Strengthening the SEC's Vital Enforcement Responsibilities: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, on Examining the Important Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Protecting Investors by Aggressively Enforcing Federal Securities Laws, May 7, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
2009 MARCH 24 - MODERNIZING BANK SUPERVISION AND REGULATION—PART II
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE
3 - STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING - As Mr. Whalen points out, probably the most important thing wecan do for stability is make sure regulators have the rules and powers in place to close failing firms in a quick but controlled manner. If we do not do that, markets will know the future Citigroups and AIGs of the world will not bring down the entire system. And market participants will act more responsibly because they know they will bear the consequences of their action. That will go a long way in creating a more stable system.
10 - ABA also supports creating a mechanism for the orderly resolution of systemically important nonbank firms. Our regulatory bodies should never again be in the position of making up an impromptu solution to a Bear Stearns or an AIG or not being able to resolve a Lehman Brothers. The inability to deal with these situations in a predetermined way greatly exacerbated the crisis.
12 - STATEMENT OF RICHARD CHRISTOPHER WHALEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, INSTITUTIONAL RISK ANALYTICS - Everybody on the street knew that AIG was the dumbest guy in the room. They all knew, and they sucked that firm’s blood for almost 7 years. Now we have to pay for it? No. I disagree.
18 - pletely incapable of making a decision like that, in my opinion.
Senator SHELBY. What is the end game with AIG, as you see it?
More taxpayers’ money floating their business and——
Mr. WHALEN. No. I pray to God that we find the courage to put
that company out of its misery and put it into bankruptcy, where
it should have been 6 months ago, because if we don’t do that, then
we are holding the people of the United States and the world hostage to the credit default swap market. If you put AIG into bankruptcy, you are not going to end the world, but you are going to
end the credit default swap market as we know it, and I think that
would be a beneficial thing for everybody.
Senator SHELBY. There is no end game, is there.
Mr. WHALEN. Well, if we have the courage, there is——
Senator SHELBY. No, but there is not right at the moment.
Mr. WHALEN. No, not at the moment. No. Absolutely not.
18-19 - Senator SHELBY. Mr. Whalen, do you envision a powerful regulator of all of our financial institutions, in a sense, including insur ance, because of the risk that some companies like AIG have
caused in the marketplace.
Mr. WHALEN. Well, as I said in my remarks, I think the Congress needs to mandate a level playing field as far as disclosure goes, because that way, companies like mine can rate insurance companies, too. It is very difficult to do insurance companies right now because the industry sits on the data. The NAIC will not do what they need to do to get that data really usable like the FDIC.
19 - elves, have we not.
Mr. WHALEN. Our colleagues talked about the mountaintop, the
God’s eye view. There is no such thing, my friends. I work in analytics. I worked in finance my whole life. There is no God’s eye
view. And even when you give people information, they don’t necessarily act on it. One of my best friends wrote a piece about AIG
in 2001 that was covered in The Economist. Herb Greenberg
threatened to sue him, and he didn’t back down and eventually
AIG had to go away. He was right, but nobody paid attention.
Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, on Examining the Regulation of Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools to Assist Regulators in Addressing Fraud and Preventing Systemic Risk in Our Capital Markets, July 15, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
The Economy and Fraud: Protecting Consumers During Downward Economic Times : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, July 14, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance
Advertising Trends and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, July 22, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance
Securitization of Assets: Problems and Solutions : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, on Examining the Securitization of Mortgages and Other Assets, October 7, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
Additional Reforms to the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, December 9, 2009
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session ... July 29, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
Over-the-counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce Risks : Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, on Modernizing the Regulation of the Over-the-counter Derivatives Markets and the Institutions that Participate in These Markets, June 22, 2009
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
(p44) - Damon Silvers, COP Member - So, for example, a credit default swap looks a lot like bond insurance.
(p72) - Statement of Joel Seligman, President, University of Rochester
Second, the scope of any systematic review of financial regulation should be comprehensive.
This not only means that obvious areas of omission today, such as credit default swaps and hedge funds, need to be part of the analysis but also means, for example, our historic system of state insurance regulation should be re-examined as well as current securities laws exemptions for areas, including municipal securities.
The fact that the Federal Government provided over $100 billion to insurance giant AIG alone suggests that insurance regulation is no longer purely a state matter.
2009 0121 - GOV (Senate) - Financial Regulation: Where Were the Watchdogs? The Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of Financial Governance, Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT)
[VIDEO-Clip] - Bean/ Vaughan - Solvency, did AIG need the money?
(p35) - Ed Royce (R-CA) - Earlier, Mr. Bachus alluded to this notion that the underwriting side of AIG overseen by the State insurance regulators was somehow walled off from the abstract securities lending division. Unfortunately, news reports, such as the Wall Street Journal article that was dated October 10, 2008, which I would like to insert into the record, detail the inaccuracy of this perception.
