MetLife vs. FSOC

  • 4.3.5.3 Disincentives to General Account Surrenders (p169-179)
    • 1. Policyholder Surrenders
      • The error of MetLife’s approach is epitomized by its treatment of the Council’s conclusion that, in the event of MetLife’s material financial distress, insurance policyholders could surrender their policies and demand cash.
      • MetLife contends that the Council did not “offer any response to MetLife’s showing that it would be irrational for the average policyholder to terminate early because doing so could trigger penalties and taxes, and because a terminating policyholder might not be able to obtain replacement coverage.” MetLife Br. 45.
      • But in an eight-page section of its analysis entitled “Disincentives to General Account Surrenders,” the Council provided a point-by-point response to these arguments. Final Determination 167-75 [JA 529-37]; see also id. at 175-77 [JA 537-39] (analyzing historical evidence of policyholder surrenders)

USCA Case #16-5086 Document #1635077 Filed: 09/09/2016 Page 1 of 37 - REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT (FSOC) - 37p

Documents 85-2 and 85-3 - 2015 0930 - MetLife v FSOC - 15-CV-45 387p