Systemic
Systemic Risk – Life Insurance
Systemic Risk – Life Insurance
- Assimilation of banking-type activities by life insurers appears to be the key systemic vulnerability.
2003 – IMF – Insurance and Issues in Financial Soundness. IMF working paper 03/138. Das U, Davies N, Podpiera R – 44p
- (p3) – Third, as noted repeatedly by EIOPA, the ESRB and market analysts, scenarios involving multiple failures may be the result of common vulnerabilities to asset stresses and simultaneous prolonged low interest rates (i.e. the risk of a double hit).
- The EIOPA 2014 stress test shows that EU life insurers are vulnerable to this risk due to rigid guaranteed returns and maturity mismatches.
- Multiple failures of life insurers may impose losses on households and may result in asset fire sales by insurers, disruption to securities lending and derivatives markets, or even government bailouts.
- Preventive measures have been taken to mitigate the risks arising from prolonged low interest rates and the effects of these still need to be monitored.
2015 12 – ESRB – Report on systemic risks in the EU insurance sector, Annex 3, Sources of systemic risks – 92p
Q: What is Systemic Risk?
Q: What is Systemic Risk?
- (p45-46) – Secretary Geithner: For two reasons: Because it was systemic and because it was an option for doing so. So if it needed both, okay — if it wasn’t systemic, we would have been indifferent to it. If it was systemic but we had no option, we wouldn’t have done it.
- Commissioner Holtz-Eakin Can you give us a metric of systemic?
- Commissioner Wallison: Yes, what do you mean by “systemic”?
- Secretary Geithner: “Systemic” is, as you guys know, I’m sure better than anybody, nobody knows what’s systemic. It’s completely — you can’t say it —
- Commissioner Wallison: What’s the rest —
- Secretary Geithner: I know, but you can’t say it — there’s no objective standard of what is systemic. It’s a —
- Commissioner Wallison: Well, what specific things did you think would happen, is the big question. What would happen if Bear Stearns had failed? What would have happened?
2009 1117 – FCIC – Hearing – Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission – Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury – Closed Session — [BonkNote]
- Chairman Paul KANJORSKI (D-PA).The thing that disturbs me is trying to get my arms around the idea of just what is a ”systemic risk.’
- ‘ …if people could have rapidly seen systemic risk would have occurred.
- We certainly have enough regulators who had eyes on the situation.
- We have all talked about it, I can assure you, and we have heard you.
- I think when the question came up in 1964, Justice Potter Stewart, in trying to explain what was ”obscene,” he said the following,
- ”I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of materials I understand to be embraced, but I know it when I see it.”
- I think probably with systemic risk, after the fact, we seem to all know it when we see it, but before it arrives, we have no idea.
- If you make the proper conclusions, we would not be in the crisis we are in today, if people could have rapidly seen systemic risk would have occurred.
- We certainly have enough regulators who had eyes on the situation.
- They just were not analyzing or seeing the situation. (p19)
2009 0305 – GOV (House) – Perspectives on Systemic Risk, Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote]
- Paper – Concepts for Successful Regulation of Systemic Risk
- Section 1: Identification of Systemic Risk
- 1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk
- As a working premise, we define systemic risk to be the risk of a failure in a transaction or series of transactions extending beyond the parties directly involved, impacting many or most participants in the marketplace.
- And the public gains awareness of these systemic effects on the larger group only after the breakdown has occurred.
- The successful identification of systemic risk needs to include the consideration of the impact of risks that are currently considered highly improbable or not measurable.
- 1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk
2009 0514 – Testimony – AAA – James Rech, Vice President, Risk Management and Financial Reporting Council – of the American Academy of Actuaries – 12p
⇒ 2009 0514 – GOV (House) – How Should the Federal Government Oversee Insurance?, Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote]
2020 – SOA – Systemic Risk in China’s Insurance Industry – Society of Actuaries – 55p
2020 - SOA - Systemic Risk in China's Insurance Industry
- 2020 - SOA - Systemic Risk in China's Insurance Industry, systemic-risk-china-insurance-english - Society of Actuaries --- [BonkNote] --- 55p
- (p9) - Therefore, based on the identification of systemic risk sources that the Geneva Association, IAIS and other scholars have given....
- the author investigated the origin of systemic risk in China's insurance market from a micro perspective and believes.....
- that the main sources of systemic risk in China's insurance market are:
- credit guarantee, minimum guarantee income of insurance contract, asset and liability mismatch, and alternative investment.
- (p10) - At the same time, the policyholder may have a run, which will have impacts on the market, the government supervision behavior, the company's reputation decline, and so forth.
- The payments at expiration and the surrender value of life insurance industry reached 937.9 billion yuan in 2015 and rose to 1.2 trillion yuan in 2016.
- In the surrender value, high-cash-value products accounted for 55%. China's insurance industry is expected to face more than 1.5 trillion yuan of maturity payment and surrender value by 2018 (Huibaoxian, 2017).
- Although a run on the insurance industry is rare, it cannot be ignored.
- Policyholders' run once occurred in smaller insurers and in a normal economic environment, although what consequences it would cause in an extreme economic environment remains unknown.