Let me just read from the article from the Wall Street Journal: ‘‘Securities lending has long been a reliable side business for life insurers, approved by state regulators. But Moody’s warned in April about the risks that insurers were taking related to these programs. -
2008 1010 - WSJ - AIG Increases Borrowings While Racing to Sell Assets, by Liam Pleven, Carrick Mollenkamp and Craig Karmin - [link-Free]
Doug Slape, Texas Insurance Commission
2009 0305 - Testimony - AAA, James Rech, Vice President, Risk Management and Financial Reporting Council of the American Academy of Actuaries - 5p
House - Committee on Financial Services - Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
2009 0305 - GOV (Senate) - American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, And Implications for Future Regulation, (CSPAN) Government Intervention and Regulation of AIG, Chris Dodd (D-CT) --- [BonkNote]
CFA - J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America, Reserve Relief, Guaranty Funds - Testimony - 47p
ACLI - Frank Keating, President and CEO, The American Council of Life Insurers
(p33) - Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) - You know, there are very few complaints. I mean, life insurance is not what drives complaints at your State Insurance Commissioner’s officer, really, is it? It is just a small percentage, is it not?
Senate - Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
2009 0318 - GOV (House) - American International Group’s Impact On The Global Economy: Before, During, And After Federal Intervention, Federal Aid to AIG Insurance, Regulators Panel (CSPAN), Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) --- [BonkNote]
Geithner (DOTT), Bernanke (FRB), William Dudley (FRB-NY)
(p13) - Bernanke - Conceivably, its failure could have resulted in a 1930’s-style global financial and economic meltdown, with catastrophic implications for production, income, and jobs.
House - Committee on Financial Services
2009 0325 - GOV (House) - Roles and Responsibilities of Inspectors General in Financial Markets Regulatory Agencies
CFA - Testimony of Barbara Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America - 35p
(p31) - We also agree with NAIC Chief Executive Officer Therese Vaughn, who said in testimony at the same hearing,* “In our view, an entity poses systemic risk when that entity’s activities have the ability to ripple through the broader financial system and trigger problems for other counterparties, such that extraordinary action is necessary to mitigate it.”
Further Examining What Went Wrong In The Securities Markets, How We Can Prevent The Practices That Led To Our Financial System Problems, And How To Protect Investors
2009 0402 - GOV (House) - The Collapse and Federal Rescue of AIG, and What it Means for the U.S., Hank Greenberg, AIG - Edolphus Towns (D-NY) --- [BonkNote]
(p22) - Senator Richard SHELBY (R-AL). A threshold question comes to me: What constitutes ‘‘too big to fail’’? What constitutes that?
Senator SHELBY. How do you define that?
Sheila BAIR (FDIC) - It is difficult to define.
I think it is market perception as much as a precise definition.
Brookings Institute - Prepared Statement of Martin Neil Baily Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, And Former Chairman Of The Council Of Economic Advisers Under President Clinton, And Robert E. Litan1 May 6, 2009
(p93) - Large troubled life insurers can also generate systemic risks if policyholders run to cash out their life insurance policies, or if the millions of retirees who rely on annuities suddenly learn that their contracts may not be honored sharply curtail their spending as a result.
Senate - Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
2009 0513 - GOV (House) - AIG: Where is the Taxpayers Money Going?, AIG Collapse and Rescue, Ed Liddy Testimony
Baird Webel - 3:30 - What is Systemic Risk? So is an Asteroid a financial Risk? What does a Systemic Risk Regulator have to do about this? <Bonk: Atomic Bomb 1950's Newspaper Article>. Who would represent the Insurance Industry on a systemic risk panel?
2009 0514 - Testimony - AAA - James Rech, Vice President, Risk Management and Financial Reporting Council - of the American Academy of Actuaries - 12p
House - Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
2009 0603 - GOV (House) - Challenges Facing the Economy, (CSPAN) State of the U.S. Economy, John Spratt (D-SC)
Q: Marcy Kaptur (D-OH): 14. Can you give me your thoughts on why AIG was saved, and Chrysler and GM allowed to enter bankruptcy? Sure you were involved in each discussion to some degree.
A: Bernanke: A failure of AIG would likely have resulted in harm to the holders of policies issued by AIG's insurance subsidiaries, to state and local governments that lent funds to AIG, to workers whose 401(k) plans had purchased insurance from AIG, to global banks and investment companies that were counterparties of AIG in loans and derivatives transactions, and to money market mutual funds and other investors that held AIG's commercial paper.
Moreover, as broad market dislocations precipitated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers have shown, there was a serious risk that the harm of an AIG default would spread to the financial system as a whole.
As I explained in my testimony, an AIG failure could have exacerbated problems in the commercial paper market, could have led to a run on the broader insurance industry by policyholders and creditors, and could have led financial market participants to pull back even further from commercial and investment banks.
