Government Reports

  • REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

1940s

  • 1949 - GOV - Profits: Report of a Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on The Economic Report On Profits Hearings - [PDF-249p]
    • (p3) - A recurrent theme in the hearings was the drying up of the security market for equity issues and the increasing dependence on institutional borrowing, such as that which might be obtained from the big banks or the insurance companies. Great divergence was evident in the testimony of the witnesses as to the causes and cure for this situation.
    • Mr. MONTGOMERY. From what I understand, the life insurance companies are looking for some one to borrow their money, because there is no place to put it.
  • 1949 01 - (GOV - Joint) - January 1949 Economic Report of the President -  [PDF-698p]
  • United States Government Efforts To Combat Fraud And Abuse In The Insurance Industry
    • 1995 0605 - GOV Report - FOURTH INTERIM REPORT ON UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: PROBLEMS IN BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD PLANS IN WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, WASHINGTON, DC, NEW YORK, AND FEDERAL CONTRACTS

1970s

  • 1972 - GOV (JEC-Report) - Studies In Public Welfare, Paper No. 11,  The Labor Market Impacts of the Private Retirement System. A Study Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of The Joint Economic Committee - 135p
    • (p8) - For instance the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 extended the deduction privilege for the first time to investment earnings of pension funds held by insurance companies, permitting them to maintain these funds in separate accounts, and this led to the vigorous expansion of insured plans.
      • The Self-Employed Individuals' Retirement Act of 1962 (The Keogh Act) gave the self employed the opportunity to deduct a proportion of their salary for a bona fide retirement plan, and this, along with subsequent amendments, contributed to the growth of small plans.4
    • (p17) - In terms of the funding method, pensions may be provided through the purchase of annuities from life insurance companies, through the accumulation of resources in a trust fund, through a combination of these two, or out of general assets of the employer. Roughly a fifth of all pension plans covering over 100 employees are insured; these account for 18 percent of all annual contributions. Two-thirds of plans and contributions involve trust funds. Eight percent of the plans and
      15 percent of the contributions are combinations of the insured and trust fund methods. Only 2.5 percent of all plans covering over 100 employees are unfunded or "pay-as-you-go," that is, financed out of current revenues, and these account for less than 1 percent of annual contributions.23 Pension plans with less than 100 participants account for only a small share of total coverage. "Keogh" plans for the selfemployed and their workers have expanded rapidly, with over 130,000 small pension plans for the self-employed in 1970 (in addition to a smaller number in the self-employed profit-sharing plans), yet these had less than 200,000 participants. Most of these small plans are held with insurance companies. 24 The method of funding affects costs and benefit security somewhat. The employee in an insured plan probably has the most certainty of getting an earned benefit, since insurance companies make it their business to guarantee that funding schedules are met; the participant in an unfunded plan must depend on the continued profitability of its sponsor and there is little benefit security. On the other hand, the insurance approach usually costs more for plans of equal size and offers less flexibility to the employer than the trust fund approach, especially for larger plans. In terms of labor market impacts, however, there are few differences between insured and trusteed plans.25
  • 1973 10 - GOV - Report - United States Government Publications - Monthly Catalog - 156p
  • 1979 - GOV (House-Report) - Life Insurance Marketing and Cost Disclosure Report Together with Dissenting Views, House - Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce - Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Moss (D-CA) - [PDF-106p]
    • 1978 0807, 0814 and 0815 - GOV (House) - Life Insurance Marketing and Cost Disclosure, John Moss (D-CA)  ---  [BonkNote]

1980s

  • 1983 0311 - GOV (Senate - Committee on Finance) - Taxation of Financial Services Industry (HRG98) - [PDF-356p]
  • 1985 05 - The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity
    • Part B. Life Insurance Companies and Products ....253
    • 10.06 Impose Current Taxation on Life Insurance
    • Inside Build-Up .......254
    • 10.07 Impose Current Taxation on Deferred Annuity
    • Investment Income ......259
    • 10.08 Limit Life Insurance Company Reserve Deduction .........261
    • 10.09 Repeal Special Life Insurance Company Deductions .........263
  • 1985 11 - FTC - Report - Life Insurance Products And Consumer Information, by Michael P. Lynch and Robert J. Mackay,  Staff Report Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission  ---  [BonkNote]  ---  [PDF-317p]

