Issues Working Group, which discussed in executive session issues pertaining to claims of the federal government in insurer insolvencies and Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
- 7. Received the report of the Model Act Working Group, which heard a report from a technical resource group regarding proposed amendments to the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act concerning the treatment of derivative instruments and swap agreements in insurer insolvencies, and received comments from the ACLI.
- 8. Heard a report on the status of Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company, in Rehabilitation.
- 9. Heard a suggestion that the subcommittee meet with the Financial Condition (EX4) Subcommittee concerning the status of claims for reinsurance recoverables associated with intercompany pooling arrangements.
- (p650) – Mr. TELFER. In 1929 the Modern Woodmen were actuarially insolvent – don’t ask me what that is, just accept it; it is a long story so they proceeded to rerate their policies, and in doing that they made a contract with a firm known as Frank Pearson & Co. of Chicago.
- Well, Pearson was a transfer man-a man who transfers an old policy into a new one.
- Your Mr. Sullivan could tell you a lot about that.
1936 – GOV (House) – Investigation of Real Estate Bondholders’ Reorganizations – Part 19 – Adolph J. Sabath (D-IL) — [BonkNote]
Pre-funded Guaranty Fund
Pre-funded Guaranty Fund
- 199x – NP – NYT-? – Mutual Benefit – Industry thinking about prefunded Fund – ACLI
- 1995-1, NAIC Proceedings
- Commissioner Robert Wilcox (Utah) agreed and suggested that there be a charge to the appropriate committee for the NAIC to study and consider a pre-funded guaranty fund and whether an interstate compact would be an appropriate mechanism to implement such a fund.
- He added that the compact was thought to be a means to protect a pre-funded guaranty fund from state legislatures as well as an efficient and effective method to administer the fund.
- The compact would establish a body to hold the funds as a trustee, and the only way the funds could be reached would be a dissolution of the compact itself, which could only be accomplished by legislative action.
- Commissioner Robert Wilcox (Utah) agreed and suggested that there be a charge to the appropriate committee for the NAIC to study and consider a pre-funded guaranty fund and whether an interstate compact would be an appropriate mechanism to implement such a fund.
- (p118) – Mrs. Olga Pegelow – Chicago – Executive Life Annuity Policyholder
- Mrs. PEGELOW . May I ask a question? — I know there is a guaranty fund in 48 States, but in that guaranty fund, is the money there?
- Alex MCMILLAN (R-NC). Well, that is another question. — In most cases, since it is a guarantee.
- Mrs. PEGELOW. But the money is not there. — The money has to first be collected.
- Mr. McMILLAN. But that means that those who participate in that State in the sale of insurance are obligated to pay into the fund.
- Mrs. PEGELOW. In other words, all the other insurance companies that are solvent in that State will have to donate the money or pay the money to this guaranty fund;
- …. it isn’t like the FDIC where the money is there.
- Mr. McMILLAN. I wish it were.
- Mrs. PEGELOW. Right. So there is that difference. There is a guaranty fund, but there is no life —
- Mr. McMILLAN. Those are based on guarantees too. The fact of the matter is —
- Mrs. PEGELOW. But the Government is behind the FDIC.
- Mr. McMILLAN. The reason why the taxpayers are having to pay off S&L depositors is because the fund wasn’t adequate to meet the guarantee of the deposits.
- Mrs. PEGELOW. Correct. And this is the same problem with the insurance money.
- The money isn’t there.
- Mr. McMILLAN . You obviously make a very valid point.
1991 0227, 0507, 0509 and 0523 – GOV (House) – Insurance Company Solvency, (CSPAN) Insurance Company Insolvencies, Cardiss Collins (D-IL) — [BonkNote]