House - Committee on the Budget
2009 0616 - GOV (House) - Systemic Risk and Insurance, CSPAN (Insurance and Systemic Risk), Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) --- [BonkNote]
approx. 21:00 - Melissa Bean - AIG's Problems weren't just in the Financial Products area, also was in the Securities Lending Department, Activities, products,
approx. 29:00 - European Union - Peter Skinner
1:26 - Patrick Baird (ACLI)
1:27 - NAIC, Michael McRaith, Director, Illinois Department of Insurance
1:27:30 - Michael Capuano (D-MA)
NAIC - Michael T. McRaith, Director, Illinois Department of Insurance -16p
House - Committee on Financial Services - Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
2009 0622 - GOV (Senate) - OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES: MODERNIZING OVERSIGHT TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND REDUCE RISKS
2009 0716 - GOV (House-OGR) - Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout? Part III, Edolphus Towns (D-NY) --- [BonkNote]
House – Joint Hearing - Committee on Oversight and Government Reform - Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy of House of Representatives
2009 0721 - GOV (House) - Are Some Institutions Too Big To Fail And If So, What Should We Do About It?, Barney Frank (D-MA)
(p36) - Jim BUNNING (R-KY) - Yes, but they are at the trough every time they have a problem, whether they are a finance company or whether they are an insurance company, whether they are an auto company.
CII - Ann Yerger, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors - 106p
(p16) - One important lesson of the recent crisis is that as financial products and services proliferate and become more complex, they often fall through the regulatory cracks.
Senate - Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
2009 0910 - GOV (House) - The Risks of Financial Modeling: VAR and the Economic Meltdown
(p7) - Paul Volcker - ".....insurance companies, which I would say parenthetically I hope better regulatory systems will be developed, maybe not as part of this legislation but next year." (p7)
(p19) - Paul Volcker - "I would hope this committee would look at the question of national charters for insurance companies and bring them under—at least the big ones—under a framework so that something like AIG with similar problems can’t arise in the future." (p19)
(p49) - Ed PERLMUTTER (D-CO) - How do we resolve insurance companies? Do you know? We liquidate them through the insurance commissioner.
Senate - Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
2009 0924 - GOV (House) - Recent Innovations in Securitization
(p6) - Ed Royce (R-CA) - Our architects of this Republic added the commerce clause to the Constitution precisely to prevent a fragmented economy. They envisioned one national market, not a market where local and State
governments with conflicting State laws could strangle free trade among the States. We have seen the ill effects of this type of patchwork regulatory system in our insurance market. I think it would be a grave mistake to move forward with that failed model for the rest of the financial services sector.
(p34) - Ed Royce (R-CA) - I think there is a broad agreement that the current State-based insurance system is inefficient; the studies that I have seen have a tag of about $10 billion cost to the consumer. It also hampers U.S. competitiveness. I am thinking about the Schumer-Bloomberg study and other studies. The lack of a centralized regulator with the ability to look at the entire U.S. market, certainly those were the concerns that the Treasury Department laid out in their regulatory reform proposal. So as we are working to streamline and consolidate regulatory authority in the insurance portion of our financial system, especially in light of some of the problems with AIG and so forth, it appears we may be taking a step back, then, in the rest of the financial services sector with this CFPA. Let me ask you, do we run the risk of replicating many of the problems that have arisen in the insurance market throughout the financial services sector with this legislation if we go down this road?
Mr. JOHN. That is specifically my concern, yes.
House - Committee on Financial Services
2009 1006 - GOV (House) - Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office, Barney Frank (D-MA)
(p75) - **David B. ATKINSON. (Executive Vice President, Reinsurance Group of America (RGA), on behalf of the Reinsurance Association of America (RAA)) -
There have been insolvencies. We do have a State guarantee system that backs up
Spencer BACHUS (R-AL) - So there were no losses?
Mr. ATKINSON. Insolvency regulation has worked well. It has been a success. [Bonk: Non-Responsive]
House - Committee and Subcommittee Committee on Financial Services
Harvey R. Miller, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP Oral Testimony.
David Moss, Harvard Business School
(p96-97) - David Moss - But I will just remind you that with FDIC-which, by the way, I think the resolution mechanism works quite well with FDIC-but it is attached to an insurance system that protects depositors. I suspect that if that insurance system did not exist we would be very reluctant to put a major bank into resolution for fear that it would spark runs on other banks by fearful depositors.
So there is a question of how we stabilize the broader financial system, whether we put a major financial institution into bankruptcy or resolution. Do we have a system for protecting the healthy institutions at the same time? I would be glad to talk about that in more detail if that would be helpful, but those are my broad comments.
House - Committee On The Judiciary - Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
2009 1028 - GOV (House) - Executive Compensation: How Much Is Too Much? - (CSPAN) Executive Pay and TARP-Funded Companies
(p51) - Mr. SULLIVAN. (CT-Insurance Commissioner) - And I would point to the area that we regulate, the dominion that we have authority over, insurance has very high capital standards. And as a consequence, we have not seen failures within the insurance industry. I can count on one hand over the last 3 years the insurance affiliates that have failed during the most significant upheavals in the financial market while we have seen hundreds of banks fail during the same time.
Mr. MANZULLO. (R-IL) - Then some witnesses here want to pool the entire insurance industry.
Mr. SULLIVAN. And we are very skeptical about any grab of such authority when we have a proven system that works.
2009 1029 - GOV (House) - Systemic Regulation, Prudential Matters, Resolution Authority, And Securitization, Financial Industry Regulations, Business Interests (CSPAN)