SIFI – Systemically Important Financial Institutions

  • (p21) – Chairman LUETKEMEYER (R-MO) – Thank you. Mr. Van Der Weide, I want to let you know that you gave us more information in your 2 or 3 minutes’ response here than all of the other folks we have had before this committee, put together, when we asked that question about SIFIs.

2015 0429 – GOV (House) – The Impact of International Regulatory Standards –  [PDF-125p,

  • 2014 0723 – GOV (House-CFS) – Assessing the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years Later
    • [PDF-169p, VIDEO-CSPAN]
    • (p46) – Barney Frank (D-MA)  And I don’t think that-if that is your major-if that is all you do is asset management or sell life insurance, I don’t think you should be a SIFI.
      • For one thing, I think they have enough other things to do, and there is no sign of their causing problems.
  • CSPAN
    • House –  Financial Services Subcommittee: Significance of Financial Institutions
    • Senate – Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
  • 2012 0516 – GOV (House) – The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act: What it Means to be a Systemically Important Financial Institution, (CSPAN) Designation of Systemically Significant Financial Institutions, Economists Panel 
  • 2014 0723 – GOV (House-CFS) – Assessing the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years Later
  • 2014 1118 – GOV (House) – The Impact of International Regulatory Standards on the Competitiveness of U.S. Insurers, Part II 
  • 2015 0325 – GOV (Senate) – FSOC Accountability Nonbank Designations
  • 2017 0328 – GOV (House) – The Arbitrary and Inconsistent Non-Bank SIFI Designation Process
    • [PDF-83p, VIDEO-youtube] – <mp3, mp4>
    • 2017 0228 – GOV (House Report) – Report Prepared by The Republican Staff of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives – [PDF-60p]
    • [GOV Page]
  • 2012 0516 – GOV (House) – The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act: What it Means to be a Systemically Important Financial Institution, (CSPAN) Designation of Systemically Significant Financial Institutions, Economists Panel – [PDF-121p,  VIDEO-CSPAN] – 53:41
    • 11:25 – William (Bill) Wheeler (MetLife – America’s Division, President)
      • Largest Life Insurance Company in the United States, Bank-Centric Rules Inappropriate, Only company with a Bank Holding Company – Selling it, so they will be regulated by insurance commissioners.
      • Investments
      • Banks v Insurance Companies Different
      • TARP, Look at Activities-Based
    • 29:00 – Carolyn Maloney/ Bill Wheeler (MetLife) – What caused AIG Failure?
    • 36:00 – Luetkemeyer/ Bill Wheeler (MetLife) – Interconnectedness, derivatives etc, Banks, Traditional Insurance
    • Manzullo – Messing up MetLife, Bank Holding Company, Federal Reserve – People don’t have sophistication…re: Life Insurance.
  • 2014 1118 – GOV (House) – The Impact of International Regulatory Standards on the Competitiveness of U.S. Insurers, Part II
    • [PDF-140p,  VIDEO-YouTube] – <mp3, mp4>
    • House – Committee on Financial Services – Housing and Insurance
    • 58:15 – 1:00:37 – Luetkemeyer (MO) / Sullivan (FRB) –  How is an insurance company a SIFI? 
    • 1:15- – Dennis Ross (Fla) – state regulation not significant? McRaith
    • 1:19 – ohio congressman -NCOIL input?? Shapiro Study: capital 
    • 1:24 – 
    • 1:27 – Garrett (NJ) – cost benefit, secrecy, transparency
    • 1:33 – re: Roy Woodall turned away from IAIS

Interconnectedness

MGIC, for instance, which Baldwin bought for $1.l7 billion, had $380 million in real estate and other assets which Baldwin sold to raise cash for the purchase.

  • But instead of selling only to outsiders, Baldwin has sold some of its assets, including stock of its own operating companies, to its own insurance companies.
  • ”Some of our best investments are subsidiaries that we own and manage,” said James E. Schwab, the company’s vice president and treasurer, defending the policy.
  • The problem is that when the assets are not stocks and bonds of publicly traded companies, there can be differences of opinion about how to value the assets.

1983 0123  – NYT – Baldwin United vs The Doubters – [link]

  • (p65) – Karl L. Rubinstein, (Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner, State of California): The Baldwin-United companies were hungry and the insurance companies were fat.
    • A series of transactions by which various of the Baldwin companies “sold” assets to the insurance companies occurred.
    • This included some mortgages and real estate, but it also included the almost $1 Billion in affiliated securities.
    • These included preferred shares in various Baldwin entities and other assets which quickly became non-performing (assuming, arguendo, they ever had the capacity to perform).
    • As a result, almost $1Billion in cash was taken out of the insurance companies and replaced with affiliated assets which turned out to be more or less worthless due to the financial collapse of the Baldwin empire for various reasons, not the least of which was the strain of attempting to repay the principle and interest on the MGIC loan.

