Jim Millstein

  • 2009-2011 - U.S. Department of the Treasury - Chief Restructuring Officer
    • 2008 Financial Crisis
  • 2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG ---  [BonkNote]  --- [PDF-241p] - [VIDEO-CSPAN-Parts 4 and 5]
    • 2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - Written Testimony - Jim Millstein (Chief Restructuring Officer U.S. Department of the Treasury), Congressional Oversight Panel - 14p
  • 2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG ---  [BonkNote]  --- [PDF-241p] - [VIDEO-CSPAN-Parts 4 and 5]
    • (p218) - Damon SILVERS. I wasn’t planning to ask this, but I now feel compelled to do so.
      • I notice Mr. McWatters didn’t bring up Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan, so obviously it’s on Treasury’s mind.
      • Is it not the case that in the week of September 15, 2008, that the cash calls that the company could not meet were in two lines of business and two lines of business only.
      • And but for those cash calls, none of this would have been necessary?
      • And those two lines of business were, and it depends on what— you know you can believe or not—you can argue I guess with the state insurance regulators, they certainly were the swaps business and they may have been the securities lending business. 
      • And but for those two enterprises, none of this would have occurred?
      • Is that not so?
    • Jim MILLSTEIN. That is not so. So let me——
    • Mr. SILVERS. Are you seriously asserting that if you wipe those two pieces of business off the books, that AIG was nonetheless insolvent?
    • Mr. MILLSTEIN. Let me——
    • Mr. SILVERS. And are you accusing the New York State Insurance Commissioner of lying to this panel?
    • Mr. MILLSTEIN. Can I answer the question? I’m trying to be——
    • Mr. SILVERS. I’m just astounded at the lengths you will go to to defend something that may, in fact, be defensible in a perfectly straightforward way.
  • millstein.law.columbia.edu/people/james-millstein
    • pre-2000 - Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton - Partner and Head of the Corporate Restructuring practice
      • representation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in LTV’s Chapter 11 proceedings
    • 2000-2008 - Lazard - Managing Director and Global Co-Head of Corporate Restructuring at Lazard 
    • 2009-2011 - U.S. Department of the Treasury - Chief Restructuring Officer
      • 2008 Financial Crisis
    • ?-2018 -Founder and Chief Executive Officer at Millstein & Co.
    • Current (as of 2023) - Guggenheim Securities - Co-Chairman

    • J.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar.

    • M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley 
    • B.A. in Politics from Princeton University.
  • 2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG - [PDF-241p
    • (p218) - Jim Millstein (Chief Restructuring Officer, U.S. Department of the Treasury):
      • All of the contracts at AIGFP are guaranteed by the parent.
        • The parent has a $100 billion dollar balance sheet of its own.
      • On September 8th of 2008, with $15 billion dollars of commercial paper, we all know what happened to Lehman Brothers, to the commercial paper markets after Lehman Brothers filed and defaulted on $5 billion dollars of commercial paper.
      • Fifteen billion dollars of commercial paper at the parent company.
  • (p218) - Jim Millstein - Fifteen billion dollars of commercial paper at the parent company.
    • Eighty billion dollars of repo.
    • Again, the repo markets went into seizure after the Lehman Brothers filing. And a much smaller amount of repo.
    • Two trillion dollars of notional derivatives, $400 billion of credit derivatives, concentrated very much in the real estate part of the market. 

2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - TARP and Other Government Assistance for AIG - [PDF-241p]

  • (p4) - Of equal concern, the default by AIG and AIGFP on more than $100 billion of institutional indebtedness, including $15 billion of commercial paper and $85 billion of short-term repurchase obligations9  would have exacerbated the stresses in the money market and repo markets driven by Lehman’s bankruptcy.
    • 9 Includes securities lending obligations. 

2010 0526 - COP - Hearing - Written Testimony - Jim Millstein (Chief Restructuring Officer U.S. Department of the Treasury) - 14p