Misconduct

  • Widespread misconduct in the financial sector on a broad scale creates mistrust, weakening the ability of markets to allocate capital to the real economy.
  • This in turn may give rise to systemic risks, which is why addressing misconduct is part of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) work programme.
  • Recent instances of misconduct have included collusion in the manipulation of wholesale markets and retail mis-selling schemes.

Bankassurance

  • 21 There are various definitions of bankassurance.
    • By focusing on production, a bankassurer can be defined as a financial group or conglomerate that includes both bank credit origination and insurance underwriting.
    • But bankassurance can be limited to distribution agreements only in which a bank merely distributes third-party insurance products in a contractual agreement with an insurer and does not own the underwriting factory.

2011 11 – IAIS – Insurance and Financial Stability – 47p

Transparency

  • Transparency is a concept imported by Spencer Kimball. Hart Hearings, supra 28, at 1086·1237, 1087·1088 – (testimony of Spencer Kimball);
    • [Bonk: Hart Hearings = 1973 / 1974 – GOV (Senate) – The Life Insurance Industry – Phillip Hart (D-MI) – 4 Parts  —  [BonkNote]]

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

Ethics

  • 1970 – AP – The Key Ethical Dilemmas in Marketing Insurance: A Comparison of the Two Main Segments of the Insurance Industry, by Robert W. Cooper, Drake University, by Garry L. Frank, Drake University – 7p – Bad Link – <WishList>
  • 1993 – AP – Ethical Issues, Helps, and Challenges: Perceptions of U.S. Actuaries, by Vaughan, Cooper, Frank – 23p
  • 1991 – JFSP – Ethics In The Life Insurance Industry: The Issues, Helps, And Hindrances, by Robert W. Cooper and Garry L. Frank – 
  • 2005 – AP – The Highly Troubled Ethical Environment of the Life Insurance Industry: Has it Changed Significantly from the Last Decade and if so, why?, by Robert W. Cooper & Garry L. Frank, Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3):149-157 – 
  • 2011 – JFSP -The Ethical Environment of the Life Insurance Industry – 15p
  • Robert W. Cooper, Drake University
  • CEFLI- cefli.org/about-cefli/
  • “As the only non-advocacy organization devoted exclusively to compliance and ethics in the life insurance industry, CEFLI is the premier provider of compliance-related education and training.”

Market Moving Information

  •  I have heard that the designation process is not transparent, and I am all for increased transparency, but I assume the Council must balance transparency against disclosing confidential or potentially market-moving information. (p37/2:08)

—  Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)

2015 0325 – GOV (Senate-Banking) – FSOC Accountability: Nonbank Designations – [PDF-165p,  VIDEO-CSPAN]

  • 1991 0522 – GOV – Executive Life Insurance Failure
    • 51:00- 52:50 – Garamendi – Tennesee Sundquist – Shouldn’t Say, Have to Say /  Can’t Say. Bonds Prices. 
  • Where Was the Press During the S&L Crisis? – c-span.org/video/?7307-1/press-sl-crisis
    • This program is part of a series of three panel discussions entitled “Where Were the Watchdogs When the Savings & Loans Were Robbed?”
  • He (ACLI – John Bruins) said the ACLI is concerned about the reaction that may be received from consumers when their policy illustration changes, even though no changes have been made to the product being illustrated.
    • He noted that several companies have indicated receiving negative reactions from policyowners when their policy illustration changed.

2016 04 – LATF, NAIC Conference Call

  • 2017 0328 – GOV – THE ARBITRARY AND INCONSISTENT NON-BANK SIFI DESIGNATION PROCESS
    • [PDF-83pVIDEO-youtube]
    • Anne Wagner (MO)
    • Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, President, American Action Forum
    • Kupiec, Paul H., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
    • Pollock, Alex J., Distinguished Senior Fellow, R Street Institute 
      Zaring, David, Associate Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
    • House – COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES – SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
  • Second, notwithstanding our disagreement with FSOC’s decision to designate Prudential and MetLife, we are even more troubled by the lack of clarity provided to regulators or even the companies themselves on the specific issues of concern that led to these companies’ designation.
  • This approach ultimately fails to make the financial system safer from the risks the company poses because regulators and the company have little information on how to address the company’s risk to the system.