1988 0914 and 0915 – GOV (House) – Insurance Company Failures – [PDF-4xxp-GooglePlay,

  • AIG
    • 2010 0526 – COP – Hearing – TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG – [PDF-241p, –  Snippets
      • (p2) – Elizabeth Warren:  The company was a corporate Frankenstein, a conglomeration of banking and insurance and investment interests that defy regulatory oversight…
    • 2010 0127 – GOV (House) – The Federal Bailout AIG – [PDF-652p
      • (p140) – Blaine LUETKEMEYER (R-MO). Mr. Paulson, one of the things that we are looking into here with AIG, can you explain to me, AIG and their Financial Products, was that a subsidiary of AIG or was that part of their business model?
      • Mr. PAULSON. I believe it was part of the business model.
      • Mr. LUETKEMEYER. There wasn’t a separate entity that was separately capitalized?
      • Mr. PAULSON. It was clearly at the holding company and it was part of–
      • Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The thing that makes–
      • Mr. PAULSON. It wasn’t part of an insurance business model, but it was sure part of the company’s business strategy.
      • Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Because it makes a big difference. If it is not part of the insurance product company and it is a subsidiary that is separately capitalized, you can let that thing go down and it doesn’t impact the insurance part of it, which I believe it was. Is that not correct?
      • Mr. PAULSON. Well, I would say this to you. This company was so big and intertwined that it was-if there was any way that the people who were working on this could have found a way to just hive off and let one small part of the company go down-

Banks

  • Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee
  • Conference of State Bank Supervisors
  • History of Bills (HOB)
    • 1987 - GOV - History of S. 706 - A Bill To Amend The Bank Holding Act And The National Bank Act To Clarify Limitations On Insurance Activities Of Banks, to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. By Mr. HEINZ (for himself and Mr. Dodd) - govinfo.gov/content/pkg/HOB-1987/html/HOB-1987.htm
  • 1990 - SOA - Banks: Successful Entry Into The Insurance Industry On A Worldwide Basis, rsa90v16n4a6 - Society of Actuaries - 20p
  • 2006 - World Bank - Resolution of Failed Banks by Deposit Insurers: Cross-country Evidence (WPS3920), Thorsten Beck and Luc Laeven - 34p
  • 1988-1989 - LR - Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, by Alfred C. Aman - 64p
    • Controversy over what is or should be the business of banking challenges the rationales for banking regulations.64
      • Changes in data processing and communications technology have created a new financial services industry.
      • "These new methods have revolutionized the business, and created new businesses and new products.
        • Money market funds, central asset accounts, and universal life policies would have been impossible before modern data processing and communication technologies. 65
      • These new services raise questions about just what "the business of banking" in fact is.

Banks and Insurance

  • Assimilation of banking-type activities by life insurers appears to be the key systemic vulnerability.

2003 – IMF – Insurance and issues in financial soundness. IMF working paper 03/138. Das U, Davies N, Podpiera R – 44p

  • 2009 1210 – COP – Hearing – Hearing With Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Congressional Oversight Panel  —  [BonkNote]
    • Tim Geithner / Elizabeth Warren 
    • Warren – AIG was not a bank.
  • When Congress passed the McFaddin Act in 1927, it “leveled the playing field” by reducing restrictions on bank activities in other lines of commerce and that disastrous results ensued. (p72)

—  Daniel Murphy, Executive Vice-President, E.F. Hutton

1984-2, NAIC Proceedings – Integrated Financial Services (EX) Task Force

  • (p536) – The Subgroup also found that the remaining Federal Reserve risk categories for banking organizations – liquidity, operational, legal and reputational – encompass similar underlying concepts of risks associated with insurance operations, but that such risks are viewed somewhat differently in the context of the organization and management of the business operations of banks and insurance companies.
  • From the array of risks identified, however, the Subgroup determined that some insurance risks were exclusive to particular insurance products and were therefore not comparable to banking risks.
  • (p537) – 1. Mapping of Life Insurance Company Risks

