Posts by Bonk
Advocis
Advocis
- 2015 0915 – Advocis – Comment – Expert Committee to Consider Financial Advisory and Financial Planning Policy Alternatives – 274p
- 2016 0715 – Advocis – Comment – Re: CCIR – Segregated Funds Working Group Issues Paper, May 2016 – 46p
- CLHIA Reference Document IVIC Suitability Needs-Based Sales Practices (February 2013) provides a fulsome discussion of relevant suitability guidelines for IVIC sales.
CHLIA Guideline G2, Individual Variable Insurance Contracts relating to Segregated Funds, - CLHIA/IFB/Advocis document “The Approach,” which provides needs analysis criteria.
- Appendix One of FSCO’s September 2014 Life Insurance Product Suitability Report
- Insurance Distribution in Canada: Promoting a Customer-Focused System, the CLHIA
- The CCIR asserts (with no reference to documentary evidence) that complaint and enforcement data indicate that some life insurers may not be monitoring the product knowledge and sales practices of those selling their products in a manner that is comparable to the monitoring conducted on the mutual funds sector. Moreover, the complaint and examination files surveyed by the CCIR indicate that in some cases life insurers have not accepted responsibility for the sales conduct of licensed intermediaries selling their products.
- Insurers are best positioned to be responsible for oversight of advisors
- Advocis believes that the insurer must bear the responsibility for oversight of the advisor. Indeed, they are the only party properly positioned to do so.
- CLHIA Reference Document IVIC Suitability Needs-Based Sales Practices (February 2013) provides a fulsome discussion of relevant suitability guidelines for IVIC sales.
Cannibal Life
Cannibal Life
- Cannibal Life is a medium-size stock life insurance company owned by a powerful non-financial company.
- Its management and that of its parent company are aggressive and non-traditional; its agency organization is traditional and commission-oriented.
- At the urging of its parent company, Cannibal Life decides to adopt a completely new marketing strategy designed to achieve major market penetration.
- It decides to withdraw all currently issued life insurance plans and to offer only the Universal Life Insurance Policy, notwithstanding the risk of losing its entire agency organization.
1975/1999 – SOA – The Universal Life Insurance Policy, by James C. H. Anderson, Society of Actuaries – 10p
- Tom BAKOS: Well, I guess I’d just like to mention that I think actually UL was developed in 1960-something-or-other.
- FROM THE FLOOR: That was adjustable life.
- Tom BAKOS: I think Cannibal Life was the precursor.
2003 – SOA – Do You Know How Much You’re Spending? The Hidden Costs of Product Complexity, rsa03v29n38pd – Society of Actuaries – 19p
Tom Bakos
Tom Bakos
- Thomas L. Bakos: Anybody who believed an illustration that purported to demonstrate cost would be a foolish person.
1991 – SOA – Illustrations, Society of Actuaries — [BonkNote] — 20p
- One of the first things that a serious reader of the NAIC Life Insurance Illustrations Model Regulation will realize is that it is not a tightly written document.
— Thomas L. Bakos, Guardian, will speak as the appointed illustration actuary of a life insurance company
1996 – SOA – Implementing the Illustration Regulation: The Clock Is Ticking, Society of Actuaries – 25p
- Tom BAKOS: Well, I guess I’d just like to mention that I think actually UL was developed in 1960-something-or-other.
- FROM THE FLOOR: That was adjustable life.
- Tom BAKOS: I think Cannibal Life was the precursor.
2003 – SOA – Do You Know How Much You’re Spending? The Hidden Costs of Product Complexity, Society of Actuaries – 19p
- I think a point made earlier, and one I have certainly heard discussed, was that profit, or a measure of profit, does not need to be included in the derivation of a disciplined current scale.
- Although that may be theoretically true, it may be a practical impossibility to actually create a disciplined current scale with no profit because the self-support and lapse-support tests have to be met.
- It seems to me that a company cannot sell a policy and pay dividends or have other nonguaranteed elements that were derived on the basis of no profit. They have to reflect profit at some point in time.
