FCIC - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

  • 2011 01 - FCIC - Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States - 663p
    • fcic.law.stanford.edu/report///Index
      • Conclusions of The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - 14p
      • Appendix B: Life of Hearings and Witnesses - 8p
      • The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report Index - 20p
      • Dissenting Statement - Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Bill Thomas - 29p 
      • Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies - American Enterprise Institute - 98p 
  • 2011 0127 - FCIC - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Final Report -  [VIDEO-CSPAN]
  • 2011 0216 - GOV (House) - The Final Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
  • 2009 0227 - Letter - NAIC to FRB (Thomas C. Baxter) - National Association of Insurance Commissioners to Thomas C. Baxter - 2p
  • LC - causeofaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/118676749-Nara-Filing-Fcic.pdf
  • 2011 04 - Leading Articles & Commentary on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Compiled by the Robert Crown Law Library - 11p
  • 2016 0311 - WSJ - Analysis of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Documents Release - [link]
  • "sb-aig"
  • 2010 0830 - FCIC - Report - Preliminary Staff Report - Governmental Rescues of "Too-Big-to-Fail" Financial Institutions- 43p
    • In addition, AIG was exposed to significant losses from its securities lending operation.
      • That operation pooled investment securities held by AIG‟s life insurance subsidiaries and lent out those securities in exchange for cash collateral.
      • The securities lending operation invested that cash collateral in a variety of securities, including $45 billion of MBS. As the MBS became illiquid in 2007, AIG was unable to sell the MBS to raise the cash needed to repay its securities lending counterparties.
      • In early September 2008, counterparties demanded that AIG return $24 billion in cash, thereby aggravating AIG‟s liquidity problems.110
        • 110 COP (2010b), at 42-46.
    • The rescue of AIG raised immediate questions as to why the Fed and the Treasury decided to save AIG and not Lehman.
      • Fed chairman Bernanke addressed those questions in the following testimony he delivered at congressional hearings on September 23 and 24, 2008:
  • Insurance Commissioners - During 2008 Crisis
    • Joel Ario (PA)- Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner
    • Eric Dinallo (NY)- New York Insurance Commissioner
    • Sandy Praeger (KS) - Kansas Commissioner of Insurance, President, NAIC
      • 2008 1006 - NAIC to GOV Letter - Praeger, Waxman, Davis - [link to NAIC Page - 4p]
        • (p1-2) - The problems stem from the operations of AIG’s holding company, its financial products division, and its securities lending division, regulated at the Federal level by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
    • Doug Slape (TX) - Chief Deputy Commissioner of the Texas Department of Insurance
    • Terri Vaughan (IA) - NAIC CEO

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