2003-3, NAIC Proceedings – Financial Condition (E) Committee 

  • 2013 1212 – GOV (House) – International Finance System, Part 1 (CSPAN) 
    • [PDF- , VIDEO-CSPAN]
    • 01:10:00 – Neugebauer / Lew – FIO, Late Reports, McRaith, FSOC, Banking vs Insurance, US v Europe, Complicated issue, states, feds, opening the conversation, G-20, Capital Standards
    • 01:19:00 – Bill Foster (D-IL) – Banking Capital Standards to Insurance, FSOC
  • 1990 – LR – Dual Banking and State Bank Insurance Powers: Diversifying Financial Services Through the Back Door, by Michael E. Schrader – 21p
    • This conclusion is based on an analysis of Federal Reserve Board orders involving applications by Citicorp 16 and Merchants National Corp. 17 to engage in insurance activities through state-chartered banks, as well as from an overview of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal’s AMBAC decision and the Federal Reserve Board’s proposed regulatory response.19
  • 1992 – LR – Banking and Insurance – Should Ever the Twain Meet?, by Emeric Fischer – 101p
    • The huge amount of resource material furnished by Gary E. Hughes, Chief Counsel, Securities of the American Council of Life Insurance has made this study far more meaningful.
  • 1996 – LC – Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25
  • 1997 – SOA – The Role of Banks in Insurance Markets, rsa97v23n271pd – Society of Actuaries – 25p
  • 2014 – AP – The Convergence of Insurance with Banking and Securities Industries, and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in Finance, by Matthew C. Turk – 107p
  • (p27) – Life insurers are distinct from banks in terms of their fundamental business model, their financial structure, and their regulatory oversight.
    • And a one-size-fits-all approach to rulemaking will not produce workable results.

—  Statement of Gary E. Hughes, ACLI – Executive Vice President & General Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers

2011 0728 and 1025 – GOV (House) – Insurance Oversight: Policy Implications for U.S. Consumers, Businesses and Jobs – Part 1 2011 0728), Part 2 ( 20111025) – [PDF-285p,

  • … the life insurance industry has developed new products that contain predominantly investment features similar to those offered by depository institutions.  (p93)

—  William S. McKee, Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of the Treasury [DOTT]

1983 0311 – GOV (Senate – Committee on Finance) – Taxation of Financial Services Industry (HRG98) – [PDF-356p, VIDEO-?]

   
  • GLB
  • Deregulation
  • New York
    • Cuomo
    • Dewind Commission
      • chairman, Adrian W. DeWind, a New York lawyer,
  • INIA welcomes the statement in Annex 1 that “Not all resolution powers set out in the Key Attributes are suitable for all sectors and all circumstances”.
  • However, there seems to be a contradiction between this statement and the fact that in very few instances throughout the document is the recognition that the framework and tools set out for effective resolution of financial groups will properly account for the differences between the banking and insurance business models.

2011 0902 – INIA (International Network of Insurance Associations) Letter to FSB – 4p

comments on the FSB consultation paper “Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions

  • Failures in our economic system perform the essential function of weeding out uncompetitive enterprises, but insurance is, in a way, like banking.  

—  Dr. William Freund, NYSE professor of economics at the Graduate School of Business of Pace University in New York

1991 – SOA – Major Issues Facing the Economy, The Insurance Industry and Actuaries in the Years Ahead, Moderator Daphne Bartlett, rsa91v17n21 – Society of Actuaries –  12p  

Deregulation

  • It is an exciting time in the financial services industry today.
  • Banks want to sell insurance.
  • Insurance companies want to sell securities.
  • Sears Roebuck wants to sell everything.
  • I will discuss the insurance activities of banks and bank holding companies

— Charles Eggleston, not a member of the Society, is a Senior Manager at Price Waterhouse

1984 – SOA – Deregulation of Financial Industries (rsa84v10n221) –  30p 

  • NAIC
  • 1984-2, NAIC Proceedings – Systems for Deregulation and Improved Regulation (EX) Task Force
    • J. Michael Low, Chairman – Arizona
  • Paul KANJORSKI (D-PA): If we have learned anything from the financial crisis, it is that excessive deregulation is dangerous.
    • My three bills work to reverse this trend by closing loopholes and fixing problems in the broken regulatory structure, especially in our securities and insurance markets.  (p1)

2009 1006 – GOV (House) – Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office, Barney Frank (D-MA) – [PDF-325p, VIDEO-House-Error]

  • (p26) – Pete STARK (D-CA) The only thing I think we can do better than the States is pay, and I am not sure we can do that much better than a rich State like California or New York.
    • But I am suggesting that if we are called upon to pay, that perhaps at that point we could reasonably require some minimum asset standards, to insure the integrity of the assets, so we would not have to pay again and again and again.
  • John GARAMENDI, California Insurance Commissioner – That, of course, is coupled with regulation, and here is the case where my State fell down and did not carry out its regulatory responsibilities.
    • In fact, I suspect for most of America, the 1980s, the deregulation period, when the mantra of deregulation was preached in most every hall in America-the result of that is now the debacle of the 1990s, the S&Ls, the banks and now some parts of the insurance companies.