- One of the results of this disclosure item is that when profit, which may not have been included before, is introduced into a currently payable scale, it would probably have to be disclosed at that time. It could be a little embarrassing.
— Thomas L. Bakos
1996 – SOA – Implementing the Illustration Regulation: The Clock Is Ticking, Society of Actuaries – 25p
1991 0729 – GOV (House) – Regulation of Insurance Companies and the Role of The National Association of Insurance Commissioners – NAIC – Ben Erdreich (D-AL)
1991 0729 – GOV (House) – Regulation of Insurance Companies and the Role of The National Association of Insurance Commissioners – NAIC – Ben Erdreich (D-AL)
- 1991 0729 – GOV (House) – Regulation of Insurance Companies and the Role of The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Ben Erdreich (D-AL) — [BonkNote]
- [PDF-286p-GooglePlay], VIDEO-?] ->Not on govinfo.gov – R
- GAO – 1991 0729 – GAO – Insurance Regulation: Assessment of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General General Government Programs, Before the Subcommittee on Policy Research and Insurance Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives – 57p
- ⇒ NAIC – Statement of Mike Weaver, Commissioner, State of Alabama – 8p
- House – Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs – Subcommittee on Policy Research and Insurance
- (p10) – Statement of Mike Weaver (Commissioner, State of Alabama) – A very recent example of that would be the Mutual Benefit situation where over $1 billion was withdrawn over a 2-week period of time. There are not many insurance companies nationwide that can withstand that thrust.
- The public has to have confidence in what is going on out there in all financial institutions, insurance being one of the major ones.
- (p13) – NAIC – William McCartney, Director of Insurance, State of Nebraska and Vice President, National Association of Insurance Commissioners
-
- We are seeing a real crisis in confidence:
- That, in my mind, is probably the worst thing that could happen.
- There is not a company in the country that can stand runs that Commissioner Weaver was talking about, where people ask for $1 billion in policy loans and surrenders in a 2-week period.
1991 0511 – NP -The Los Angeles Times – Insurance Firm Operations Cut by Garamendi, by Daniel M. Weintraub and Kathy M. Kristof
1991 0511 – The Los Angeles Times – Insurance Firm Operations Cut by Garamendi, by Daniel M. Weintraub and Kathy M. Kristof
- 1991 0511 – The Los Angeles Times – Insurance Firm Operations Cut by Garamendi, by Daniel M. Weintraub and Kathy M. Kristof – [link-BonkNote]
- Halting what he describes as a run on the bank,” State Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi placed severe operating restrictions on First Capital Life Insurance Co. but stopped short of seizing the troubled firm.
11 May 1991, Sat The Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, California) Newspapers.com
11 May 1991, Sat The Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, California) Newspapers.com
2023 1121 – FSRA – Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability
2023 1121 – FSRA – Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability
- 2023 1121 – FSRA – [2023-015] – Proposed guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability — [BonkNote] — [link] — 34p
- 2024 0209 – FSRA – [2023-015] – Comments – Consultation for Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability — [BonkNote] — [link]
- Open Date – November 21, 2023
- Comment Due Date – February 9, 2024
- 2024 0209 – FSRA – [2023-015] – Comments – Consultation for Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability — [BonkNote] — [link]
- 2023 1121 – FSRA – [2023-015] – Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability – Project — [BonkNote]
- 2023 1121 – FSRA – [2023-015] – Consultation for Proposed Guidance on Life Insurance Agent & MGA Licensing Suitability – BonkNote Comment — [BonkNote] – Private
- Contents
-
- Purpose………………………………………………………. 2
- Scope………………………………………………………….. 3
- Rationale and background …………………….. 5
- Interpretation …………………………………………… 7
- FSRA has broad authority to determine matters that are relevant to whether an agent, including an MGA, is suitable to be licensed under s. 392.4(1) of the Act……………………… 7
- FSRA’s assessment of suitability is also guided by its statutory mandate …………………………………. 8
- Misconduct impacts life agent and applicant suitability ……………. 9
- Key factors in FSRA’s framework for assessing the impact of conduct and activities on suitability ……………………………………11
- False statements and material omissions ……………………… 12
- Suitability – Additional considerations for corporate and partnership agents ……………………… 13
- Suitability – Additional considerations for Managing General Agencies (“MGAs”) …………………….. 14
- Insurers – Agent suitability responsibilities ………………………… 18
- Life agents may be held to be in a principal – Agent relationship ………………………………………….. 20
- Approach ……………………………………. 22
- Principles ……………………………………. 22
- Processes and practices ………….. 22
- Effective date and future review ………25
- About this Guidance ………………………26
- References …………………………………………26
- Appendix A ……………………………………….. 27
- Appendix B ……………………………………….. 29
- (p4) – In this Guidance, the term MGA refers to a corporate or partnership life insurance agency that deals with the public and engages in, or is required by contract to perform, any of the following activities on behalf of or in support of an insurer:
- Soliciting or submitting applications for insurance on behalf of agents who are associated with or under contract to the MGA, or affiliated with or under contract with the insurer on whose behalf the MGA is soliciting or submitting applications from life agents for insurance.