–NAIC Letter to GOV

2015 0325 – GOV – FSOC Accountability Nonbank Designations   3p

  • (p45) – Q15 – Is the list of products and activities set out in Annex 1 representative of the insurance activities and products that are conducted in the listed jurisdictions? Are there other products and activities that should be added to the list, for example because they have similar features as those in Annex 1? To what extent, if any, will the analysis of the products and activities in Annex 1 allow for the consistent application of the NTNI concept across jurisdictions? Also, are there additional or alternative terms for the listed products and activities that should be added to improve the completeness and clarity of the list?
  • (p47) – Q15 Stakeholders comments
    • Universal life is missing from the list…
      • on behalf of the European GSIIs, Aegon, Allianz, Aviva, Axa and Prudential
      • Association of British Insurers
  • (p48) – Q15 IAIS response
    • (ii) the IAIS decided to discontinue the NTNI product label and to focus on substantial liquidity risk and macroeconomic exposure and their related systemic risk transmission channels, the IAIS believes that it is no longer necessary to proceed with the publication of a list of products as proposed in the CD.

    • It is worth noting that the list of product features, and by extension products considered for the purposes of Phase Il Minimum Guarantees on Variable Product indicator calculation, remains unchanged from the 2013 methodology.

2016 0720 – IAIS – NTNI Consultation Document IAIS Responses to Comments – 51p

  • The IAIS received 56 submissions in response to the 2018 ICS Consultation Document of which 18 were requested by the respondents to be kept confidential.
  • Therefore, the comments that are posted here publicly are a subset of those that the IAIS will be taking into account as it moves forward with the ICS.
  • We thank all stakeholders and members who took the time to provide the many thoughtful comments on all aspects of the ICS.

iaisweb.org/page/supervisory-material/insurance-capital-standard//file/82711/public-2019-iais-field-testing-technical-specifications

  • Mr. Brown, CLU, presented his statement on behalf of the National Association of Life Underwriters.
    • Mr. Brown’s testimony emphasized the market confusion engendered by the FTC’s release of the 1.3% rate of return. He provided numerous examples of misleading and deceptive advertisements based on the FTC press release.
    • He also gave examples of cancellations and replacements of whole life policies caused by the FTC’s misleading release.
    • His point was the grave injury which the FTC’s irresponsible actions have caused average life insurance consumers.

1980-1, NAIC Proceedings

  • (p2) – Q1 – 1 – Based on the above characterisation of NTNI, is the terminology “non-traditional” confusing? If so, what might be a better term than NTNI? Additionally, what might be a better term than “traditional” for products and activities that are not NTNI?
    • The division into “traditional” and “non-traditional” products and activities is not properly fitting, considering that some products classified as systemically risky might be part of an insurer’s traditional business. Thus, terms like “insurance-driven” and “market-driven” would be more appropriate for clarifying the intention behind the distinction of the two. A clearer and also simpler way would be the separation between “potentially systemically risky” and “not systemically.
      • GDV – German Insurance Association
    • Yes, the term “non-traditional” could create confusion. The introduction to the Consultation explains that one main objective is to “provide further clarification on the concepts of NT and explain how their characteristics drive their systemic relevance.” (emphasis added) As this statement suggests, the concept of “non-traditional” is focused on identifying potential sources of systemic significance or risk, and is not intended to define whether an activity is one that insurers have “traditionally” pursued according to the ordinary meaning of that term. As the Consultation notes, an activity might generate systemic risk, even though it is one that has a long-established history, and is therefore one that is “traditionally” offered by insurers in a particular marketplace. Similarly, new products or practices may not be systemically risky, or might reduce overall systemic risk, despite being new or innovative.
      • American Academy of Actuaries
  • (p94) – Q2 – 2 – Are there any other benefit or liquidity features that should be taken into account in identifying NTNI products and activities?
    • It would appear that products where benefits are variable at the discretion of the insurer but where the insurer has no obligation to share profit, such as universal life and certain kinds of deferred annuities sold in the US are not covered in the table.
      • AIA Group – Hong Kong
  • (p94) – Q15 – Is the list of products and activities set out in Annex 1 representative of the insurance activities and products that are conducted in the listed jurisdictions? Are there other products and activities that should be added to the list, for example because they have similar features as those in Annex 1? To what extent, if any, will the analysis of the products and activities in Annex 1 allow for the consistent application of the NTNI concept across jurisdictions? Also, are there additional or alternative terms for the listed products and activities that should be added to improve the completeness and clarity of the list?
    • Universal life is missing from the list, and perhaps some consideration should be given to product packaging, secondary benefits and riders.