Executive Life Insurance Failure, Charles B. Rangel (D-NY)  —  [BonkNote]

Competition

  • Regulatory Competition
  • 1996 – SOA – Competitors to the Life Insurance Industry, rsa96v22n186if – Society of Actuaries – 26p
  • The life insurance industry competes for agents and in designing unique policies that are often merely sales tools.
    • But as shown in this section, it does not compete vigorously on the basis of price.
    • Without meaningful cost disclosure, effective price competition is impossible.54  (p62)

1979 – FTC – Life Insurance Cost Disclosure – 460p

  • Today, life insurers compete directly with non-insurance financial services institutions, such as banks and mutual funds.  (p12)

—  William B. Fisher, Vice President And Associate General Counsel, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, On Behalf Of The American Council Of Life Insurers  (ACLI)

2001 0621 – GOV (House) – Insurance Product Approval: The Need for Modernization – [PDF-208p, VIDEO-?]

  • 2022 1109 – AP – Regulatory Competition in the US Life Insurance Industry, by Johnny Tang – 88p
    • Competition between jurisdictions is a central feature of many public policy problems.
      • I examine the consequences of such competition in the US life insurance industry, where states vie to attract insurers by setting lower capital requirements, but the costs of such actions are borne by consumers in other states.
      • I document empirical evidence of competition between state regulators and its effects on the supply of life insurance.
      • I then develop a quantitative model of the insurance market to evaluate the effects of this competition.
      • I find that competition leads regulators to set lower capital requirements, which increases default risks but also increases consumer surplus by lowering prices.
      • On net, these effects decrease regulators’ utility based on regulators’ revealed- reference objective functions.
  • Thirty-one years ago, Mark S. Dorfman (1972) concluded that workable competition did not exist in the market for life insurance products because of industry marketing practices that tended to exacerbate the insurance consumer’s ignorance and the problem of information asymmetry inherent in the industry.
    • Utterances by both industry representatives and industry critics suggest Dorfman’s assessment may still linger today.

2004 – LR – Workable Competition and the Life Insurance Market: A Quantitative Analysis, by Andrew W. Bacdayan, Elliott, Jones – 12p

  • <WishList> – 1972 – AP – Workable Product Life Competition in the Life Insurance Market, by Mark S. Dorfman, Journal of Risk and Insurance 39 (December 1972): 613-625.
  • 4. Any change in premiums and values is an important management decision and investment yields are only one factor involved.
    • Recent changes may have been influenced more by competition than by a rise in interest rates.

—  B. T. Holmes

1957 – SOA – Life Insurance Policies, Premiums and Dividends, Society of Actuaries – 9p

States and Territories

  • REGULATION FROM A LEGISLATOR’S PERSPECTIVE
  • I hope to give you some insight into state government regulation and the way we feel about the life insurance industry.
  • As a state legislator, I have never had any serious problem with the life insurance industry.
  • One reason for this is because life insurance is strictly voluntary.
    • This is quite different from casualty insurance which has mandated coverages.
    • If a person buys a life insurance policy, he does it on his own free will and this takes us off the hook.
  • Second of all, life insurance has always served a very important purpose in this country. 

—  Warren D. Arthur, IV. (not a member of the Society, is a state representative in the South Carolina legislature. 

1981 – SOA – Changes in Life Insurance Laws and Regulations: What Do We Need and How Can We Get It?, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • The Council of State Governments (CSG), National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL), and National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)-organizations of state officials devoted to sound insurance public policy-are writing to tell you why we believe that the protection of insurance consumers should continue to be based exclusively at the state level.

2009 0901 – Letter – NCOIL,CSG, NCSL to GOV Dodd, Frank, Shelby, Bachus – 2p

Consumerism

  • : the promotion of the consumer’s interests

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consumerism

  • I am not convinced that the consumer advocates,–David Swankin excepted– really know or speak for what the average consumer wants.
    • I fear that in the dialogue between regulators, business and consumerists, what the general public really wants may be overlooked.