- Training agents who are affiliated with or under contract to the MGA or the insurer on whose behalf the MGA is providing training, or ensuring such agents are trained, with respect to insurance.
- Any functions historically performed by insurers when they had their own direct agent team as a dedicated/exclusive sales force.
- Other conduct, obligations, duties or activities which results in or could reasonably be expected to result in the activities listed immediately above.
- (p5) – Rationale and background – Licensing suitability under the Insurance Act
- Suitability is an ongoing requirement under the Act. FSRA assesses suitability when a new application for licensing is submitted, when a licence renewal or reinstatement is sought, and at any time FSRA deems appropriate.[5]
- 5 S. 7(1) of O. Reg. 347/04 provides that an application for the renewal of a licence must be made in the same manner as for a licence in the first instance. S. 8(a)-(d) of O. Reg. 347/04 provides that FSRA may suspend or revoke a licence on any grounds on which an application for a licence may be refused, if after due investigation andhearing, it appears to FSRA that the licensee:
- (d) has demonstrated incompetence or untrustworthiness to transact the insurance agency business for which the licence has been granted
- (p8) – FSRA’s assessment of suitability is also guided by its statutory mandate
- FSRA’s assessment of suitability is informed by its statutory mandate, including to:
- protect the rights and interests of consumers
- contribute to public confidence in the insurance sector
- promote high standards of business conduct
- deter deceptive or fraudulent conduct, practices and activities
- FSRA’s assessment of suitability is informed by its statutory mandate, including to:
- (p9-10) – Misconduct impacts life agent and applicant suitability
- In assessing an applicant’s or agent’s/MGA’s, suitability, FSRA will consider whether the applicant’s or agent’s, including an MGA’s, conduct or activities, past or present, may make them unsuitable to be licensed.
- Conduct or activities that create a risk that an agent, including an MGA, may fail to comply with the law or to treat customers fairly, or act contrary to legal and regulatory obligations, may demonstrate that an applicant or agent, including an MGA, is not suitable for licensing.
- The following are examples of conduct and circumstances that may make an applicant or agent, including an MGA, unsuitable. They include, without limitation:
- Failing to diligently perform any duty or activity that an agent, including an MGA, undertakes or agrees to perform on behalf of an insurer or another agent, or in support of an insurer’s obligations under the Act, under FSRA or multi-jurisdictional Guidance or under regulations or rules made under the Act, including obligations related to the recruitment, training or supervision of agents, treating customers fairly (including disclosures, suitability and after-sales servicing) and practices related to the underwriting, negotiation, contracting for and administration of insurance contracts.
- Any other behaviour relevant for the purposes of assessing suitability that engages the factors set out in the Agents Regulation.
- (p15) – The insurance products they and/or their individual agents distribute are sold in compliance with the Act, regulations, and FSRA rules and Guidance, given the unique elements of their business.
