Communications

  • William Koenig (Northwestern Mutual) suggested that the parties all needed a common understanding of the terms used in their discussion. (p655)

1993-4, NAIC Proceedings – Life Disclosure Working Group – NAIC




  • GOV to NAIC


  • NAIC to Government
  • 2009 0731 – NAIC to NYT – re: The New York Times July 30 article, “After Rescue, New Weakness Seen at A.I.G”, by Mary Williams Walsh – 1p
    • 2009 0730 – NYT – After Rescue, New Weakness Seen at A.I.G., by Mary Williams Walsh – [link]
  • 2013 1211 – Letter – Tom Leonardi (Connecticut Insurance Commissioner) to NAIC etc, re: Corporate Governance – 3p
    • “We have met the enemy and he is us!”
      • This famous line from the comic strip Pogo aptly describes the current state of governance at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
  • 2022 1024 – NAIC to NAIC – To: NAIC Members, From: Director Judith L. French, Chair
    Life Insurance and Annuities (A) Committee, RE: Survey Inquiry about Enhanced Cash Value Offers on Universal Life Insurance Policies – 8p
  • 2009 1030 – Letter – GOV – Issa (R-CA) to William C. Dudley, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York – 5p
  • 14. Paragraph 25: The comments regarding level playing field could be extended to noninsurance (ie investment-related) products offered by insurers.

2011 0926 – IAIS to OECD  – Comment on the OECD’s draft paper on Policyholder Protection Schemes: Selected Considerations 

  • IAIS to OECD Comment Letter – [Automatic Download – 5p]
  • OECD’s draft paper on Policyholder Protection Schemes: Selected Considerations – 64p
  • 39 – Comment on paragraph 39:
    • We suggest to mention that the appearance of conflict of interest can be as harmful to the reputation risk to the insurer or the industry than the conflict of interest itself.

— Autorite des marches financiers (Quebec) – lautorite.qc.ca/grand-public

2015 – IAIS – Compiled Comments on Consultation Document: Issues Paper on Conduct of Business Risk and its Management, Comments as compiled on 15 August 2015 – 37p

  • 2014 1008 –  Starr International Company, Inc. v. The United States – Case 1:11-cv-00779-TCW –  Trial Volume 8 – Geithner – 254p
    • (p62-63) – Q. Now, with respect to AIG, the financial problems that AIG had were financial problems that related to subsidiaries other than the insurance subsidiaries; correct?
    • A. I believe that’s true, but I couldn’t say with confidence today that there were not also problems in some of the insurance subsidiaries.
    • Q. In September of 2008, you were not aware of any problems in the insurance subsidiaries; correct?
    • A. I’m just being careful because I don’t think I could say with confidence today or even then what was the precise locus of the losses and the funding needs that were the basis for their coming to us and asking for assistance.
    • Q. Didn’t you speak to Mr. Dinallo, the insurance commissioner of New York?
    • A. I did.
    • Q. And didn’t he tell you that the insurance subsidiaries were stable and well-capitalized?
    • A. I don’t know if that’s exactly how he would have said it or generally how he would have said it.
    • Q. Is that the substance of what he conveyed to you, sir?
    • A. I guess the reason I’m being careful is because I don’t know the extent to which he could have spoken to all of AIG’s insurance subsidiaries. He could have spoken to those with respect to those within his jurisdiction I suspect, but I’m not sure he would have represented that with respect to the firm as a whole.
    • (p73) – Q. Let me show you Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit 2762.  This is a news release by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, dated September 16, 2008.

    • (p77) – Q. I mean, for example, if you look at the last paragraph and indeed the last sentence, where it says, “Strict solvency standards and keen financial oversight — based on conservative investment and accounting rules — continue to be the bedrock of state-based insurance regulation.” Do you see that?
    • A. I do.
    • Q. And did you understand that the point that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners were making were that the individual AIG insurance subsidiaries were stable and properly capitalized?
    • A. That is my sense. Yes.