—  on behalf of the European GSIIs, Aegon, Allianz, Aviva, Axa and Prudential, Association of British Insurers

IAIS – Compiled Comments on Non-traditional Non-insurance Activities and Products – 153p

A: She <Sheila Bair> was saying that a couple of hundred banks would fail. I thought that was totally imprudent, totally incorrect, and should not have been said.
Q. Why was that imprudent and should not have been said?
A. Because these are people that are supposed to make sure that banks don’t fail.
Q. Why is it that publicly saying that all of these banks are likely to fail, why would you consider that to be imprudent?
A. Because it creates fear.
Q. And what is the problem of creating fear?
A. That it causes the banking system to freeze up. It causes it causes a hording of cash, both within the financial system and outside of the financial system, and that hording of cash results in a negative impact on the economy.
Q. All right. Then you go on to say: are no benefits by having prominent officials claiming that large financial institutions are
“There failing, are insolvent, are incapable of raising funds, or that they should be allowed to fail.”

Bank Atlantic vs. Richard X. Bove and Landenburg

  • Because of the concerns expressed by several states over the potential impact of the survey and at the suggestion of NAIC staff, a draft of the survey was forwarded to the Special (EX) Committee on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
  • The Executive Committee designated Commissioner Earl Pomeroy, as chair of that committee and as the President of NAIC, to provide further input and direction.
  • Accordingly, on Sept. 10, I met with Commissioner Pomeroy, along with Mike Hessler (Ill.), Tom Reents (Neb.) and Art Chartrand (NAIC) to review these issues.
  • First, I wish to greatly express my appreciation to Commissioner Pomeroy for articulating his concerns and providing a productive framework for this subgroup to continue to carryout its charge.
  • As a result of that meeting, it was mutually agreed to suspend the activity on the current survey and to proceed as follows:
    • 2. Commissioner Pomeroy was very supportive of the subgroup recommending to EX3 Subcommittee that it pursue its investigation and make any appropriate recommendations in regard to the use of purported “consumer” groups fronting as leads or advertising agencies for insurance companies.

1991-1A, NAIC Proceedings

TO: Members of the Market Conduct & Consumer Affairs (EX3) Subcommittee
FROM: Brad Connor (Mo.), Chair of EX3 Subgroup on Unfair Trade Practices
DATE: October 11, 1990 .
RE: Meeting with NAIC Leadership on Subgroup’s Projects

Bait and Switch

  • Policies that credit higher interest rates in early years and lower rates in later years came in for criticism.
  • Some characterized such policies as “bait and switch” and thought they should be restricted by regulation or by actuarial standards of practice.  (p4)

1993 07 – AAA – ASB Mulls New Standards, by Gary Corbett, ASB Vice Chairman – The Actuarial Update, July1993-AU – 8p

  • 2023 0520 – Letter – Barry Flagg / Veralytic to Finseca2p
    • I regret to have to resign from Finseca … again, for the following reasons.
      • California Best Interest Rule for insurance products (i.e., CA SB 264). 
      • Lobbying against Client’s Best Interest rules is lobbying for preservation of current NAIC-based regulations that permit agents, brokers and insurers to “quote” low premiums while charging HIGH costs withOUT disclosing either those HIGH costs nor the HIGHer risks of future “premium calls” for more than the originally “quoted” premium or total loss due to policy lapse even when all originally “quoted” premiums were paid.
      • Such “bait-and-switch” sales and marketing practices foster DIS-trust blocking financial security for all, and continue to divide the financial security profession.
      • This current regulatory regime creates an environment where the reckless get rewarded and the prudent get punished.
      • I likewise believe Client’s Best Interests rules for life insurance are BOTH needed to protect consumers against “bait-and-switch” sales and marketing practices AND will lead to sales growth.
      • Insurance products are the last, largest, most-neglected and worst-performing assets on client’s balance sheets (e.g., WSJ: Universal Life Insurance, a 1980s Sensation, Has Backfired – [link-f]). – [Bonk: by Leslie Scism]
      • Client’s Best Interest rules harmonize the operating principles necessary to enable more financial advisors to have more conversations like this with more customers, resulting in BOTH greater financial security for all AND growth in sales.
  • Sheryl Moore (Moore Market Intelligence) said she is concerned that some companies are increasing their insurance charges to subsidize their option budget.
    • She said she is also concerned that the practice of playing “bait-and-switch” with renewal rates is becoming more common among universal life products.