- (p16) – Whether the MGAs’ control and compliance functions are designed with regard to the size, complexity, operations, and risk profile associated with the MGA’s business. [26]
- For example, an MGA that focuses on recruitment of new individual life agents and candidates for licensing may require additional oversight and safeguards.
- (p16-17) – Improper practices impact the suitability of MGAs
- Practices that can or do contravene the Act, regulations, rules, or applicable FSRA or multijurisdictional Guidance, or are likely to lead individual agents associated with the MGA to do so, demonstrate that an MGA is not suitable for licensing.
- Examples of such practices include, without limitation:
- Using deceptive promotional material or tactics, or failing to take appropriate action where life agents do so.
- Disseminating deceptive or misleading information to life agents or others.
- Maintaining insufficient controls against unlicensed sales of insurance.
- Facilitating or acquiescing to unethical activity in the licensing, sales or contract administration processes.
- Offering, acquiescing to, or facilitating sales incentives that encourage sales that are not in accordance with regulatory requirements or that create conflicts of interest that are not adequately addressed through disclosure and other practices to mitigate and address such conflict (such as ensuring appropriate independent advice)
- (p18) – Insurers – Agent suitability responsibilities
- As such, insurers are required to screen agents, including MGAs, who act on their behalf and to monitor them on an ongoing basis. Insurers are accountable for these obligations but have flexibility in deciding how they comply with the outcomes-focused requirements outlined in the Interpretation section of this Guidance.
- To determine whether the insurers are adhering to their obligations, FSRA will assess them against the regulatory outcomes (e.g. the need to properly screen, train and oversee agents, including MGAs, to help ensure the fair treatment of consumers) rather than prescribing a particular path to achieve compliance (e.g. an insurer may directly screen, train and oversee agents or may, provided it has a reasonable system to ensure its reliance is reasonable, rely on MGAs or others to assist with one or more of those obligations).
- (p20) – Life agents may be held to be in a principal – Agent relationship
- Third parties such as FSRA and consumers may be entitled to rely on the law of agency (for example, under the doctrine of apparent authority) when an insurer and licensed agent deliver products and services collaboratively.
- (p21) – An Insurer or MGA may be held responsible for the actions of an agent by virtue of FSRA’s UDAP Rule
- Where there is a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of risk and the conduct authorized by the insurer or MGA, FSRA may, based on the specific factual circumstances, consider the insurer or the MGA, as is applicable, responsible for consumer harm which has been incurred or is likely to occur.
- FSRA interprets these requirements collectively to mean that where an insurer reasonably knows or should know that an agent, including an MGA, is not suitable to carry on business as an agent and fails to take action, the insurer will be responsible for the noncompliance of the agent, particularly if that non-compliance results in, or is likely to cause, consumer harm.[37]
- [37] This is because that where the non-compliance with the Act, regulations, FSRA rules and the agent’s license is reasonably foreseeable to the insurer, it is FSRA’s view that the insurer, as the principal on whose behalf the agent is acting, should be responsible for the risk to consumers based on the requirements of O. Reg. 347/04.
- (p27) – Appendix A – Suitability concerns – The following are examples of conduct or circumstances that may impact suitability.
- FSRA will review such concerns to determine the impact on suitability following the assessment factors identified in the Interpretation section and in Appendix B.
- [Bonk: Missing –
- (p29) – Appendix B – Key factors in FSRA’s framework for assessing the impact of conduct and activities on suitability
- 2020 1222 – FSRA – Fair Treatment of Customers in Insurance, Identifier: No. GR0008APP – 5p
- (p1) – This Approach confirms that the Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario (FSRA) will use Guidance: Conduct of Insurance Business and Fair Treatment of Customers (Guidance), adopted jointly by the Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators and the Canadian Insurance Services Regulatory Organizations on September 27, 2018, to supervise the conduct of insurers, and other entities FSRA regulates under the Insurance Act (Ontario), with respect to the fair treatment of customers.