    • Mr. Boies: Let me go back now to the issue with respect to the Doomsday Books.  <WishList>

NAIC - Index


Indexes

  • Dividend Index
  • Price Index
  • Volatility Index

Regulatory – Index

International – Index

  • 1985 – AP – A Non-Metric Multidimentional Scaling Analysis of Customer’ Attitudes to Life Insurance: An Empirical Investigation of Insured vs. Non-insured Attitudes Towards Life Insurance Purchasing Decision Variables in Egypt, by Galal Abd El-Haleem Harby – 331p
 

Government – Index

Risks – Index

Yield Index

  • Yield Index Advisory Committee – NAIC
  • 1989 – SOA – What Will Be The Life Insurance Products Of The Future, Society of Actuaries – 18p
  •  1987 – SOA – Regulatory Update, rsa87v13n216 – Society of Actuaries – 26p
    • The NAIC Yield Index Advisory Committee was started in the middle of 1984 at the behest of the regulatory community; notable among them is John Montgomery (California)
    • The main thing that triggered their interest in having such an advisory committee formed was what our committee came to call the big red 12% ad.
    • We have all seen lots of them.
      • “Buy the new Extravagance Plus policy with the Miller life –12%.”
      • And if there is any other text in the ad it is probably not much and certainly little, if any, of the conditions that pertain to the base on which the 12% is credited. The regulatory community started to become concerned about that advertising then.
    • That concern continues because you still see a lot of the ads.
  • 3. Make Recommendations on Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index
  • Mr. Foley explained that the concept of a yield index was very popular in the 1970s and early 1980s.
    • At that time the NAIC adopted a model regulation with an Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index.
    • California was the only state that adopted the Yield Index and Mr. Summers noted that it has since been repealed.
    • Mr. Foley noted that when the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation was revised at the Summer National Meeting all references to indices were deleted.
    • Mr. Batte moved, and Mr. Hartnedy seconded a motion to delete the Optional Form of Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index from the list of official NAIC model laws. The motion passed.

2000-3, NAIC Proceedings

  • 1984-2, NAIC Proceedings
    • 2. Adopted charges of advisory committee which include development of yield index (first priority) and study of test limits in the NAIC Model Life Insurance Disclosure Regulation.

  • 1988-1, NAIC Proceedings
    • Project No. 7a “Disclosure of Interest Yield Index:”
      • Questions had previously been raised as to whether the product rankings would be similar under the interest-adjusted index and the yield index for interest sensitive life insurance products, such as universal life plans.
  • 1991-2A, NAIC Proceedings
    • 5. Ratification of Amendments to the Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index. Mr. Strauss explained that when the Life Insurance Disclosure Mode] Regulation amendments were adopted in December 1990, identical amendments should have been made to the Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation With Yield Index. Upon motion duly made and seconded, the committee directed that the December 1990 amendments be made to the Optional Form of the Disclosure Regulation and directed that any future amendments to either model regulation be automatically made in the other model regulation unless there was specific wording to the contrary (Attachment Five-A).
  • 2000-3, NAIC Proceedings
    • Mr. Batte moved, and Mr. Hartnedy seconded a motion to delete the Optional Form of Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index from the list of official NAIC model laws. The motion passed.
  • John MacBain: I think the rationalization we’re seeing in pricing is motivated by a lot of things.
    • But it’s amazing how rational industry became when regulators started concentrating on solvency, and after the federal government started concentrating on our industry, after what happened to the savings and loans.
    • I think that has pushed us into more “rational behavior.”
    • And I, for one, am pleased because it’s brought the actuary much more into focus than a few years ago.
    • But I’m a little concerned that, if interest rates turn around and investment gains start to accrue, perhaps we will become less rational.
    • I’m glad to see that illustrations are becoming rational, although I’m not sure that what California did is rational, in terms of requiring this yield index, which absolutely nobody on the consumer side is going to understand.
    • But I’d be interested in getting a feel for whether the panel feels that, when the economy turns around and investment gains are more amendable, whether the pricing will continue to be as “rational”?

1994 – SOA – The Driving Forces Behind Participating – Universal Life (UL) – Nonguaranteed Element Product Development, Society of Actuaries – 12p

Issues and Debates