—  William M. White, Connecticut General – Director of Government Regulations

1980 – SOA – Effect of Governmental Actions and Consumerism on Product Design and Pricing of the Future, Society of Actuaries – 26p

  • Judge DeShelter suggested the areas where the life insurance industry was most vulnerable to attack from consumer advocates were:
    • (1) misrepresentation of product (basically advertising and sales presentations);
    • (2) inability to find a legitimate basis of cost comparison; and
    • (3) failure to bring pressures to bear in controlling medical costs.

1972 01 – SOA – Consumerism in Cincinnati, by Thomas Mitchell, The Actuary, act-1972-vol06-iss01-mitchell – Society of  Actuaries – 3p

  • Too many consumerists question everything the insurance industry does, and very often for self-serving motives.
  • Further, they show a marked rigidity of mind: having finally understood interest-adjusted net cost, they do not want to admit its deficiencies or learn alternatives.
  • And I often doubt if they are really interested in the consumer, anymore than a member of the Comintern is really interested in the proletariat – they are just interested in their place in the power structure.

—  J. Bruce MacDonald

1981 – SOA – The Life Insurance Business–The View of Consumerists, Society of Actuaries (rsa81v7n38) – Daniel F. Case – Moderator – 18p

  • (p17) – David L Brain, executive vice president of Kentucky Central Life recently surveyed the top executives of 62 large, medium, and small life insurance companies for their opinions on the impact of the consumer movement on their business.
  • Thirty percent felt that the activity of the critics will lead to reduced premium rates or more liberal benefits. “
  • In addition to the negative publicity the industry has already received ,” wrote Mr. Brain, “the most frequently mentioned effects of consumerism are:
    • better service and improved policy owner relations;
    • stiffer government regulations;
    • and a trend toward more frequent price benefit comparisons . . .”

1973 0220 – GOV (Senate) – The Life Insurance Industry, Senator Hart (D-MI) – Part 1 of 4 – [PDF-815p-GooglePlay]

  • Economic growth is going to have an impact on our surplus and performance.
  • Consumer activism is another.
  • Consumers want insurance companies to be more solvent and be more stable, but I’m not sure they want to pay for it.
  • It is kind of how Ross Perot sees the nation, in the sense that he knows what we need to be, but he’s not real convinced that we want to pay for it.
  • We all need to buckle down and contribute to a solution.
  • Consumer activism has driven the rating agencies and
    the way companies do business.

—  David E. Neve

1992 – SOA – Managing Statutory Performance, rsa92v18n4A14 – Society of Actuaries – 22p

  • From a consumerist point of view, ALl
    • (i) deemphasizes the dichotomy between term and permanent insurance 
    • (2) will lead to improved policyholder understanding of his insurance portfolio
    • (3) means greater convenience in maintaining an up-to-date portfolio
    • (4) will result in an increased emphasis on service by the agent, and
    • (5) provides a means of protection against rises in the cost-of-living

—  J. Peter Duran

1979 – SOA – The Adjustable Life Decisions, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • 1972 – SOA – Transactions, Society of Actuaries – 360p
  • 1974 – SOA – Consumerism and the Compensation of the Life Insurance Agent, by Anna Maria Rappaport – 68p
  • 1974 – SOA – Life Insurance and Consumerism, Society of Actuaries – 160p
  • 1976 – SOA – Consumer/Consumerist Trends and their Actuarial Implications, Society of Actuaries – 20p
  • 1980 – SOA – Effect of Governmental Actions and Consumerism on Product Design and Pricing of the Future, Society of Actuaries – 26p
  • Criticism of the life insurance product has been around for many years and has been especially strong during the last decade.
  • I feel that, if the life insurance industry cannot find a way to create within the confines of those laws or, alternatively, to change them, then we must resign ourselves to an ever decreasing share of the savings dollar as well as mounting consumerist attacks.
  • JAMES A. MITCHELL: A thought that occurs to me is that consumerism must be good business for two basic reasons:
    1. We must deliver products and services satisfactory to the consumer if we are to stay in business.
    2. The organizations which do the best job in this regard are those which will grow and prosper over the longer term.
  • Thus, instead of looking exclusively at the short-term “costs” of consumerism to our companies, we should seek out and invest in the many areas where the interests of the policyholder and the company are parallel.
  • As an example, the key to delivering and maintaining our products is the agent. The basic reason that many of our policyholders are “orphans” is that such a high proportion of our agents do not survive more than a couple of years in business.
  • The attendant costs to our companies are large. If we can find the keys to doing a better job of recruiting, training, and helping to make our agent a success, then he can do the job of servicing his policyholders and we will have greatly increased the return on our investment in field manpower.