- (p1) – Superintendent’s Guideline No. 03/18: Treating Financial Services Consumers Fairly, issued by the FSRA’s predecessor agency the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), remains in place for the supervision of conduct in the mortgage brokering, loan and trust, and credit union and caisse populaire sectors.
- (p2) – Rationale and Context
- The Guidance is based on Insurance Core Principle 19, Conduct of Business (ICP 19), set by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.[1] ICP 19 prescribes the elements that must be in place if insurers and intermediaries are to be deemed as treating their customers fairly, from before an insurance contract is entered into and through to the point at which all obligations under that contract have been met.
- (p3) – FSRA’s market conduct reviews of insurers continue to focus on the alignment of business functions with fair treatment of customers principles. In these, FSRA assesses insurers’:
- corporate governance
- agent training and outsourcing arrangements
- incentives and remuneration
- product marketing and advertising
- point-of-sale information
- claims handling
- complaint handling and dispute settlement
- (p4) – CCIR/CISRO Fair Treatment of Customers Working Group – ccir-ccrra.org/FairTreatmentofCustomersWorkingGroup
- Canadian Insurance Services Regulatory Organizations (CISRO) Principles of Conduct for Insurance Intermediaries – 3p
- (p1) – The Principles are intended to supplement, complement and build upon the intermediary elements in the
- 2018 – Guidance on Conduct of Insurance Business and Fair Treatment of Customers (FTC), issued by CISRO and the Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators (CCIR). – 28p
- The Principles also align with Insurance Core Principles (ICP) of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).1
- 1 International Association of Insurance Supervisors. Insurance Core Principles, ICP 18 and ICP 19, updated November 2019. https://www.iaisweb.org/page/supervisory-material/icp-on-line-tool
- (p1) – The Principles reinforce the fair treatment of Customers throughout the life cycle of the insurance product as a core component of the intermediary business culture. This includes conducting business in an honest and transparent manner. Expectations for the conduct of insurance business may differ depending on the nature of the relationship to the Customer, the type of insurance provided, and the distribution method. Intermediaries with oversight responsibilities must take appropriate measures to ensure that their employees and representatives meet high standards of ethics and integrity.2
- 2 The Insurer is responsible for fair treatment of Customers throughout the life cycle of the insurance product, as it is the Insurer that is the ultimate risk carrier. The Insurer’s ultimate responsibility does not absolve Intermediaries of their own responsibilities for which they are accountable.
- (p2) – 4. Advice: When providing advice to or for a Customer, Intermediaries are expected to seek appropriate information from the Customer in order to understand and identify their unique needs. Intermediaries are expected to provide objective, accurate and thorough advice that enables the Customer to make an informed decision. Advice is expected to be suitable for the needs of the Customer based on the Customer’s disclosed circumstances.
- (p2) – 5. Disclosure: Intermediaries are expected to provide Customers with objective, appropriate, relevant, timely and accurate information and explanations so that they can make informed decisions. Intermediaries are expected to:
- Properly disclose the information to all necessary parties, including the insurer; and
- Disclose information and explanations in a manner that is clear and understandable for Customers, regardless of the distribution model or medium used.
- (p2) – 6. Product and Service Promotion: Intermediaries are expected to ensure that products and services are promoted in a clear and fair manner. Regardless of the distribution model or medium used, Intermediaries are expected to ensure that promotions are not misleading, and are easy to understand. Product promotions are expected to disclose all necessary and appropriate information.
- (p2) – 7. Claims, Complaints Handling, and Dispute Resolution: Intermediaries are expected to handle or cooperate in the handling of claims, complaints and disputes in a timely and fair manner.
- (p3) – 9. Competence: Intermediaries are expected to maintain an appropriate level of professional knowledge, and should stay current through continuing education to ensure the fair treatment of Customers. Where applicable, continuing education requirements must be fulfilled. Intermediaries are expected to not misrepresent their level of competence or conduct business beyond their level of professional knowledge and experience, and duties must match training/education.
- (p3) – 10. Oversight: Intermediaries with contractual or regulatory oversight obligations are also responsible for the conduct of any employee or third party involved in the marketing, distribution or servicing of an insurance product. Intermediaries are expected to have tools at their disposal such as policies and procedures, training and control mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of Customers is achieved in relation to their oversight obligations.