- (p10) - Under the pressure of low interest rates in China, along with the regulation of government, China's insurance companies will face a dilemma of both maturity payment and surrender value.
- It is necessary to prevent a run event; otherwise, insurance companies' liquidity will be significantly affected, which will lead to fracturing of company funds in a severe case or even a financial crisis.
IAIS – Systemic Risk
IAIS – Systemic Risk
- Background IAIS systemic risk work
- 2011 Publication of “Insurance and Financial Stability”
- 2012 Publication of “Reinsurance and Financial Stability”
- 2013
• Identification of first cohort of G-SIIs
• Publication of G-SII Policy Measures document
• Publication of Report on Macroprudential Policy and Surveillance in Insurance
• Guidance for Systemic Risk Management Plan - 2014 Guidance on Liquidity Management and Planning
- 2015 Development first version of BCR and HLA
- 2016
• Three – yearly review of G-SII Assessment Methodology
• Publication of document on Systemic Risk from Insurance Product Features to clarify original concept of Non-Traditional, Non-Insurance (NTNI) activities - 2017 – Creation of Systemic Risk Assessment Task Force
- 2017 1208 – IAIS – Activities-Based Approach to Systemic Risk, Public Consultation Document – 62p
- 2018 0201 – IAIS – Activities-Based Approach to Systemic Risk – 10p
2008 Financial Crisis – Systemic Risk
Systemic Risk – 2008 Financial Crisis
- Precrisis, there was a longstanding assumption that banks were the only types of financial companies that could pose systemic risk.
- As you noted, during the crisis that was proved un-true. Investment banks, insurance companies, other nonbanks precipitated the economic collapse. (p10-11)
— Jeremy C. Kress, Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Ross School of Business
2019 0314 – GOV (Senate) – Financial Stability Oversight Council Nonbank Designation, Mike Crapo (R-ID) – [PDF-123p, VIDEO-Senate-Page]
Panic
Panic
- Panic of 1907
- Insurance Panic
- 2013 0621 – AP – The Failures that Ignited America’s Financial Panics: A Clinical Survey, by Hugh Rockoff – 52p
- FCIC – Geithner – 50p
- 2009 1210 – COP – Hearing – Hearing With Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Congressional Oversight Panel — [BonkNote] — [PDF-98p, VIDEO-CSPAN]
- (p78) – Tim Geithner – And doubts about the value of AIG life insurance products could have generated doubts about similar products provided by other life insurance companies, feeding the panic that was crippling the economy.
- Our fear is this: By failing to disclose these facts, the insurance industry is undermining public confidence in the industry and ultimately risking the possibility of panic. (p158)
— Statement of Martin D. Weiss, President, Weiss Research, Inc.
1991 0227, 0507/09/23 – GOV – Insurance Company Solvency, aka Insurance Company Insolvencies – [PDF-369p-GooglePlay]
- In 1907, following the Armstrong investigation and as a result of the panic of that year, the N.A.I.C. adopted a resolution to set the stage to obtain uniformity in valuing securities.
1958 0211 – Insurance Regulation in the Public Interest: “A BETTER N.A.I.C.” – by Robert E. Dineen – 122p
- 1999 Self-Insurance as Insurance in Liability Policy
“Other Insurance” Provisions, Rory A. Goode https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570&context=wlulr
Q: Can the Insurance Industry Create Systemic Risk?
Q: Can the Insurance Industry Create Systemic Risk?
- Assimilation of banking-type activities by life insurers appears to be the key systemic vulnerability.
2003 – IMF – Insurance and Issues in Financial Soundness. IMF working paper 03/138. Das U, Davies N, Podpiera R – 44p
- Paper – Concepts for Successful Regulation of Systemic Risk
- Section 1: Identification of Systemic Risk
- 1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk
- As a working premise, we define systemic risk to be the risk of a failure in a transaction or series of transactions extending beyond the parties directly involved, impacting many or most participants in the marketplace.
- And the public gains awareness of these systemic effects on the larger group only after the breakdown has occurred.
- The successful identification of systemic risk needs to include the consideration of the impact of risks that are currently considered highly improbable or not measurable.
- 1.1 Definition of Systemic Risk
2009 0514 – Testimony – AAA – James Rech, Vice President, Risk Management and Financial Reporting Council – of the American Academy of Actuaries – 12p
⇒ 2009 0514 – GOV (House) – How Should the Federal Government Oversee Insurance?, Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote]
- (p84) – Mr. CAMPBELL (R-CA). Talk about the life insurance subsidiary for a second.
- I know that in your-I believe it was the company’s evaluation of systemic risk, that is where you believe there is a great deal of systemic risk, but there is a lot of counterparty liabilities to other life insurance companies. Is that true?
- Ed LIDDY (AIG CEO). It is in both.
- You know, we insure, on the property casualty side, we insure 94 percent of the Fortune 500 companies.
- So the systemic risk idea is very real in both the property casualty and the life side.