2014-3, NAIC Proceedings – Moore Market Intelligence Letter (9-28-14) ……………. 6-345

  • Bill White, chief actuary, New Jersey, reported on their special project pertaining to universal life. – <WishList>
  • Their commissioner, on June 25, 1982, declared an 81-day moratorium on “Universal-Flexible Factor” type of policies.
  • His staff was directed to
    • (1) study the matter and issue a position paper on the subject;
    • (2) conduct public hearings on March 10-11;
    • (3) terminate the moratorium April 16 with the publishing of a set of guidelines. – <WishList>
  • Reports and results have been mailed to each insurance department.
  • Some of the questions New Jersey conveyed included:
    • (1) are these policies participating or non-participating;
    • (2) the “Bait and Switch” potential;
    • (3) disclosure;
    • (4) Federal Income Tax aspects;
    • (5) non-forfeiture values;
    • (6) replacement problems.
  • The concern was not just with the “twisting” replacements, but was the impact of justified replacements on the solvency of replaced companies.

1982-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • The Larry Gorski Amendment that was adopted says in-force illustrations cannot be less favorable than sales illustrations or the actuary would have to disclose that;
    • the idea is that buyers would be able to find out that a company was utilizing a bait-and-switch strategy in its illustrations

—  William C. Koenig, senior vice president of Northwestern Mutual and the incoming chairperson of the Life Committee of the ASB.

1996 – SOA – Update on Life Insurance Illustrations, Society of Actuaries – 24p

Overfund

  • (p5-7) – Section 2 – Introduction and Background
    • The ultimate goal of this report is to raise awareness regarding the questionable sale of complex insurance products (overfunded UL insurance in particular) in specific circumstances, and to commence a broader discussion regarding specific actions that can be taken to increase adherence to FTC/ICP 19 and to mitigate the potential risk of poor consumer outcomes in the future.

2023 10 – FSRA – Report – Observed Practices in the Distribution and Sale of Universal Life Insurance  —  [BonkNote]  —  15p

  • Consider that there are really two parts to the fund value, at least for a policy that is “over funded” (i.e., has a fund value greater than the GMF).
    • The first part is equal to the GMF.
    • The second part we might call the excess fund, and it is equal to the excess of the fund value over the GMF.
    • [Bonk: GMF – Guaranteed Maturity Fund]

—  James W. Lamson

1988 – SOA – Update on Universal Life Reserves and Non-Forfeiture Values, Society of Actuaries – 36p

  • If the maximum COIs were based on the select and ultimate table, policyholders paying guideline premiums based on the ultimate table could overfund the contract.

2002 – SOA – The New 2001 CSO: Implications for Universal Life Plans, by Nancy Winings, pdn0201 – Society of Actuaries – 6p

  • 2019 0327 – Leimberg – Subject: Barry Flagg: New York Best Interest Rule for Life Insurance – New Requirements for Life Insurance Producers and Ethical Considerations for Other Estate Planners, by Barry Flagg27p
    • [Bonk: Overfund-?] – Premium amounts paid into the policy in excess of this Base/Target Premium can, therefore, be viewed as “excess premium” above and beyond that required to cover the costs of maintain the death benefit.
      • “Excess premiums” are typically intended to either create a cash value reserve as “pre-payment” of what would otherwise be future premiums and/or to grow the policy account for wealth accumulation, retirement planning, and/or asset protection

Non-Traditional

  • The obvious question that springs to mind when asked to consider non-traditional life products is what is meant by “non-traditional”?
  • Upon reflection, virtually every product of significance in today’s market can be termed non-traditional in one way or another.

— Trevor C. Howes

1984 – SOA – Non-Traditional Life Insurance Products–Canada, Society of Actuaries – 28p

  • Let us agree on our terms.
    • What I mean by traditional life policies is the life insurance product stereotypes.
    • A stereotype policy is one which is indivisible and wholly defined, by its terms, at issue.