- (p1) – The Principles are intended to supplement, complement and build upon the intermediary elements in the
2012 – Book – Law and Economics of Insurance, Edited by Daniel Schwarcz
2012 – Book – Law and Economics of Insurance
- 2012 – Book – Law and Economics of Insurance, Edited by Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School — [BonkNote]
- PART I INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE
- A. Adverse Selection
- 1. Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba (2002), ‘Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market’
- 2. Peter Siegelman (2004), ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat’ – 61p
- B. Moral Hazard
- 3. Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia (2004), ‘The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities’
- 4. Tom Baker (1996), ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’ – 59p
- A. Adverse Selection
- PART II INTERPRETING, REGULATING AND ENFORCING INSURANCE POLICIES
- A. Interpreting and Construing Insurance Policies
- B. Regulating the Content of Insurance Policies
- 7. Russell Korobkin (1999), ‘The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure’
- 8. Daniel Schwarcz (2007), ‘A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies’ – 76p
- C. Bad Faith Breach of Contract
- 9. Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘”Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers’ – 41p
- PART III LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. The Desirability of Liability Insurance
10. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘On Liability and Insurance’
11. George L. Priest (1989), ‘Insurability and Punitive Damages’ B. The Duty to Settle
12. Kent D. Syverud (1990), ‘The Duty to Settle’
13. Alan O. Sykes (1994), ‘Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique’
14. Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith (2007), ‘The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors” & Officers” Liability Insurer’
15. Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David Hyman and William M. Sage (2007), ‘Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003′
- Volume II:
- PART I REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS
- A. The Structure of Insurance Regulation
- 1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), ‘The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation’ – 76p
- 2. Martin F. Grace and Richard D. Phillips (2007), ‘The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation’ – 52p
- B. Solvency Regulation
- 3. J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington and Robert Klein (1995), ‘Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance’ – 17p
- 4. Scott E. Harrington (2005), ‘Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance’ – Edited version published in H. Scott, ed., Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel:
Banking, Securities, and Insurance, Oxford University Press, 2005- 2003 – AP – Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, by Scott E. Harrington – 49p
- C. Regulation and Risk Classification
- 5. Kenneth S. Abraham (1985), ‘Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification’
- 6. Michael Hoy and Michael Ruse (2005), ‘Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets’
- D. Price Regulation in Insurance Markets
- 7. Henry Grabowski, W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans (1989), ‘Price and Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation’
- 8. Mary A. Weiss, Sharon Tennyson and Laureen Regan (2010), ‘The Effects of Regulated Premium Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance’
- 9. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (2002), ‘Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California’
- E. Regulation and Insurance Policy Renewal
- 10. Mark V. Pauly, Howard Kunreuther and Richard Hirth (1995), ‘Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance’
- 11. Ronen Avraham and K.A.D. Camara (2007), ‘The Tragedy of the Human Commons’
- F. Regulating Insurance Demand
- A. The Structure of Insurance Regulation
- PART II PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKETS
A. Tort Law as Insurance- 14. Richard A. Epstein (1985), ‘Products Liability as an Insurance Market’
- 15. Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue (1990), ‘The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability’
- 16. Kenneth S. Reinker and David Rosenberg (2007), ‘Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge’
- B. Government Role in Catastrophe Insurance
- 17. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell (1997), ‘Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks’
- 18. J. David Cummins (2006), ‘Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?’