2009 0318 – GOV (House) – American International Group’s Impact On The Global Economy: Before, During, And After Federal Intervention, (CSPAN) – Federal Aid to AIG Insurance, Regulators Panel –[PDF-380p, VIDEO-CSPAN]
- (p5) – To be clear, though, the business of life insurance, in and of itself, does not pose systemic risk to the broader economy or the U.S. financial system.
- (p6) – As a factual matter, that source will clarify that the vast majority of insurance does not impose systemic risk.
— Michael T. McRaith, NAIC / Director of Insurance – State of Illinois
Insurance and Systemic Risk) – Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote]
- An insurance business having special interconnections to capital markets may be capable of generating systemic risk, however, but financial and mortgage guarantee lines have been stressed because of their coverage of mortgage related securities, and as has been well-documented, large, complex financial institutions with insurance operations, like AIG, have produced systemic risks within the economy. (p15)
— Statement of Therese M. Vaughan, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
2009 0305 – GOV (House) – Perspectives on Systemic Risk, Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) — [BonkNote]
- Large troubled life insurers can also generate systemic risks if policyholders run to cash out their life insurance policies, or if the millions of retirees who rely on annuities suddenly learn that their contracts may not be honored sharply curtail their spending as a result. (p93)
— Prepared Statement of Martin Neil Baily Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, and Former Chairman Of The Council Of Economic Advisers Under President Clinton, and Robert E. Litan1 May 6, 2009
2009 0506 – GOV (Senate) – Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to Fail”, Christopher Dodd (D-CT) — [BonkNote]
2008 Financial Crisis – Contagion
Contagion – 2008
- From: “Habayeb, Elias”
Sent: 09/16/2008 07:16 AM
To: Alejandro LaTorre
Cc: “Frenkel, Dr. Jacob A.” <Jacob.Frenkel@aig.com >
Subject: FX Settlement Failures - Alex,
- It seems that Barclays, JPM and Deutsche Bank are holding back on the amounts they owe us under FX transactions.
- If this continues, the amounts are in the billions. This is extremely dangerous because it impairs our ability to make payments on the other side.
- This is the risk we were most concerned about and shared with you over the weekend.
- I would like discuss with you soonest possible as it is cascading through the system.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/JX-062sdnewones.pdf
Resolution Authority
Resolution Authority
- 2008 0710 – GOV (House) – Systemic Risk and the Financial Markets, CSPAN – Transformation of Financial Markets
- [PDF-86p, VIDEO-CSPAN] – <mp3, mp4>
- Paulson, Bernanke
- 1:17:30 – Paulson – need resolutions authority like FDIC
- The lack of an appropriate regulatory regime and resolution authority for large nonbank financial institutions contributed to this crisis and will continue to constrain our capacity to address future crises. (p7)
— Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S Department of the Treasury
2009 0324 – GOV (House) – Oversight of the Federal Government’s Intervention at American International Group – [PDF-91p, VIDEO-CSPAN] – <mp3, mp4>
- Geithner and Bernanke Testimony on AIG Bonuses
- House – Committee on Financial Services
- Fed Window
- Richard Scott, FCIC MP3 Interview
- 2014 04 – Book – Modernizing Insurance Regulation – John H. Biggs, Matthew P. Richardson – 304p
- 2020 0825 – FSB – Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Insurance Sector – 72p
- NAIC
- GUARANTY FUNDS
- NAIC Insurer Receivership Model Act
- 2009 0924 – GOV (Senate) – Systemic Risk and Resolution Issues / Experts’ Perspectives on Systemic Risk and Resolution Issues – [PDF-128p, VIDEO-CSPAN]
- (p7) – Paul Volcker – “…..insurance companies, which I would say parenthetically I hope better regulatory systems will be developed, maybe not as part of this legislation but next year.”
- (p19) – Paul Volcker – “I would hope this committee would look at the question of national charters for insurance companies and bring them under-at least the big ones-under a framework so that something like AIG with similar problems can’t arise in the future.”
- (p49) – Ed PERLMUTTER (D-CO) – How do we resolve insurance companies?
- Do you know?
- We liquidate them through the insurance commissioner.
- (p25) – Senator Bob CORKER (R-TN) – Well, it may not-I think this whole issue of authority is pretty incredible, and I think all of us realize that the Fed nor anyone else has the authority not only to deal with AIG but Citigroup or Bank-there is nobody.
- I mean, I think that is an amazing thing that for some reason only hits my alarm bell, nobody else’s.
- But there is no entity in our country that has the ability to deal with an AIG, a Citigroup, a Bank of America, anybody.
- I find that pretty incredible.
2009 0305 – GOV (Senate) – American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, And Implications for Future Regulation – CSPAN- Government Intervention and Regulation of AIG – [PDF-72p]
Systemic Risk – Other
Systemic Risk – Other
- 2021 01 – GAO – Macroprudential Oversight, Principles for Evaluating Policies to Assess and Mitigate Risks to Financial System Stability- GAO-21-230SP, Government Accountability Office – 35p
- 2015 07 – IMF – United States – Systemic Risk Oversight and Management – Technical Note, (FSAP) Financial Sector Assessment Program International Monetary Fund – 78p