—  George R Dinney

1982 – SOA – Programs to Conserve Traditional Life Insurance Policies, Society of Actuaries – 18p

  • (p34) – With respect to NT products, the investment guarantee products, and the universal insurance are all systematic trigger factors.
  • [Bonk: NT = non-traditional]

2020 02 – SOA – Systemic Risk in China’s Insurance Industry, Society of Actuaries – 55p

  • 3.2 Non-traditional and non-insurance business activities
  • 28. In contrast, there are business activities that either deviate from, or miss entirely some of, the criteria mentioned above.
  • In life insurance, for example, noninsurance features, such as different types of guarantees or the absence of penalties for early surrenders, have been added to traditional products.
    • These non-traditional features materially change the risk profile of the combined product.
  • Similarly, life insurance products with savings and investment features are characterised as non-traditional by a number of supervisors.
  • As for reinsurance, the underwriting of reinsurance contracts is a traditional function.
    • However, reinsurance contracts with limited or no risk transfers can change the risk profile, making at least part of the insurance business non-traditional or even non-insurance.

2011 11 – IAIS – Insurance and Financial Stability – 47p

  • At your June meeting, your task force received a draft of a proposed revision of the NAIC Life Insurance Solicitation Model Regulation.
    • This proposal would incorporate the following new features into the model regulation:
    • 2. A special plans section to accommodate the unique features of nontraditional plans such as universal life insurance.

—  Statement on Behalf of the American Council Of Life Insurance (ACLI To The NAIC (A) Committee’s Life Cost Disclosure Task Force – November 29, 1982 – p523

1983-1, NAIC Proceedings

  • Finally, there are issues of adequacy.
  • Are the state guarantee funds adequate to deal with a major failure?
  • I don’t believe that Executive Life was a major failure.
  • I believe that there are major failures waiting for us, because of the life insurance industry’s switch from the product that it was selling.
  • When I was taking actuarial exams, the product that was being sold was the guarantee about human mortality.
  • That was what we sold then, and now we’re selling investments.
    • We’re selling universal life, and we’re selling GICs.
    • These have very little to do with what we originally started from, and what the industry built on.

Now we’re competing with banks and brokerage houses and stock markets for investment dollars.

—  James A. Kenney, Consulting Actuary, Coates and Kenney Associates in Berkeley, California

1992 – SOA – Is There Life After Executive Life? Retirement Plan Participants and The Guarantees Of Insurance Companies, Society of Actuaries – 22p

Rate Regulation

  • Rate regulation is not an issue that pertains to the life market.

— William Fisher, ACLI / Vice President and Associate General Counsel for the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, on behalf of the American Council of Life Insurers

2001 0621 – GOV (House) – Insurance Product Approval: The Need for Modernization, Richard H. Baker (R-LA) – [PDF-208p, VIDEO-?] 

  • Commissioner David Lyons (Iowa) convened the Life Insurance (A) Committee for the purpose of conducting a hearing on the Second Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Life Insurance and the Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Deferred Annuities. 
  • Bill Carroll. (American Council of Life lnsurance-ACLI) said the ACLI did not believe the life insurance model should be adopted in its present form because it constituted rate regulation, especially in respect to non-traditional products, referred to as fund-based products.
    • [Bonk: fund-based products ≅ Universal Life]

1994-1, NAIC Proceedings

  • There is no rate regulation for life insurance companies in any State that I know of.
    • Life insurance is an open competition rate, and has been very successful that way; there’s been no regulation.  (p5)

—  Statement of John C. Neff, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance

1985 Part 1 1116, 1223, 1230 – GOV (Senate) – The Cost and Availability of Liability Insurance for Small Business – [PDF-1163p-GooglePlay-link]

General Accounts

  • 1983 – SOA – Segmentation of Insurance Company General Accounts, Society of Actuaries – 38p
  • 5. A general account is a design feature that is generally available to purchasers of whole or universal life insurance whereby the general assets of the insurance company support the policyholder’s CSV <Cash Surrender Value>.  (p134/5)

2005 05 – Commercial Bank Examination Manual – Purchase and Risk Management of Life Insurance, Effective date November 2005 Section 4042.1, Interagency Statement on the Purchase and Risk –  Management of Life Insurance – 318p