- 19. Howard Kunruether and Mark Pauly (2006), ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina’
IM Academy v. Marco Moukhaiber – Always Marco
IM Academy v. Marco Moukhaiber – Always Marco
- 2021 – LC – IM Academy v. Marco Moukhaiber – [Always Marco] — [BonkNote]
- International Markets Life Inc.v. d.b.a. IM Academy
- Court File No. – 2101-07692
- Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Calgary
- STATE CLAIM – INJUNCTION
- STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
- 2021 0208 – Always Marco – Infiltrating A Pyramid Scheme: IM Academy – [VIDEO-YouTube]
- Bob Proctor
- 28 – unverifiable and unfalsifiable
- 28 – different guys for different generations
- 30 – shame
- 2021 0507 – Always Marco – Exposing The Cult: IM Academy – [VIDEO-YouTube]
- 2021 0529 – Always Marco – Leaving The Cult: Why Fidel Left IM Academy – [VIDEO-YouTube]
- 2021 0818 – Coffeezilla – AlwaysMarco is Being Sued by IM Academy – [VIDEO-YouTube – 02:44:40]
- 2021 0828 – Coffeezilla – AlwaysMarco First Response After He Was Sued – [VIDEO-YouTube-28:30]
- – Robert Fitzpatrick – ftc useless
- Industry has roots, very deep
- we are the new generation. their generation didn’t have YouTube. Now we control the public perception, narrative,
- no, we have a voice
- Louis Rossman – phone repair guy
- James Janney-?
- Marco – People have to alert authorities of issues / problems because they aren’t aware of them
- 2024 0514 – Bloomberg – How the ‘Harvard of Trading’ Ruined Thousands of Young People’s Lives: IM Academy promises a Wall Street education. But instead of riches, many of its members have lost everything., by Alice Kantor – [link]
- [Always Marco] – Marco Moukhaiber, a former concert promoter turned YouTube vigilante, was in his condo in Edmonton, Alberta, in the summer of 2020 when he decided IM was his next target. He’d built a 93,000-person YouTube following with the release of video exposés of MLMs including health insurance company Primerica Inc. and telecom company ACN, and he’d already received cease-and-desist letters and threats of legal action from a few. Now his followers were directing him to IM. After weeks of research, Moukhaiber pretended to be interested in the platform and secretly recorded a recruiter telling him what IM had to offer.
- Six months later, on Feb. 8, 2021, Moukhaiber released a 40-minute VIDEO-YouTube-[Infiltrating A Pyramid Scheme: IM Academy] exposing Terry’s MLM history and the unsubstantiated claims IM consistently made about young adults getting rich from it. The video described the hundreds of thousands of young people who’d been left penniless and humiliated. Within a few days, it had clocked 590,000 views.
- Terry sued Moukhaiber for defamation. The YouTuber couldn’t afford a drawn-out legal battle, so he settled, agreeing not to make any more videos about IM. But the damage to the company was done. Videos were circulating by former IM subscribers denouncing the harm the company had inflicted on teenagers around the world.
- 2021 – LC – IM Academy v. Marco Moukhaiber – [Always Marco] — [BonkNote]
- [Always Marco] – Marco Moukhaiber, a former concert promoter turned YouTube vigilante, was in his condo in Edmonton, Alberta, in the summer of 2020 when he decided IM was his next target. He’d built a 93,000-person YouTube following with the release of video exposés of MLMs including health insurance company Primerica Inc. and telecom company ACN, and he’d already received cease-and-desist letters and threats of legal action from a few. Now his followers were directing him to IM. After weeks of research, Moukhaiber pretended to be interested in the platform and secretly recorded a recruiter telling him what IM had to offer.
Always Marco – Primerica
Always Marco – Primerica
- 2023 – LC – Primerica vs. Marco Moukhaiber – [Always Marco] — [BonkNote]
- Action No.: Q2303 13143
- Plaintiff – Primerica
- Defendant – Marco Moukhaiber – [Always Marco]
- 2023 – Infiltrating a Pyramid Scam: Primerica by AlwaysMarco – [VIDEO-YouTube-42:34]
- 2023 0901 – Coffeezilla – @AlwaysMarco Got Sued…AGAIN! Here’s Why! – [Primerica] – [VIDEO-YouTube-13:55]
- Action No.: Q2303 13143
- File Number: 1242844
- Plaintiff – Primerica
- Defendant – Marco Moukhaiber – Always Marco
- Court – Court of King’s Bench of Alberta
- Judicial Centre – Edmonton
- Document – Notice of Application
- 13:55 – Document – Statement of Claim
- reddit.com/r/antiMLM/comments/158jaep/always_marco_primerica_downprivate_anyone_know/
- <WishList – VIDEOS.