1990s

  • 1990 02 - GOV (House-Report) - Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies - John Dingell (D-MI) - [PDF-81p]
    • House - Committee on Energy and Commerce - Subcommittee on  Oversight and Investigations
  • 1991 03 - GOV (House-Report) - A Descriptive Analysis of the Insurance Industry in the United States
    • [PDF-185p-GooglePlay] -> Not on govinfo.gov
    • House -  Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs - Subcommittee on Policy Research and Insurance on the US Insurance Industry
      • The Subcommittee wishes to thank Joseph E. Ross, Director of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, for authorizing the use of CRS materials and making available CRS staff towards the development of this print.
      • The Subcommittee is especially appreciative of Jean Rosales, Economic Analyst of the CRS Economics Division, who coordinated the CRS effort by compiling the work of the below mentioned authors and wrote a substantial portion of the text.
  • 1992 - GOV (Senate-Report) - The BCCI Affair - A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations - Senator John Kerry (D-MA) and Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), 102d Congress 2d Session, Senate Print 102-140 - [PDF-583p]
  • 1994 10 - GOV (House-Report) - Wishful Thinking: A World View of Insurance Solvency Regulation - John Dingell (D-MI)  ---  [BonkNote]  ---  [PDF-137p]
    • Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
  • 1995 0619 - GOV (Senate-Report) - Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 - Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs United States Senate To Accompany S. 240 Together With Additional Views - 55p
    • (p9) - This abusive litigation also threatens to undermine one of the underpinnings of the Federal securities laws—disclosure to investors. Risk-averse corporate management avoid discussions of future business plans. Many companies refuse to talk or write about future business plans, knowing that projections that fail to materialize will inevitably result in a lawsuit.24 
    • Underwriters, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals are prime targets of abusive securities lawsuits. The deeper the pocket, the greater the likelihood that a marginal party will be named as a defendant in a securities class action. The availability of insurance also drives these lawsuits. In 1994 alone, $1.4 billion was paid out by corporations or their insurers to settle securities lawsuits.25
    • The ‘‘victims’’ on whose behalf these lawsuits are allegedly brought often receive only pennies on the dollar in damages.26 Even worse, long-term investors ultimately end up paying the costs associated with the lawsuits. As the Council for Institutional Investors advised: ‘‘We are * * * hurt if a system allows someone to force us to spend huge sums of money in legal costs by merely paying ten dollars and filing a meritless cookie cutter complaint against a company or its accountants when that plaintiff is disappointed in his or her investment.’’27
  • 1998 0921 - GOV (Senate-Report) - Federal Employees Life Insurance Improvement Act - Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs to accompany H.R. 2675 - 19p
    • To require that the Office of Personnel Management submit proposed legislation under which Group Universal Life insurance and Group Variable Universal Life Insurance would be available under chapter 87 of title 5, united states code, and for other purposes.
  • 1999 0914 - GOV (House-Report) - Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999  ---  [BonkNote]  ---  47p

2000s

  • 2005-2006 - GOV (Senate) - Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions - Senate - Committee on the Budget, Committee Print 109-72, 109th Congress - [PDF-1002p]

2010s

  • 2010 0125 - GOV (House - Report) - Public Disclosure As A Last Resort: How the Federal Reserve Fought to Cover Up the Details of the AIG Counterparties Bailout From the American People: Special Report, Darrell Issa (R-CA) - 22p
  • 2010 0518 - GOV (House - Report) - The SEC: Designed for Failure - Committee on Oversight and Government Reform - Darrell Issa (R-CA) - 33p
  • 2014 - GOV (House - Report) - Legislative and Oversight Accomplishments of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,  Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA), Staff Report - [PDF-421p]
    • A CHANGE IN FOCUS: THE BAILOUT OF AIG
    • FRBNY to the Rescue?
      • Collateralized debt obligations are bundled investments that offer a cash flow to whoever holds it.
        • These financial instruments became very popular before the financial crisis because banks could bundle together the various loans and mortgages they held and sell them in pieces, thereby creating an immediate cash infusion.
        • Over time, crafty professionals found this to be a way to hide, for example, bad sub-prime mortgages that might present a serious risk of default.
        • While AIG’s investment branch would bundle asset-backed payment streams into CDOs and then sell interests in the CDOs to investment firms such as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs,648 another branch of AIG would sell CDS as insurance against default on the CDOs – sometimes to the same firms.
          • This internal contradiction placed AIG in a precarious position where it would be forced to make payments either way – an illogical position that resulted from branches acting independently and without an understanding of the risks posed.
        • 648 Id. at 20.
    • House - Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
  • 2017 0228 - GOV (House - Report) - Report Prepared by The Republican Staff of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives - [PDF-60p]