1972 – SOA – Transactions, Society of Actuaries – 360p

  • Betty Furness, former Special Assistant to the President on Consumer Affairs, to the audience at a 1971 symposium on “the challenges of consumerism”:
    • “The consumer game is a game everybody plays whether they want to or not. The world is roughly divided into two teams. On the one side are the consumers; on the other, the people producing things for them to consume. The consumer game is a difficult game, in part because one teams seems to have invented the rules while the other team has been left to guess what they are.72
    • 72 Betty Furness, “Rising Consumer Expectations,” in The Challenge of Consumerism: A Symposium, ed. E. Patrick McGuire (The Conference Board, 1971), 15.
      • The symposium was organized by the Conference Board, a politically moderate business membership organization. The speakers included business executives, academics and government officials, but there was no speaker from any consumer organization. Furness was the closest among the speakers to “represent” the consumer movement’s views.  (p219)

2022 – AP – Sociology – Mobilizing Consumers: The American Consumer Movement In The 1960s-70s As A Social Movement – A Dissertation Submitted To The Faculty Of The Division Of The Social Sciences In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy – Department Of Sociology, By Yaniv Ron-El –355p-knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4840

Marketing

  • We have all heard some talk about twisting, and it has strong negative connotations.
    • Universal Life, mainly because of its premium flexibility, has changed that.
  • I recently heard one of our marketing people refer to replacement of old traditional permanent policies with Universal Life.
    • He called it “The Enlightened Liberation of Assets”.

—  Stuart Grodanz, Travelers

1984 – SOA – Variable Universal Life, rsa84v10n4b12 – Society of Actuaries –  22p

  • …a great deal of our problem is caused because the people out there marketing our life insurance products are trying to market it against and like mutual funds.
    • Until we start to market it as life insurance and describe it and teach the consumers about life insurance, they’re not in any position to make those kinds of judgment calls

—  Robert E. Wilcox, Utah Insurance Commissioner and Chairman of the Life Disclosure Working Group (NAIC)

1995 – SOA – Current Developments Surrounding Regulations and Standards of Life and Annuity Products, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • Historians have, perhaps, been too preoccupied with mortality tables and the founding dates of companies to consider the astonishing influence that selling method, or the lack of it, has had upon the development of life insurance in every age.

1942 – Book – Marketing Life Insurance: Its History in America, by J. Owen Stalson

  • 1942 – Book – Marketing Life Insurance: Its History in America, by J. Owen Stalson
  • 1961 – SOA – Marketing Trends, Society of Actuaries – 10p
  • 1976 – LR – Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual Life Insurance – 125p
  • 1979 – SOA – Marketing Systems, rsa79v5n18 – Society of Actuaries – 18p
  • 1982 – AP – Using Information-Processing Principles in Public Policymaking – Marketing – 21p
  • Marketing
  • A. By urging agents to upgrade their prospecting, is the life insurance industry forsaking a market and inviting government sponsored life insurance programs?
  • B. Would it be in the consumers’ best interest if the life insurance industry sold a greater portion of permanent insurance? What is being done, or should be done, to emphasize permanent insurance more in such areas as advertising, sales promotion, plan design, field compensation, and production credits?
  • C. Is it possible to make new plans available to present policyholders by change or by rider addition without too expensive a process?

1962 – SOA – Discussion of Subjects of Special Interest: Marketing, tsa62v14pt2d29 – Society of Actuaries – 8p

Lobbying

  • Lobbying is a word which may have negative connotations in some people’s minds. Those people who are not close to the political process sometimes think that if politicians were able to make decisions in an environment free of lobbying, then better decisions could be made.
    • This is a misconception of the political process.
    • Today’s issues are so complex and the agendas of the politicians are so full that they cannot possibly become knowledgeable in all the issues confronting them. Therefore, the lobbyists fill a very important educational function in our political process. In many cases, lobbyists bring arguments and information, which would not otherwise have surfaced, to the political debate.
  • Our panel will review the process of lobbying. It will talk about good and bad ways to approach it, how to be effective, some of the various techniques involved and some of the pitfalls to avoid. This is a concept oriented session. As such, we will not spend a lot of time updating particular issues. However, examples will be used to illustrate how some particularly effective or ineffective lobbying approach was handled.

—  Stephen G. Kellison, 

1986 – SOA – Overview of the Lobbying Process, Society of Actuaries – 18p