- [Bonk: VIDEO-YouTube – Mentioned in Lawsuit – Document ?-Find]
- 2021 1214 – Dec 4, 2021 – Debate with Primerica Recruiter Gary Kornegay — <WishList>
- 2023 0114 – Jan 14, 2023 – Marco vs Primerica — <WishList>
- 2023 0119 – Jan 19, 2023 – She Lost $100,000 in Primerica I Multi-Level Misery — <WishList>
- 2023 0123 – Jan 25, 2023 – Infiltration Successful… — <WishList>
- 2023 0130 – Jan 30, 2023 – 17-Year-Old Recruited To Primerica By His DAD I Multi-Level Misery — <WishList>
- 2023 0228 – Feb 28, 2023 – Betting Every Penny On Primerica I Multi-Level Misery — <WishList>
- 2023 0414 – April 14, 2023 – PRIMERICA lS threatening to sue me — <WishList>
- 2023 0714 – July 14, 2023 – Infiltrating A Pyramid Scheme: Primerica — by AlwaysMarco — [VIDEO-YouTube-42:34]
- 2023 0714 – July 14, 2023 – Mr. Moukhaiber made a guest appearance on a YouTube video posted by Pocket Watching with JT, entitled “Multi-level Marketing (MLM) SCAMS Exposed! with @AlwaysMarco” — [VIDEO-YouTube-01:53:07]
- 2023 0715 – July 15, 2023 – The Many Lies of Mario Arrizon — <WishList>
- 2023 0719 – July 19, 2023 – Gary Kornegay & Daniel Alonzo’s INSANE Interview — <WishList>
- Cease and Desist Letters
- April 14, 2023
- July 16, 2023
Primerica – VIDEOS
Primerica – Social Media
- 2023 – Infiltrating a Pyramid Scam: Primerica by AlwaysMarco – [VIDEO-YouTube-42:34]
- Always Marco – Primerica
- 2023 – LC – Primerica vs Marco Moukhaiber – Always Marco — [BonkNote]
- Always Marco – Primerica
- 2024 0418 – The Bear Cave Report – Primerica — [BonkNote]
- 2024 0418 – Report – The Bear Cave – Problems at Primerica (PRI), by Edwin Dorsey – [link]
- [Jeff Fieldstad]
- Team Freedom – youtube.com/@teamfreedom6973
- 2013 0827 – Team Freedom – Team Freedom Systems: Universal Life vs. Buy Term & Invest the Difference – [Jeff Fieldstad] – [VIDEO-YouTube-11:54]
- 2022 – Business Growth Fundamentals – SNSD Jeff Fieldstad – 2022/12/14 – [VIDEO-YouTube-01:16:31]
- 25 – I believe – Mutual Funds – 12%
- 72t
- 26 – Replacing Cash Value Life Insurance Policies like Crazy
- 27 – 10-12%
- 2024 0128 – BigMilkCartons – National Pyramid Scheme: An Exposé on Primerica – [VIDEO-YouTube-41:10]
- [Bonk: 3 more Primerica videos]
- – Andrew Wellington | Lyrical Asset Management on Why Primerica Stock – [VIDEO-YouTube]
- 2024 – BNI Nexus BNI Tampa – Rhonda Hemphill with Primerica – [VIDEO-YouTube-08:17
- Primerica is the Costco of Life Insurance
- Bad Rep sometimes
- Book – Brandon Dawson –
- 01:15 – Whole vs Term – UL = a form of Whole Life
- Renting Cash
- Doesn’t mean you get what you think you are getting.
- Verbage, Depending on agent, Medical / non-medical,
- 05 – 2 year clause, child riders,
- Primerica pays other companies don’t, 9/11, 2008
- 07:30 – Most companies are looking not to pay you.
- Paying $100 for referrals